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Occupational regulation of many professions has grown 
in magnitude and complexity in the past fifty years. 
Statutes relating to occupational regulation are often 
implemented by state legislatures without sufficient 
quantitative analysis. 
Prior studies have analyzed the need for regulation 
to protect consumers. Some research has been published 
which addresses the differences in the quality of services 
offered by regulated and unregulated professions. Due to 
lack of data, the effect of state regulation on commercial 
income tax preparers has not been quantified. 
Recently data from the 1979 cycle of the Taxpayer 
Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP) have been made 
available by the Internal Revenue Serv·ice (IRS). TCMP is 
an IRS audit program that is used to estimate how well tax-
payers are complying with the income tax laws. Those data 
provide the opportunity for analysis relating to the 
question of the quality of services offered by commercial 
income tax preparers in regulated and unregulated states. 
The analysis evaluated differences in error rates or 
amounts between returns prepared in a highly regulated 
state--Oregon, a state with minimum regulation--California, 
and the remaining forty-eight unregulated states. Items 
were chosen from the tax returns to evaluate the integrity 
and competency of the commercial tax preparer, the effect 
of continuing education requirements and the accumulated 
effect of the totals of income, adjustments and deductions 
on the quality of the returns. 
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Descriptive statistics, cluster analysis, and non-
parametric methods were used in the research. Descriptive 
measures indicated that Oregon's error rates were among the 
lowest while California's errors were among the highest in 
the country. Cluster analysis grouped Oregon with states 
in the midwest while California grouped with other states 
in the sunbelt. 
The nonparametric tests indicated that Oregon's error 
rates and amounts were statistically smaller than the un-
regulated states. When Oregon was compared to the 
clustered states or to the states in the Northwest, the 
differences were not significant. When the tests were 
completed for the items chosen from California's returns, 
it was evident that the error rates were substantially 
higher on the samples from California than the unregulated 
states. When California's errors were considered relative 
to the states from the sunbelt, the results were similar 
although not as substantial. The final comparison was made 
relative to levels of regulation. The errors on the 
returns from California were significantly larger than 
those from Oregon in all of the areas tested. 
The data available from the 1979 TCMP audits are 
currently very limited. The IRS may be releasing the files 
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in the near future for general academic research. These 
files will provide excellent opportunities for expanded 
research on the topic of return preparation relative to the 
type of preparer and many other areas of tax compliance and 
administration. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Occupational regulation of many professions by state 
governments has grown in magnitude and complexity in the 
past fifty years. While the Supreme Court has called the 
right to make a living a man's most precious heritage 
(Barsky ~ Board of Regents, 1954: 659), states have 
limited the ability of workers to enter a myriad of pro-
fessions. Decisions relating to occupational regulation 
are made by state legislatures. Such statutes are based on 
testimony by individuals and groups directly affected. 
These statutes are often enacted without analysis and based 
on insufficient and inaccurate data. 
BACKGROUND 
Numerous authors have indicated that occupational 
regulation should be limited to professions where the 
potential of irreparable harm to consumers clearly out-
weighs the associated economic costs of regulation (Young, 
1986; Fellmeth, 1985; Kleiner, Gay and Greene, 1932; 
Elliott and Smith, 1978; and Stolar, 1976). The dif-
ferences in the quality of services provided by regulated 
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and unregulated professions has been analyzed in some 
professions; however, due to lack of data, the effect of 
state regulation of commercial income tax preparers has not 
been quantified. 
Oregon and California regulate commercial income tax 
preparers while the remaining states do not regulate this 
industry. Oregon licenses commercial income tax preparers, 
and requires passing scores on two examinations and con-
tinuing professional education for relicensing. California 
registers commercial tax preparers, requires completion of 
continuing professional education courses and posting of a 
performance bond for reregistration. 
The issue of regulation of commercial income tax 
preparers stems from interest in the topic at the federal 
level during the mid 1970s. The General Accounting Office 
(GAO) completed a study entitled No Apparent Need to 
Regulate Commercial Income Tax Preparers for Congress in 
1975. While the title indicates a clear-cut conclusion, 
the study itself left the issue of state regulation unre-
solved. 
The concluding comments from the GAO study are: 
The question remains whether regulation of the 
entire industry, including the professionals and 
others, is desirable in order to generally improve 
performance. 
We do not know. There is no data with which to 
estimate its potential benefits. Perhaps the 
experience of California and Oregon, states which 
recently adopted regulation, will provide some 
basis for future evaluation (GAO, 1975: 20). 
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STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
The problem of this study can be stated as: Are 
there relationships between the components of state regula-
tion of commercial income tax preparers and the quality of 
the service they provide to consumers as measured by the 
magnitude of errors and changes resulting from examination 
of a sample of completed tax returns? 
THE RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS 
A survey of the literature indicates that the number 
of regulated occupations has grown rapidly in the past 
fifty years. The studies cited indicate that regulation 
should be limited to fields where the consumer lacks enough 
information to choose the proper product or service. As 
the tax laws and tax forms have become more complex, many 
families have turned to commercial income tax preparers to 
help with the task of complying with the income tax regula-
tions. 
Very little re·search has been completed which 
evaluates the quality of services provided by regulated 
occupations. With the data available from the Taxpayer 
Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP) examinations, this 
research can address the issue of quality of services in 
the commercial tax preparation industry. 
The research hypothesis is that state regulation of 
commercial income tax preparers should improve the quality 
of income tax return preparation. 
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH 
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Commercial income tax preparers represent a specific 
segment of the tax preparation industry. Responses by tax-
payers during the TCMP examination indicated that 38 per-
cent of the returns were prepared by commercial preparers. 
Commercial preparers are independent individuals, employees 
of local and national tax services and public accountants. 
Certified Public Accountants and lawyer~ will be excluded 
from current consideration because they are regulated by 
all states. 
A clear and quantifiable basis for legislative deci-
sion making in expansion or reduction of state regulation 
of commercial income tax preparers does not exist. A way 
to establish such a basis for analysis would be to study 
differences among the returns prepared in Oregon, 
California and the remaining states. Such analysis should 
be based on knowledge of the underlying applicable income 
tax law. The results from such analysis would signifi-
cantly enhance the knowledge relative to the economic 
theory of occupational regulation and provide information 
for legislators making occupational regulatory decisions 
regarding tax preparation and other fields. 
5 
SCOPE OF THE DATA AVAILABLE 
Historically, research based on information obtained 
from examination of income tax returns has been limited by 
lack of data. Recently the Internal Revenue Service has 
made additional data sources available for academic 
research. ~mong these is the Taxpayer Compliance 
Measurement Program (TCMP) information. Data collected by 
the Internal Revenue Service in their 1979 cycle of the 
TCMP is categorized by thirteen types of tax return pre-
parers and can be sorted by state. The data base is com-
posed of information gathered from 55,000 randomly selected 
taxpayers. Answers to the Internal Revenue Service 
examiners' questions have been aggregated and arranged so 
that differences between amounts as reported and as 
corrected on approximately ninety items of income and 
deductions can be evaluated. These ninety items represent 
questions of tax treatment varying from the changes caused 
by arithmetic errors to complex issues of income tax law. 
OVERVIEW OF THE DISSERTATION 
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as 
follows. The second chapter reviews the relevant litera-
ture. A summary of the essays by Milton Friedman and 
Walter Gellhorn is used as a framework for the more current 
research on occupational regulation. The history of the 
tax preparation industry and the development of the 
national tax services in the 1950s are reviewed. Regula-
tion of commercial tax preparers in Oregon and California 
is considered. Federal research and the resulting tax 
legislation, including preparer penalties, are summarized. 
More recent research and current conflicting opinions on 
the need for regulation of commercial tax preparers are 
presented. 
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The third chapter describes the design of the study 
in more detail. The null hypotheses and their alternatives 
are presented. The fourth chapter contains the data 
description and analysis. The Taxpayer Compliance 
Measurement Program is described. The statistical methods 
are presented and compared. 
The results of the statistical analysis are presented 
and interpreted in Chapter v. The sixth and last chapter 
discusses the results, summarizes the conclusions, con-
siders the limitations and states the need for future 
research. 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Contemporary discussions of occupational regulation 
can be traced to the essays of two authors: Milton 
Friedman and Walter Gellhorn. A summary of their 
discussions is used as an outline for the survey of the 
literature on occupational licensure, followed by more spe-
cific discussions of the history and regulation of commer-
cial income tax preparers. 
OCCUPATIONAL REGULATION 
Views of the Major Authors 
Milton Friedman offers a conservative view of occupa-
tional licensure, making a case for dispensing with all 
state regulation of professional or occupational 
endeavors (Friedman, 1962: 138), while Gellhorn con-
centrates his research on the expansion of the number of 
occupations subject to licensing (Gellhorn, 1956: 106}. 
Gellhorn found that the right to work had been legis-
lated into a "most precarious condition" (Gellhorn, 1956: 
105} in all states and many occupations. Not only were 
traditional professions such as medicine and law affected, 
but the line between profession and occupation was blurred. 
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Historically, professions had been recognized because their 
"practice was based upon the theoretical study of a depart-
ment of learning" and "the individuals who follow them are 
bound to follow a certain mode of behavior and are so 
regarded by the public" (Gellhorn, 1956: 107). It has 
become more difficult to say which employment is "learned" 
and therefore a profession and which is not and therefo:-e 
an occupation (Gellhorn, 1956: 107). Many occupations are 
semi-professional, such as nursing, and require the mastery 
of a large body of knowledge (Gellhorn, 1956: 106). The 
walls between separate categories have been broken down and 
instead the difference between profession and occupation 
has become a difference in degree (Gellhorn, 1956: 108). 
By 1952, more than eighty separate occupations had 
been licensed by various state laws (Gellhorn, 1956: 106). 
The list included threshing machine operators, egg graders, 
pest controllers, yacht salesmen, tree surgeons, well 
diggers, tile layers and potato growers: all of these are 
occupations rather than professions (Gellhorn, 1956: 106). 
By the latter half of the 1970s, the list had been expanded 
to include more than 500 licensed occupations (Kleiner, 
1982: 383) • 
Gellhorn found that occupational licensing had rarely 
been imposed but rather it was induced. Only in rare 
instances had public recognition of scandalous conditions 
led to licensing against the wishes of the licensees; 
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usually the occupational group lobbied for regulation. The 
stated reason was to protect the public against so-called 
incompetent or unscrupulous individuals~ The unstated pur-
pose was to receive a competitive advantage or an enlarged 
inc:ome (Gellhorn, 1956: 109). 
The pattern of pressure for occupational regulation 
was similar all over the country: legislation had been 
enacted on behalf of a producer group (Friedman, 1962: 
139). Friedman found it surprising that there were not 
more licensing laws, rather than less, since the producer 
groups involved had an intense interest in the specific 
problems of their trade. Unfortunately, consumers had only 
a casual interest and were not motivated to go to the 
legislature to testify against restrictive legislation 
(Friedman, 1962: 143). 
Comparisons of modern occupational licensing and 
medieval guilds were drawn by both Gellhorn and Friedman. 
Guilds were originally concerned with the reputations of 
their members and early standards assured that all measured 
up to the prescribed norms of reliability. However, by the 
middle of the fourteenth century, the power of guilds 
expanded to the point that competition was restrained 
(Gellhorn, 1956: 113}. The guilds had developed organiza-
tions with control features designed to protect their mem-
bers and in time these controls brought the guilds into 
monopoly positions (Council of State Governments, 1952: 
10). Friedman considered the overthrow of the medieval 
guild system an indispensable early step in the rise of 
freedom in .the Western world {Friedman, 1962: 135). 
Self-Regulation 
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The term "self-regulation" was developed to describe 
the process of self governance by the regulated pro-
fessions. Self governance of medieval guilds, one of the 
oldest regulated occupations, was noted as early as the 
middle ages (Gellhorn, 1956: 118). The governing boards of 
regulated professions, composed of practicing members of 
the occupations, set prices, entrance requirements 
including length of apprenticeship, examination and 
entrance fees (Gellhorn, 1956: 117)., 
In a study of twenty-four occupations licensed in 
various states in 1940 and 1950, Alex Maurizi was able to 
show a substantial correlation between the passing rates on 
licensing examinations for new applicants and the excess 
demand for licensed practitioners in half the occupations 
he studied {Maurizi, 1974: 412). Maurizi was disturbed by 
the lack of correlation in the remaining SO percent of the 
cases (Maurizi, 1974: 412). He did not allow for the 
effect of national examinations which did not fall under 
the control of the individual state regulatory boards. For 
example, although the examination for accountancy was writ-
ten and graded as a national examination, Maurizi found 
correlations for accountancy passing scores and excess 
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demand for licensed practitioners significant at the 1 per-
cent level (Maurizi, 1974: 406). Maurizi's study is cited 
as evidence that state licensing boards alter the pass rate 
of examinations to control the number of new licensees but 
his results may not support that conclusion. 
Seventy-five percent of the occupational licensing 
boards were composed exclusively of licensed practitioners 
in the respective occupations by 1952 (Gellhorn, 1956: 
140). These members made decisions in professions where 
they had a direct economic interest; they were directly 
representative of the organized groups with the occupation 
they were governing (Gellhorn, 1956: 140). 
There has been concern by policy makers that self-
regulating professions set entrance standards too high and 
have been insensitive to complaints by consumers against 
their members (Shaked, 1981: 217). The argument is still 
made to legislators by trade associations that only a board 
chosen from the regulated occupation can have the technical 
expertise required for evaluation of license applicants 
(Fellmeth, 1985: 16; Friedman, 1962: 140). 
Avner Shaked and John Sutton developed a mathematical 
model of self-regulation which indicated that granting of 
monopolistic powers to the self-regulating professions was 
likely to result in an economic welfare loss and that per-
mitting the entry of rival paraprofessionals was welfare 
improving (Shaked, 1981: 233). 
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Constitutional Validity 
According to the u.s. Supreme Court, the liberty of 
which one may not be deprived without due process includes: 
••• the right of the citizen to be free in the 
enjoyment of all his facultiesi to be free to use 
them in all lawful waysi to live and work where he 
willi to earn his livelihood by any lawful 
calling ••• (Allgeyer~ Louisana, 1897: 578). 
Statutes, ordinances and regulations speak to what 
callings are "lawful." The state cannot, "under guise of 
protecting the public, arbitrarily interfere with private 
business or prohibit lawful occupations or impose unreason-
able or unnecessary restrictions upon them" (Burns Baking 
~~Bryan, 1924: 504, 513). These words have little 
impact as legislatures, not courts, consider whether a 
measure is reasonably needed to protect the public health, 
welfare or safety. The Supreme Court has presumed that a 
legislature had sufficient knowledge to support its 
judgment that the legislation was in the public interest. 
Only in rare circumstances would the courts interfere with 
legislative decisions regarding occupational regulation 
(Gellhorn, 1956: 119). 
Interstate Mobility 
Gellhorn stated that licensing laws would soon anchor 
Americans by local residence requirements as a condition of 
license eligibility even though these restrictions were not 
related to public health, safety, or welfare (Gellhorn, 
1956: 126). In 1980, Leila Pratt used data from the 1960 
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census to study labor migration patterns and concluded that 
the greater the number of states licensing an occupation, 
the more restricted would be the mobility of the worker 
(Pratt, 1980: 79). Morris Kleiner also attempted to 
measure the effect on migration patterns of state occupa-
tional licensing of fourteen occupations (Kleiner, 1982: 
383). Using data from the 1970 census and similar statis-
tical methods to those used by Pratt, Kleiner found that 
more restrictive state licensing statutes reduced in-
migration and were significantly related to increases in 
the earnings of the persons in the professions (Kleiner, 
1982: 383). 
Levels of Regulation 
To effectively state the case against regulation, 
Friedman considered it important to clearly distinguish 
between the three different levels of regulation: 
registration, certification, and licensing (Friedman, 1962: 
144). 
Registration is an arrangement under which certain 
individuals are required to list their names in an official 
register in order to pursue certain occupations. Registra-
tion often includes a requirement that the applicant obtain 
insurance or bonding (Fellmeth, 1985: 144). 
Certification involves an agency which certifies that 
an individual has certain skills to provide a professional 
service. Certification, both voluntary and compulsory, can 
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lower information costs about a product or service to 
buyers (Hoskins, 1986: 15). Even if certification is 
voluntary, it often serves as an intermediate stage in more 
restrictive regulation. For example, in many states there 
has been a tendency to restrict an increasing range of 
activities to certified public accountants (Friedman, 1962: 
144). 
Finally, licensing restricts the practice of an 
occupation to those who have demonstrated a competency by 
examinat.ion. Licensing is "the granting by some competent 
authority of a right or permission to carry on a business 
or do an act which would otherwise be illegal" (Council of 
State Governments, 1952: 5). 
Under which conditions could each of these levels of 
regulation be justified? Registration could be justified 
for the sake of the information it provided, as a device to 
facilitate taxation or as a means to protect consumers 
against fraud (Friedman, 1962: 145). If registration 
required insurance or bonding, consumers would have the 
opportunity to collect damages on civil judgments 
(Fellmeth, 1985: 5). 
Friedman found certification more difficult to 
justify because the private market could efficiently pro-
vide information (Friedman, 1962: 146). Gellhorn would opt 
for certification in many instances to replace licensing 
(Gellhorn, 1956: 147). 
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Gellhorn found licensing a reasonable regulation 
where the consumer did not possess enough information to 
choose the person to serve him or her (Gellhorn, 1956: 
146). Friedman found licensure unjustifiable because it 
denied the rights of individuals to enter into voluntary 
contracts. Licensure could only be justified on the 
grounds of neighborhood effects. The most obvious example 
of neighborhood effects is the incompetent physician who 
produces an epidemic (Friedman, 1962: 147). 
The Medical Profession 
Friedman used the medical profession as an example of 
the social and economic cost of regulation to illustrate 
his point against licensure. Regulation allowed the pro-
ducer group to obtain a monopoly position (Friedman, 1962: 
148). The American Medical Association was the strongest 
trade union in the United States. It was able to effec-
tively control entrance into the medical profession by 
controlling admission to approved medical schools and the 
membership of the state medical licensing boards (Friedman, 
1962: 150). 
Following Friedman's discussion of the monopoly 
created by the medical profession, a number of authors con-
sidered the questions he raised. Chris Paul summarized 
these studies, stating that economists generally believed 
that the medical profession earned above normal returns by 
restricting entry into their profession (Paul, 1982: 559). 
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Paul then extended the general theory of regulation to the 
case G-f a self-:a:"~gulating profession, the structure of 
regulation in medicine. Paul presented a model of self-
regulatory behavior and tested the model's implications for 
the medical profession. He found that where licensing 
boards were controlled directly by the medical profession, 
physi1::ians • incomes were significantly higher for both 
years he tested (Paul, 1982: 568). Paul was also 
interested in the reasons behind the regulation of the 
medical profession and the resultant quality of medical 
care. Paul's research found no support for the contention 
that physicians were initially regulated at the behest of 
the general population (Paul, 1984: 27). Also his research 
found no support for the contention that state licensing of 
physicians improved the quality of medical care (Paul, 
1984: 27) • 
Restricted Entry and Quality of Service 
Does licensure provide the public with assurance of 
at least minimum quality? As stated earlier, Gellhorn 
found that some forms of regulation were useful where the 
consumer lacked information since one of the traditional 
elements necessary for the marketplace to function effi-
ciently is sufficient information. 
In his study of regulated professions, Hayne Leland 
questioned the economic justifications for regulating 
quality. Minimum quality was expressed as a minimum level 
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of competence to pass a professional examination (Leland, 
1979: 1329). Leland found that markets which had minimum 
quality standards tended to be characterized by information 
asymmetry, in which the seller knew the quality of his ser-
vice or product, but the buyer did not (Leland, 1979: 
1329). Quality is defined as quality of services or 
quality of products (Leland, 1979: 1330). Leland developed 
a model of markets with asymmetric information and studied 
the nature of market failure. He found that minimum 
quality standards in such markets may be socially 
desirable, but if the professional group was allowed to set 
the minimum quality standards (self-regulation), these 
standards may be set too high (Leland, 1979: 1342). 
Stuart Dorsey extended these studies to the effect of 
licensing on the excluded worker. He found that blacks, 
the less educated and apprentices were more likely to fail 
licensing examinations even though they did not appear to 
be less able than other workers who were admitted to the 
licensed professions (Dorsey, 1980: 424). 
Leland continued the modeling of markets with asym-
metric information and found that if one firm tried to 
improve quality in a market lacking information, the con-
sumer had no way to recognize the improvement in quality 
(Leland, 1979: 1339). Any firm undertaking quality 
improvements in this type of market would'bear the full 
cost of those improvements. In a market with a large 
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number of competing firms, no benefits would accrue to the 
individual firms and the optimal level of investment in 
quality improvement would be zero (Leland, 1979: 1339). 
Thus, he found that a market which should be regulated 
tended to remain at the lowest level of quality required by 
the regulatory standards. 
Educational Testing Service funded research on the 
effectiveness of occupational licensing and these studies 
concluded that the public was often deluded by licensing 
laws which did not require reexamination or evidence of 
continued competency (Shimberg, 1973: 33). Persons 
entering the licensed occupations may need to meet rigid 
requirements but often did not have to demonstrate that 
they had maintained their skills. Licenses could be 
renewed indefinitely on payment of the appropriate fee 
(Shimberg, 1973, 33). 
Further, new licensing legislation often contained a 
"grandfather clause" which exempted those already practicing 
and the public had no way of knowing which practitioners 
were "grandfathers" (Shimberg, 1973: 33). 
Conclusions 
Gellhorn concluded that occupational licensing had 
gone too far; it compressed the economy and stratified 
society (Gellhorn, 1956: 144). Still, he stated that the 
abuses of licensing did not entirely obscure its utility; 
it did afford protection to the public. Occupational 
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licensing should save the public from being victimized, not 
be used as an economic weapon to strengthen the licensees 
(Gellhorn, 1956: 145). Occupational licensing, then, 
should be reserved for special cases where the consumer did 
not possess enough information to choose (Gellhorn, 1956: 
146). He also found a second special case for licensing 
might arise where theoretical training was a necessary step 
toward achieving occupational competence (Gellhorn, 1956: 
146). Following the theory that limited licensing serves 
the public interest Gellhorn concluded: 
In occupational licensing, the choice is not 
between some regulation and none. The choice is 
between licensing for the sake of the occupations 
and, on the other hand, licensing for the sake of 
the public at large (Gellhorn, 1956: 151). 
Friedman took a much more conservative position and 
summed up the problems of all types of regulations as 
follows: 
The most obvious social cost is that any one of 
these measures, whether it be registration, certi-
fication, or licensure, almost inevitably becomes 
a tool in the hands of a special producer group to 
obtain a monopoly position at the expense of the 
rest of the public (Friedman, 1962: 148). 
The discussion of the relative merits of occupational 
regulation was still continuing during the year of the IRS 
TCMP study. In an address before the American Enterprise 
Institute Occupational Licensure Conference in 1979, 
Michael Pertschuk, Chairman of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion, stated that he believed licensing was both a cause 
of and a response to the problem of quality of services 
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in regulated occupations. Licensing allowed the government 
to step in where consumers were unable to evaluate bundles 
of diagnoses and services, but it became a vehicle for the 
dominance and exclusive authority of a profession 
(Pertschuk, 1979: 34). To illustrate his point on the ina-
bility of licensing to ensure competence and integrity of 
those who offered services, he quoted studies estimating 
that 33 cents of every dollar spent in 1978 on automobile 
repairs went for unnecessary work and that two million 
Americans underwent surgical procedures that were unne-
cessary at a cost of ten thousand lives and $4 billion 
dollars (Pertschuk, 1979: 34). He also compared the 
quality of television repairs in Louisiana, where repairers 
were licensed, to the District of Columbia, where no 
licensing was present: both areas had the same incidence 
of unnecessary repairs (Pertschuk, 1979: 35). 
The literature review reveals that the marketplace 
does not always function efficiently and regulation may be 
warranted but the growth of that regulation has been 
nhaphazard, uncoordinated, and chaoticn (Shimberg, 1972: 
1). Government regulation protects the public but also the 
licensees. Does it increase costs, limit competition, 
restrict entry and reduce mobility? Most pertinent, what 
is the effect on quality of services offered? With this 
introdu~tion to occupational regulation and the reference 
to the quality of services provided by regulated 
occupations, the discussion turns to the history of the 
regulation of commercial tax preparers--the occupation to 
be considered. 
THE TAX PREPARATION INDUSTRY 
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The tax preparation industry is composed of two 
segments. The first segment is comprised of the commercial 
tax preparers who are the local and national tax services, 
bookkeeping services and public accountants. Commercial 
tax preparers are regulated in two states: Oregon and 
California. Public accountants are fully regulated in nine 
states, subject to some regulation in six states and unre-
gulated in the remaining states (National Association of 
State Boards of Accountancy, 1979: 2). The second segment 
of the industry is the professional preparers, comprised of 
the certified public accountants and attorneys. 
Professional preparers are regulated at the state level in 
every jurisdiction. 
History of the Tax Preparer 
The federal income tax law of 1913 resulted in a 
progressive tax with low rates based on income which 
affected only the higher income Americans. Accountants 
prepared many of the early income tax returns. The first 
accountancy regulations passed in the United States were 
"certification" laws only. These statutes restricted the 
title Certified Public Accountant (CPA) but not the scope 
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of accounting practice (Young, 1986: 10). By 1929, the New 
York State Bar Association's Committee on the Scope and 
Practice of Law reported that: 
The great field of taxation. • • has been all but 
taken over by the accountant fraternity, which 
seems to have proved itself the more fit to survive 
in such environment (Gri~wold, 1955: 131). 
As the income tax became broader and more complex, 
attorneys began to prepare returns and set out to protect 
their turf, the practice of law, against CPAs and public 
accountantse By the 1950's, the practice of preparing 
returns for compensation became much more commonplace and 
the CPAs and public accountants joined forces to protect 
their tax practices against attorneys. 
Meanwhile, another segment of the industry was 
emerging: the commercial tax preparer. The commercial 
preparer, as we recognize the industry today in the form of 
national tax services, began in 1955 when Henry and Robert 
Bloch (later changed to Block) expanded their public 
accounting practice mainly devoted to tax return prepara-
tion on a franchise basis across the country. The Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) had discontinued the preparation of 
tax returns for taxpayers in 1954 (Legislative Research, 
1982: 1)• Raymond Harless, Deputy Commissioner of the IRS 
in 1973, stated that the reasons for the discontinuance of 
tax preparation by the IRS had been threefold: increasing 
number of taxpayers, increasing IRS responsibilities and no 
increase in agency resources (Harless, 1973: 13). During 
the same time period, the simpler tax forms were discon-
tinued which eliminated the easy methods of filing tax 
returns for middle-income taxpayers. 
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Attorneys and CPAs did not have the personnel or 
interest in filling out the simpler returns and the commer-
cial tax preparers satisfied the increasing demand for 
inexpensive tax preparation. By 1970, Forbes (Editorial, 
1970) reported that commercial tax preparation was a mature 
industry. H&R Block had revenues of $53 million from pre-
paration of seven million tax returns in four thousand 
offices across the country. However, problems in the com-
mercial preparer industry were developing: competition, 
rising costs and inability to acquire and train adequate 
personnel. 
With this expansion of commercial tax return prepara-
tion came national attention to reports of negligence and 
fraud in the late 1960s and early 1970s. By 1971, H&R 
Bloc~ had grown to five thousand offices (Sager, 1971: 24). 
The total number of persons preparing tax returns commer-
cially was estimated at 200,000 (Simonetti, 1972: 348). 
~ational attention was focused on H&R Block and Beneficial 
Finance in 1971 when the Federal Trade Commission accused 
them of false advertising and illegally using confidential 
information supplied by customers (Gray, 1971: 555). 
There was also concern about smaller unscrupulous 
local tax preparers, the so-called "fly-by-night 
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operators," in business across the country. These were 
preparers who set up store-front tax services during the 
four-month tax season and then disappeared, often with tax-
payers• records and their refund checks (Legislative 
Research, 1982: 5). 
Because of the problems, the IRS, using a "shopping 
technique," initiated studies of tax preparers. An IRS 
agent posing as a client went to a return preparer with a 
predetermined set of information for income and deductions 
together with a cover story about his occupation and family 
status (Hanlon, 1973: 9). The studies received national 
attention in 1972 because of erroneous reporting of the 
findings. It was reported that 60 percent of the returns 
prepared for undercover agents contained improprieties 
(Hanlon, 1973: 8). Early reports failed to mention that 
undercover agents only visited preparers already suspected 
of incompetence or unscrupulous behavior (Hanlon, 1973: 8). 
During 1972, the IRS contacted 3,241 tax preparers 
suspected of incompetence or illegal activities. The IRS 
expanded the study during the subsequent season to include 
about six thousand preparers. The preparers contacted 
during 1973 were not under suspicion of unethical prac-
tices. Legal actions were taken against 404 preparers from 
the 1972 study and 318 preparers from the 1973 study 
(Hanlon, 1973: 11). 
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In summary, the IRS studies indicated that commercial 
preparers claimed fictitious deductions or increased the 
number of exemptions claimed to reduce the taxpayer's 
liability or achieve refunds (Hanigsberg, 1980: 19). 
Much was written in national journals in the early 
1970s about the problems in the commercial tax preparer 
industry. Many of the articles appeared in the National 
Public Accountant, the journal of the National Association 
of Public Accountants. The notoriety associated with the 
commercial tax preparation industry was damaging to the 
public accountants' image and was another added problem in 
their losing battle to maintain themselves as a regulated 
profession. 
The largest portion of the commercial tax preparation 
industry was composed of the local and national tax ser-
vices. These groups, together with the public accountants, 
in Oregon and California gathered forces to protect their 
reputations and called on the state legislatures to regu-
late the industry. 
State Regulation of Commercial Income Tax Preparers 
While hearings were in progress in Washington, D.C., 
on federal regulation of tax preparers, regulatory laws 
were enacted in two states. California enacted a registra-
tion law and Oregon enacted a licensing law. 
Regulation of Commercial Tax Preparers in Oregon. 
Oregon Income Tax Services Law, ORS 673.605 to 673.735 
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(1973) contains the regulatory requirements for tax 
preparers and consultants. Persons who prepare, advise or 
assist in the preparation of personal income tax returns 
must be licensed in Oregon as tax consultants or tax pre-
parers. Only tax consultants may offer their services 
directly to the public. Tax preparers must work under the 
supervision of a tax consultant, an attorney, a public 
accountant or a CPA. 
To become a licensed tax preparer, an applicant must 
be at least age 18, hold a high school diploma, complete an 
approved 60-hour income tax course, and pass an examina-
tion. To become licensed as a tax consultant, an applicant 
must meet the requirements for a tax preparer, be employed 
for at least two seasons as a tax preparer and pass 
another, more difficult examination (Legislative Research, 
1982: 4). For license renewal, licensees must submit proof 
of at least 60 hours of continuing education courses every 
three years. 
History of the Oregon Law. The principal proponent 
of the original law was the Association of Tax Consultants, 
an organization formed in 1973 to upgrade the profession 
through establishment of a state licensing program (Legis-
lative Research, 1982: 11). Sponsors of the legislation 
cited fraud and negligence uncovered by the IRS studies and 
erroneous and fraudulent returns found among those prepared 
by Oregon preparers. The incidence of fraud in Oregon re-
turns was nat documented (Legislative Research, 1982: 12). 
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The legislation contained a "grandfather" clause 
which resulted in the iicensing of 1,789 preparers without 
examination. This clause drew substantial criticism which 
nearly defeated the legislation. The law was amended 
slightly in 1975 and 1977. The legislative minutes 
relating to the amendments show continuing concern that the 
law was protecting members of the industry from competition 
rather than protecting consumers from incompetent preparers 
(Legislative Research, 1982: 14). 
The Oregon State Board of Tax Service Examiners, 
composed of five members of the profession, prepares, 
administers and grades examinations for preparer and con-
sultant applicants (Legislative Research, 1982: 27). 
Some assistance in preparation and grading was obtained 
from Oregon universities, but as of 1982, the licensing 
examinations still had not been formally validated 
(Legislative Research, 1982: 19). 
During the period from 1973 through June 1982, the 
Board considered 938 consumer complaints. The most common 
consumer complaints were for poorly prepared returns, 
excessive fees, failure to return clients' records, and 
inability to locate licensees after tax season (Legislative 
Research, 1982: 23). Action taken by the Board against tax 
consultants included eight fines ranging from $250 to 
$1,000. Also, a total of $9,200 had been assessed against 
25 persons found guilty of preparing income tax returns 
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without a license, representing 60 percent of the penalties 
assessed (Legislative Research, 1982: 25). 
In September of 1982, the Oregon Board of Tax Service 
Examiners was reviewed as a part of an ongoing "sunset" 
review process. Oregon's 0 sunset0 law terminates a regula-
tory agency unless that agency has demonstrated 0 a public 
need for its continued existence" (ORS 182.625). According 
to the Board, licensing was necessary to insure "improved 
and more competent tax service" (Legislative Research, 
1982: 30). 
During the 1982 review. officials of both the State 
Department of Revenue and the District Office of the IRS 
sent letters in support of state regulation of commercial 
tax preparers. No quantitative data was offered in connec-
tion with the review since the information provided by tax-
payers on tax returns is confidential, and regulatory 
agencies, such as the Board, did not have access to tax 
returns to evaluate the performance of their licensees. As 
a result of the 1982 "sunset" review, the Oregon State 
Board of Tax Service Examiners continued as the regulatory 
board for the commercial tax preparation industry in Oregon. 
Regulation in California. Under the legislation 
enacted in 1973 in California, tax preparers were required 
to register with the state's Department of Consumer Affairs 
(California Business & Professional Code Sections 
9891-9891.44, repealed 1982). There were no educational or 
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examination standards but preparers had to deposit a $1,000 
bond and renew registrations regularly {Legislative 
Research, 1982: 9). 
A study of tax preparer regulation in California was 
commissioned in 1976 by the Consumer Affairs Department and 
in 1978 the Consumer Affairs Department made an extensive 
study of occupational licensing, including a case study of 
the tax preparer progr.am. The study recommended the 
program be "sunsetted" since the registration program, 
while "administered with diligence," had only "a minimal 
capacity" to protect consumers or upgrade the quality of 
the profession {California Department of Consumer Affairs, 
1978: B-9). 
In 1977, a bill establishing a licensing board and 
requiring examinations passed the California legislature 
but was vetoed by the governor (Legislative Research, 1982: 
9). Funding for California's tax preparer program was 
discontinued in 1981~ the law was repealed June 30, 1982 
(Legislative Research, 1982: 9). 
Tax preparers were again regulated in California by 
the end of 1982. Section 9891, California Business and 
Professions Code required registration and bonding 
(increased to $2,000) of all commercial tax preparers. 
Every person wishing to register as a tax preparer had to 
be at least 18 years old and either possess a high school 
diploma or equivalent. This legislation required the 
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applicant to show proof of 20 hours of continuing education 
each year for reregistration. The law was revised in 1983 
to specifically exempt any person regulated by the 
California State Board of Accountancy, members of the State 
Bar of California and any person enrolled or authorized to 
practice before the Internal Revenue Service. Minor revi-
sions to the regulatory statutes were enacted in 1985 and 
1986, and as of the current date commercial tax preparers 
are required to register in California. 
Research on Quality of Tax Return Preparation 
Hearings at the federal level resulted in the request 
for a study of the quality of tax returns prepared by both 
commercial and professional return preparers. 
Federal Research. The 1975 report to Congress by the 
Comptroller General (quoted as General Accounting Office 
report) concluded that there was no apparent need to regu-
late commercial income tax pre9arers at the federal level. 
The conclusions were based on a study made of 1971 tax 
returns filed in 1972 and data collected from approximately 
five thousand individual 1972 and 1973 tax returns audited 
by IRS examiners in six districts (General Accounting 
Office, 1975: 3). The 1971 returns were from the sample of 
returns selected for the Taxpayer Compliance Measurement 
Program and the 1972 and 1973 returns were chosen from 
returns audited in the normal course of operations in the 
six. districts. 
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The report classified public accountants as pro-
fessional preparers with CPAs and attorneys and aggregated 
the remainder of preparer types as commercial preparers 
(General Accounting Office, 1975: 4). 
The report analyzed low- and medium-income nonbusiness 
tax returns, Schedule C low-income business returns and 
Schedule F low-income farm business returns. About 70 per-
cent of all commercially and professionally prepared 
returns fell into these four categories (General Accounting 
Office, 1975: 5). 
Commercial preparers were responsible for 28 percent 
of the returns while professional preparers completed ~5.4 
percent of the returns (General Accounting Office, 1975: 
6). The average error for commercially prepared returns 
was $156 representing an average 14 percent change in the 
amount of tax (General Accounting Office, 1975: 6). 
There was not a significant difference between the errors 
made by the different types of tax preparers on the types 
of returns analyzed; therefore, the conclusion was drawn 
that federal licensing of commercial tax preparers was not 
needed (General Accounting Office, 1975: 20). Tax pre-
parer penalties applicable to all types of tax preparers 
were recommended (General Accounting Office, 1975: 20) and 
later enacted as part of the 1976 federal tax legislation. 
The General Accounting Office report did conclude 
that there was .no apparent need to regulate commercial tax 
preparers at the federal level but addressed the issue of 
the lack of data. The conclusion called for further 
research on performance whe:u the data from Oregon and 
California's regulation of commercial tax preparers would 
be available to estimate the potential benefits of state 
regulation (General Accounting Office, 1975: 20). 
California Tax Preparer Research Project. In 1976, 
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the California Department of Consumer Affairs couw.issioned 
a study of commercial tax preparation in California by a 
regional research firm. A sample of 477 preparers was 
visited using the "shopping" technique of the 1972 and 1973 
IRS studies. The research firm found that: 
1. Ninety-nine percent of the returns were 
inaccurately prepared although registered 
preparers were more accurate than unregis-
tered preparers. Almost three-quarters of 
the returns reported a higher liability for 
the taxpayer than was necessary (Kaplan, 
1976: 11). 
2. Accuracy was directly related to the simpli-
city of the applicable tax regulation 
(Kaplan, 1976: 11). 
3. Almost half of the test returns did not 
contain all necessary forms or all requested 
informational items (Kaplan, 1976: 21). 
4. While returns were incorrectly prepared, 
there were no widespread fraudulent 
practices (Kaplan, 1976: 32). 
5. More than 80 percent of the sampled 
preparers were registered with the California 
Tax Preparer Program (Kaplan, 1976: 40). 
6. Overall, franchise preparers (example: H&R 
Block) performed better than independent 
tax or bookkeeping services (Kaplan, 1976: 
43) • 
Their findings suggested that: 
• • • consumers utilizing commercial preparers do 
not even have a fifty-fifty chance of obtaining a 
complete, accurate income tax preparation which 
reflects their minimum liability under applicable 
tax regulations (Kaplan, 1976: cove~ letter)v 
Federal Regulation 
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While regulatory statutes brought state regulation of 
commercial tax preparers in Oregon and California, Congress 
was considering legislation at the federal level regulating 
the preparation of federal income tax returns. 
In 1974, several bills were introduced in Congress 
relating to licensing or regulation of commercial tax pre-
parers. The General Accounting Office study indicated 
that there was not any significant difference in the error 
rate between professional and commercial preparers, which 
brought about far-reaching regulation of all tax return 
preparers. 
The 1976 Tax Legislation 
Congress sought to solve the problems uncovered by 
the IRS studies in 1972 and 1973 with the legislation 
enacted in 1976. The provisions of the Tax Reform Act of 
1976 (P.L. 94-455) marked a significant change in require-
ments for tax preparers. Prior to 1976, preparers were 
required to sign returns; however, there was no penalty if 
the preparer failed to sign. Criminal sanctions had been 
available only if the preparer acted in a willful or 
-----------------
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intentional way so as to produce a fraudulent return. The 
preparer could then be assessed criminal fraud penalties 
but the burden of proof was so strict that criminal 
penalties were reserved for only the worst offenders. 
The 1976 tax legislation brought the followins 
requirements and penalties. The Tax Reform Act defines 
preparers and makes them liable for negligence penalties of 
$100 and willful understatement penalties of $500 per 
return if any understatement of liability is due to the 
negligence or willful misconduct of the tax preparer (IRC 
Sec. 6694). The preparer must provide an identification 
number on all returns (IRC Sec. 6109(a)), furnish a copy 
of the return to the taxpayer and keep a completed copy of 
the return or a list of returns prepared (IRC Sec. 6107). 
These requirements became effective for documents prepared 
after December 31, 1976 (Tax Reform Act, 1976: Sec. 1203(j)). 
Recent Research 
Research in the last ten years de,."oted to various 
topics indirectly related to state regulation of tax 
preparers has included several projects on tax compliance. 
A study by Charles Clotfelter is significant because he 
used 1969 Tax~ayer Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP) 
data filesl--an earlier sample similar to the data base for 
lRecent research has been based on the 1969 TCMP 
files because this data represents the most current infor-
mation available. Availability of current data is 
restricted by Congress, even to the point of limiting its 
own access (Wilson and Smith, 1984~ 295). 
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this study. Clotfelter discusses the relative merits of 
the TCMP data as follows: 
The obvious advantage in using TCMP data is the 
opportunity to observe personal tax-reporting 
behavior rather than having to rely on indirect 
measures or self-reported compliance behavior. In 
addition, the TCMP data include rich information 
on income and tax items (Clotfelter, 1983: 367). 
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Clotfelter also refers to the problems encountered in 
survey research such as Robert Mason's study of tax evasion 
in Oregon (Mason, 1981). The problems arise because: 
In order to explain tax evasion empirically, most 
studies have relied on indirect measures of evasion, 
principally surveys asking about past evasion or 
about attitudes toward evasion. The validity of 
such studies, of course, depends on the degree to 
which the pattern or survey responses corresponds 
to actual behavior (Clotfelter, 1983: 364). 
Robert Mason's research is pertinent because it was 
conducted in Oregon during 1980 although it does not 
investigate tax compliance related to the type of preparer. 
In 1980, Robert Mason and Helen Lowry conducted a survey of 
800 Oregon adults to investigate tax noncompliance. Of 
those interviewed, 26 percent admitted cheating on their 
state income taxes in 1979 (Mason, 1981: 5). Mason also. 
found that over 5 percent of the respondents failed to file 
a tax return in 1979 when they felt they should have filed. 
Later research at the national level using the same format 
as Mason's obtained similar results. 
In 1984, Yankelovich, Skelly and White completed a 
study of taxpayer attitudes for the IRS. A portion of 
their study is a replication of Mason's study and uses 
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2,200 personal interviews across the United States. 
Cheating on their tax returns was reported by 19 percent of 
the taxpayers interviewed (Yankelovich, 1984: 29). This 
study also reported cheating by region and found that 24 
percent of taxpayers in the western region reported 
cheating on their taxes. Although the second study was 
completed four years later and differences could be attri-
butable to the time lapse, the results match Mason's quite 
closely (Yankelovich, 1984: 89). 
Current Opinions 
While there has not been any research in the past ten 
years to investigate the impact of state regulation on the 
quality of tax return preparation, it is worthwhile to note 
that opinions on the topic have been voiced by informed 
observers. 
In a letter to the Oregon State Board of Tax Service 
Examiners, Ralph Short, then Director of the IRS District 
Office in Portland, stated that: 
While we cannot support our views with any kind 
of statistics, the consensus of the affected 
division chiefs is that the skills of the tax 
return preparers have improved and the quality of 
the tax returns filed during the period following 
the effective date of the Oregon licensing law 
has generally improved (Gadarowski, 1977: 536). 
In 1986, in his co-keynote address to the combined 
members of the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants (AICPA) and the National State Boards of 
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Accountancy, Herman J. Lowe: Chairman of the AICPA Board of 
Directors, voices a different opinion: 
There is no compelling need for licensing and 
regulation of persons offering record-keeping 
and elementary accounting services • • • Nor is 
licensing required in connection with the prepar-
ation of tax returns because of regulatory and 
disciplinary authority presently possessed by the 
Internal Revenue Service and other tax author-
ities (Lowe, 1986: 54). 
The issue is far from settled~ research using the 
Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program. {TCMP) data may 
significantly add to current knowledge. 
-----· ---
CHAPTER III 
DESIGN OF THE STUDY 
Taking note of the divergent opinions reported in the 
previous chapter, the hypothesis of this research is that 
state regulation of commercial income tax preparers should 
improve quality. Quality will be defined relative to the 
magnitude of errors detected during the Taxpayer Compliance 
Measurement Program (TCMP) examinations. Regulated pre-
parers are subject to testing and education requirements. 
If state regulation of preparers is effective, the quality 
of their work should result in a lower magnitude and rate 
of errors on the returns they prepared during the 1979 tax 
filing season. 
THE NULL HYPOTHESES AND THEIR ALTERNATIVES 
In order to statistically test the null hypotheses, 
three groups of errors from the 1979 cycle of the TCMP 
examinations are analyzed. These groups are chosen to test 
the integrity and competency of the preparer. In addition, 
the effect of regulation on the total tax return is 
evaluated. 
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Integrity of Commercial Preparers 
The integrity of commercial preparers has been a con-
cern of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) for some time 
(Gadarowski, 1977: 533). During the early 1970s, the IRS 
attempted to determine the extent of errors made by commer-
cial preparers by sending agents to suspected tax preparers 
with prearranged tax return information. Using the tech-
nique known as nshopping,n the tax preparers were engaged 
to complete a tax return for the agent disguised as a 
middle-income taxpayer (Harless, 1973: 15). Items on thes~~ 
tax returns used to test the ability and honesty of the tax 
return preparers were number of dependents, unreported and 
under-reported tip income, medical expense deductions and 
charitable contributions (Harless, 1973: 15). 
If state regulation of commercial tax preparers 
affects the quality of the return preparation, differences 
in the items examined earlier by the IRS should also be 
noted in the 1979 TCMP examinations. 
Null Hyeothesis I. The error rates or amounts in 
regulated states are not significantly smaller than 
those in nonregulated states on items chosen to test 
the integrity or ability of commercial income tax 
preparers. 
Alternate Hypothesis I. The error rates or 
amounts in regulated states are significantly less 
than those measures in nonregulated states. 
Competency of Commercial Preparers on New Tax Items 
During 1977 and 1978, tax legislation was enacted 
which changed the treatment of items on the 1979 tax 
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return. The items which affected a broad segment of 
middle-income taxpayers who traditionally have their 
returns prepared by commercial preparers were capital gains 
calculations, individual retirement accounts, residential 
energy credits and earned income credits {Aronson, Greene, 
Fisher and Co., 1979). At the same time, Oregon's regula-
tion of commercial income tax preparers included require-
ments for continuing professional education for 
relicensure. 
If state regulation, including Oregon's special 
requirement for continuing professional education, is 
effective, preparers in Oregon should be more aware of the 
tax treatment, and the error rate in these new items should 
be lower for Oregon's commercial preparers. 
Null HyPothesis II. The error rates or amounts 
on Oregon's returns are not significantly smaller 
than those from nonregulated states related to 
items on the 1979 returns which were new that year. 
Alternate Hypothesis II. The error rates or 
amounts in Oregon are significantly less than those 
measures in nonregulated states. 
Competency of Commercial Preparers on Troublesome Items 
Some areas of income tax law are more troublesome for 
taxpayers than others, either from a record keeping stand-
point or because of the complexity of the tax law. 
Casualty losses, moving expenses and income averaging 
calculations have been ongoing problems for taxpayers. 
Income from farming and self-employment also generates 
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large differences on many returns (American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants, 1979). 
If education, licensing examinations and continuing 
professional education improve th~ quality of services 
offered by the commercial tax preparers, the error rate on 
these areas should be lower in regulated states. 
Null Hypothesis III. The error rates or amounts 
in regulated states are not significantly smaller 
than those in nonregulated states related to items 
which have continually caused problems for middle-
income taxpayers. 
Alternate Hypothesis III. The error rates or 
amounts in regulated states are significantly 
less than those measures in nonregulated states. 
Cumulative Effect of Total Errors on Tax Returns 
Tax returns contain many sources of income, adjust-
ments and deductions. Only a few of these sources were 
chosen for evaluation in the preceding tests. This test is 
designed to evaluate the cumulative effect of all the 
errors on returns prepared by commercial income tax pre-
parers. 
If state regulation of commercial income tax pre-
parers affects the quality of the total tax return, 
differences should be more evident as the amounts are accu-
mulated into totals for each of the three sections of the 
tax returns. 
Null Hypothesis IV. The error rates or amounts 
in regulated states are not significantly smaller 
than those in nonregulated states on amounts related 
to the totals for income, adjustments or deductions. 
Alternate Hypothesis IV. The error rates or 
amounts in regulated states are significantly less 
than those measures in nonregulated states. 
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Differences in Levels of Regulation of Commercial Preparers 
Studies in occupational regulation indic.ate that 
regulation of employment should be the least restrictive 
form capable of obtaining the desired effect (Friedman, 
1962~ Gellhorn, 1956). The State of California registers 
commercial tax preparers and requires posting of perfor-
mance bonds to protect consumers. This type of regulation 
represents a least restrictive form while the regulation in 
Oregon represents the more restrictive form. Oregon 
requires that the commerical preparer pass two examina-
tions, work under the direction of a licensed preparer and 
complete continuing professional education for relicensure. 
If the type of state regulation affects the quality 
of tax return preparation, a difference in the error rates 
should be evident between California and Oregon. 
Null Hypothesis v. The error rates or amounts in 
Oregon are not significantly smaller than those in 
California in the hypotheses listed above. 
Alternate Hypothesis v. The error rates or 
amounts in Oregon are significantly less than 
those measures in California. 
METHODOLOGY LIMITATION 
The validity of any inference procedure in statistics 
is dependent on the assumption that a random sampling 
43 
procedure is followed. This assumption is clearly valid 
for the data obtained from the TCMP files. With the random 
sampling procedure followed by the IRS, descriptive 
measures are dependable but inferences are limited since 
the aggregate form of the data prevents the calculation of 
measures of dispersion (standard deviation, variance or 
range). 
The sample size is large enough to assume normality 
of a sampling distribution of means, but without measures 
of dispersion for each state, that assumption is not 
usable. The TCMP files disclose information from income 
tax returns that is not available from any other source. 
Since this information is in an aggregate form, non-
parametric statistical tests were used for analysis. 
CHAPTER IV 
DATA DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY 
The Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP) 
files provide the data for analysis. TCMP is an Internal 
Revenue Service audit program that is used to estimate how 
well taxpayers are complying with the income tax laws. The 
Program thoroughly audits a scientifically selected sample 
of individual returns. The information obtained by the 
TCMP examinations of a random stratified sample of 55,000 
tax returns from 1979 was analyzed to determine if state 
regulation of commercial income tax preparers affects the 
quality of income tax returns. 
THE DATA SOURCE 
Data were collected by the Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS) during 1980 as part of the 1979 cycle of the Taxpayer 
Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP). The IRS uses infor-
mation developed from the TCMP data to measure the levels 
of compliance, to determine changes in compliance levels 
over time, to improve the procedures used to select returns 
for audit and to improve the effectiveness of enforcement 
operations. 
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The 1979 cycle of the TCMP examinations is the most 
recent time that questions were included regarding the type 
of tax preparer that prepared the tax return. Tax return 
preparation was classified in thirteen categories. Of 
these thirteen, four relate to commercial preparation of 
tax returns: public accountants, local tax services, 
national tax services and other paid preparers. 
To complete the analysis, a copy of one of the eight 
data tapes resulting from the 1979 cycle of the TCMP was 
obtained from the California Institute of Technology in 
Pasadena with the permissiQn of the Washington, D.C., 
office of the IRS in May 1988. 
DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA 
The total sample size for the TCMP examinations for 
1979 was 54,565. The data tape developed from the TCMP 
examinations contains 1,508 records. It is arranged with 
the data sorted by fifty-eight districts and by thirteen 
tax preparation codes. The tape provided for this study is 
sequentially recorded in the following manner. The major 
sort is district number. The minor sort is tax preparer 
code. Within the tax preparer code there are two records, 
one for total value and one for total frequency of returns 
prepared. 
The data are arranged on the tape as they were taken 
from tax returns and supporting schedules. The tax return, 
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for purposes of this study, is the unit representing the 
taxpayer. The analysis will be of data taken from Form 
1040, the u.s. Individual Income Tax Return, and Schedule 
A, Itemized Deductions. A data point is available for each 
line of Form 1040 and Schedule A filed by the taxpayer and 
reviewed by the IRS examiner. 
PREPARATION OF THE DATA 
The magnitude of an error on the tax return is 
measured by taking the total dollar value of the difference 
between the line item as filed and the line item as 
examined and dividing by the number of observations. This 
mean difference, expressed in dollars, may be affected by 
the size of income for taxpayers in the different states. 
To adjust for this effect, the mean dollar amount of dif-
ference is normalized by dividing by the total income for 
that group of taxpayers. This expresses each mean change 
as a percentage of total income by each group. 
All the calculations above were done for each pre-
parer type except for exemptions. The change in exemptions 
between the number as filed and the number as examined was 
restated as a dollar value by multiplying the mean change 
by $1,000, the value of an exemption in 1979. 
The total observations for each preparer type by 
district were summed for states with multiple districts 
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such as New York, Texas and California. By summing the 
observations and values for these states at this point, it 
was possible to accurately weight the data in the next step 
of the analysis. 
THE MODEL TAX RETURN 
Weighted means for each data point were obtained 
using SAS statistical routines for each line item on the 
1040 form and Schedule A as filed and as corrected during 
the TCMP examination using the following procedure: 
1. The mean for each of the K line items is 
determined. Let these means be: 
2. 
'Y1, Y2, . . • I YK• 
Let the sample sizes be: 
Nl, N2, . . • I NK• 
Compute the weighted average as: 
y = 
N1Y1 + N2Y2 + • ~ • + NKYK 
N 
K 
where N = I: Ni• 
i=l 
Let Wi = Ni/N (for 
Then: y = W1Y1 + 
K 
i = 
W2Y2 
= l: WiYi• 
i=l 
1 to K). 
+ . . • I + WKYK 
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The file was then exported to a personal computer and 
a macro was set up in a spreadsheet program (Quattro) to 
develop model tax returns for each preparer type in each 
district using the weighted means for each line of the 
return. These models of hypothetical tax returns were used 
to make preliminary examinations of the data, providing an 
opportunity to consider the magnitude of errors on returns 
from various states and tax preparer types. 
Of the thirteen tax preparer types, four types of 
preparers constitute the commercial segment of the preparer 
industry. The four types of commercial tax preparers and 
sample sizes are shown in Table I. These four types of 
preoarers are the preparers of primary interest for the 
study. 
TABLE I 
COMMERCIAL TAX PREPARER TYPES 
Preparer Type 
National Tax Services 
Local Tax Services 
Public Accountants 
Other Paid Preparers 
Sample Size 
Sample Size 
4,071 
7,290 
5,290 
4,232 
20,883 
For comparison purposes, in addition to the commer-
cial segment, model returns were prepared representing 
professional tax preparers (Certified Public Accountants 
(CPAs), attorneys and attorney-CPAs) and self-prepared 
returns. 
STATISTICAL METHODS OF ANALYSIS 
A variety of charts and graphs was prepared 
describing the data in a manageable and comprehensive 
fasoion in order to highlight important observations. 
Descriptive Statistics 
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Density Stripe Graphs. Density stripe graphs picture 
the distribution of the magnitude of the errors. Vertical 
lines are placed at the location of data values on a hori-
zontal data scale. These representations are especially 
well suited to small- to medium-sized samples of continuous 
data {Wilkinson, 1988: 344). 
Ranking the States. The states are ranked by the 
magnitude of error on total income, adjustments and deduc-
tions. By considering totals, the problem of missing data 
points is eliminated and the states can be ranked without 
misinterpreting the results. However, in Hypotheses I 
through III, missing data points provide for misrepresenta-
tion of the totals. Since a missing value is treated in 
the same manner as a zero change, from the original filing 
to the examination, it would mistakenly indicate no error 
either by the taxpayer or the preparer. A missing value 
so 
should indicate that that tax preparer did not deal with 
that item on tax returns in that particular state. At the 
point that totals for income, adjustments and deductions 
are being evaluated, the data for each tax preparer type 
indicates that each preparer has prepared a return with at 
least one item of each category. 
Cluster Analysis 
Data are available from each of the fifty states 
within the United States. The object is not to generalize 
beyond these states, but to make inferences about the 
causal processes that may have generated the data. There 
may be significant differences between several of the 
states due to variations other than the type of tax 
preparers. To assist in isolating the differences between 
states which might result from variations within the popu-
lations of the states, cluster analysis was used. 
Cluster analysis was used to detect natural groupings 
among the states. To assist in determining the differences 
due to abilities of the commercial tax preparers, the 
states were grouped by other taxpayer characteristics. The 
attributes used to determine clustering were "magnitude of 
errors" and "IRS compliance activities for each state." 
The magnitude of errors was measured by the total 
change during the TCMP examination in mean income, 
adjustments, deductions, and taxes for returns classed as 
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self-prepared. The differences were adjusted to a per-
centage of mean income to reduce the effect of variations 
in income levels among the states. The data from the self-
prepared returns were chosen because commercial or pro-
fessional tax preparers, other than the taxpayer, were not 
involved in filing the returns. This eliminated the issue 
of occupational regulation. Information from the self-
prepared returns was used as a surrogate for the compliance 
of a representative group of taxpayers within each state. 
In addition to clustering the states to isolate the 
current differences among the taxpayers, the literature 
review indicated that Clotfelter had observed some regional 
differences in his analysis of the 1969 TCMP data. He 
found that compliance was highest in the New England 
states with good compliance extending south to Virginia 
and Kentucky and west to Indiana and Michigan. The sunbelt 
had the highest rate of underreporting on non-farm returns. 
The Midwest and Southeast had the most underreporting for 
farm returns (Clotfelter, 1983). 
Research by Witte and Woodbury using the TCMP files 
had alsoindicated that compliance activities by the IRS 
influences the behavior of individual taxpayers. Witte 
used the 1969 TCMP data to model u.s. Federal income tax 
compliance and found that the probability of audit 
influenced the level of tax compliance (Witte and Woodbury, 
1985: 2). Audit risk for this analysis was obtained 
by using the percentage of returns audited per state from 
the 1979 filing season using the figures from the Annual 
Report of the Commissioner of the IRS for 1981. 
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Witte also found that IRS compliance activities, such 
as IRS data processing efforts, had significant effects on 
com~liance (Witte, 1985: 9). Surrogates for IRS compliance 
activities, used for this analysis, were the mean dollar 
amount collected per return audited and the cost of 
administration by the IRS per return filed. These amounts 
were also obtained from the Annual Report of the 
Commissioner of the IRS for 1981. 
----~~----- -- --- ---
Nonparametric Statistics 
Nonparametric tests were used for this analysis 
because these procedures do not require any assumption that 
specifies the exact distributional form of the population. 
A parametric difference of means test would ordinarily be 
more powerful than the nonparametric methods. However, 
because of the lack of a standard deviation, a difference 
of means test is not appropriate. The data can be measured 
on a ratio scale to permit reliance on comparisons between 
nonparametric methods. 
Model of the Differences. When two samples are 
shifted apart by a quantity that represents the difference 
between some location parameters, the theoretical 
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representation of the model is FR(AY) = FNR(AY + ~) for all 
y where R represents regulated states, NR represents non-
regulated states, FR is the f.unction for the R population, 
FNR is the function for the NR population, and ~ is a con-
stant representing the amount of shift. If ~ equals zero, 
R and NR are identically distributed and the hypothesis of 
similar populations is true. If & is positive, the vari-
ables in the NR population tend to be larger than those in 
the R population. A negative ~ indicates the values in the 
NR population tend to be smaller than the R population 
(Gibbons, 1976: 159). Nonparametric methods were used to 
test the model. The location shifts measured are the cumu-
lative distribution and medians. Three tests are applied 
to the data. Each of these tests is discussed in detail. 
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test. This two-sample test 
requires the assumption of independent random samples 
measured on at least an ordinal scale. The test measures 
differences in cumulative frequency distributionQ If 
there are no significant differences between the samples 
drawn from the different states, the cumulative frequency 
distributions from the two populations should be essen-
tially similar. The test statistic is the maximum differ-
ence between two cumulative distributions. The statistic 
can also be defined for the general hypothesis of similar 
distributions but with an alternative that states a direc-
tional difference between the two populations. 
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The Sign Test. The sign test requires the same 
assumptions as the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. It is computed 
for pairs of variables. The sign test for location is 
applied to the paired sample data by taking the difference 
of each pair. The difference between values on each obser-
vation is calculated and the number of positiv~ and nega-
tive differences is recorded. The lesser of the two is 
then compared to the total number of differences. The 
probability, when the null hypothesis is true, of obtaining 
a value which is equal to the observed value is computedQ 
The sign test uses some of the information generated about 
paired observations but does not consider the magnitude of 
those differences. 
The Matched Pair Wilcoxon Test. This test treats the 
sample differences with weights correlated with the magni-
tude of each individual difference. The assumption is that 
the data are taken from independent random samples measured 
on at least an interval scale. 
To complete the Wilcoxon test, the difference score 
for each pair is obtained. The differences are then ranked 
and numbered according to their absolute values. Next the 
signs of the differences are attached and the ranks of both 
the positive and negative differences are summed. If the 
null hypothesis is correct, the sum of the ranks of the 
positive differences should not be smaller than the sum of 
the ranks of the negative difference. 
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Comparison of Nonparametric Methods. The Wilcoxon 
test should give much better performance than the sign test 
since it takes advantage of substantially more information 
(Gibbons, 1976~ 142). The sign test uses only information 
about the direction of the differences between members of a 
pair and the hypothesized median, while the Wilcoxon test 
also uses the magnitude of each difference relative to 
every other difference (Gibbons, 1976: 141). 
The assumptions of the Student's t test cannot be 
verified with the TCMP data, but if they were actually 
true, the power efficiency of the Wilcoxon test is approxi-
mately 95 percent for both small and large samples. The 
Wilcoxon test is especially useful in situations where the 
sample size is too small to justify the normality assump-
tion (Blalock, 1979: 270). 
These two nonparametric test procedures are appli-
cable to data representing differences of paired obser-
vations. In each case, the variables must be independent. 
Inference concerns values of population medians. The data 
must be on an ordinal scale with a population assumed to be 
continuous for the sign test and symmetrical for the signed 
rank test. Gibbons (1976: 142) states that: 
In most situations, the signed rank test should 
be used in preference to the sign test when the 
assumption of a symmetric distribution appears 
tenable and the data are measured on a sufficient 
level of precision. 
56 
Both .tests ar~ nonparametric counterparts to the 
Student's t test for means. The Student's t test is based 
on the assumption of a normal distribution which is much 
more stringent than the assumption of symmetry. 
In comparing the power of the tests, the asymptotic 
efficiency of the signed rank test relative to Student's t 
test is not smaller than .84 while the sign test may be 
only .33 (Gibbons, 1976: 142). These values apply to large 
samplesi in small samples from nonnormal distributions, 
these nonparametric tests may be more powerful than 
Student's! test (Gibbons, 1976: 143). 
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is more difficult to 
evaluate. It is a good test for a general null hypothesis 
of identical distributions. It is a general test which is 
somewhat sensitive to all kinds of differences between 
populations but not particularly sensitive to any specific 
type of difference (Gibbons, 1976: 262). While the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test does not take advantage of the 
information available by pairing the observations, it is 
particularly useful where a location difference is the pri-
mary interest (Gibbons, 1976: 254). 
CBAPTER V 
RESULTS 
The results of the descriptive statistics are pre-
sented below for the model tax returns along with various 
charts and graphs. The results of the nonparametric 
statistical comparisons among Oregon, California and the 
nonregulated states are presented in the second section for 
each of the hypotheses. 
DESCRIPTIVE RESULTS 
The data for each state, for each commercial tax pre-
parer type, were prepared for statistical analysis as shown 
in Appendix B for Oregon and California. The values repre-
sent mean differences between the line items from the 
returns as reported and as corrected during the TCMP 
audits. These mean differences or changes are shown as 
dollars and also restated as percentages of income for each 
preparer type. 
Totals for each hypothesis were determined for 
reference, but not included in the statistical analysis. 
Missing values, expressed as decimal points in the tables, 
indicate that the preparer did not encounter the tax item 
---- ----------
in that state. This problem was more predominant in the 
states with smaller populations. The zeros represent no 
change for a particular item. 
Model Tax Returns 
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Weighted means for each point were obtained to pre-
pare model tax returns (shown in Appendix B) to be sure the 
calculations produced reasonable totals. The number of 
data points used in the study was scaled down to produce 
model returns containing the larger items encountered by 
most preparers in most districts. Items which accounted 
for smaller dollar values and not of interest for this 
study were not used. Income from prizes was such an item. 
The IRS divided tax preparers into thirteen types for 
their study. Four types, IRS assistance only, IRS review-
ed, IRS preparation and VITA/TCE assisted, accounted for a 
total of only 590 of the 54,565 observations. These types 
were not of interest and contained many missing d~ta points 
and so were not used. The first return was prepared from 
the total sample. The second return was prepared after the 
590 observations were deleted. The latter indicates that 
the magnitude of the changes is slightly higher repre-
senting differences of less than 1 percent because of the 
deletions. 
---- ---~---
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Comparison by Preparer Type 
The model tax returns were prepared to compare 
commercially prepared returns to self-prepared and to 
professionally prepared returns. Differ~nces among pre-
parer types in income levels and in error rates are indi-
cated in the results. The highest average total income 
levels of $29,700 are shown for professionally prepared 
returns. Average total incomes for commercially prepared 
returns are $16,600 while incomes for returns prepared by 
taxpayers are lower at $13,400. Changes in income were 
also compared among tax preparer types. The highest 
average changes are shown for professionally prepared 
returns. Changes in stated income for professionally pre-
pared returns are indicated as over 6 percent compared with 
4 percent for commercially prepared returns and less than 2 
percent for self-prepared returns. Considering the higher 
change in income, it is interesting to note that the 
changes in interest and penalties are still lowest for the 
professionally prepared returns. 
There has been very little published research which 
used the TCMP files as primary data, so there are limited 
comparisons to be made with prior studies. Clotfelter used 
the 1969 TCMP files to study tax compliance. A table from 
the Appendix to his publication forms the basis for com-
parison of reported amounts versus examined amounts from 
the 1979 TCMP data (Clotfelter, 1983: 373). The magnitude 
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of changes is compared among all preparers, all commercial 
preparers and commercial preparers in regulated states in 
Table II. 
TABLE II 
COMPLIANCE BY TYPE OF INCOME, DEDUCTION AND TAX: 
SUMMARY RATIO OF TOTAL REPORTED AMOUNTS TO 
TOTAL CORRECTED AMOUNT 
Tax Item 
Wages 
Dividends 
Interest 
Rents 
Capital Gains (D) 
Proprietorship (C) 
Farming (F) 
Tips 
Ad). Gross Income 
Tax 
Exemptions 
Adjustments 
Total Deductions 
Contributions 
All 
Preparers 
1969 1979 
----
1.000 .997 
.975 .941 
.983 .961 
.721 .556 
.941 .898 
.830 .758 
.635 .345 
.772 .624 
.975 .964 
.938 .918 
1.023 1.039 
1.105 1.134 
1.092 1.058 
15168 1.094 
Commercial Preparers 
Total Oregon California 
.998 .997 .995 
.889 .917 .953 
.959 .978 .942 
.550 .521 * 
.839 .846 .703 
.713 .863 .700 
.409 * * 
.564 .138 • 710 
.956 .979 .950 
.899 .959 .862 
1.044 1.003 1.080 
1.213 1.110 1.263 
1.071 1.032 1.099 
1.160 1.030 1.255 
*The reported amounts were negative, indicating losses. 
In Table II shown above, a ratio of less than one 
means that~the reported amount is less than the corrected 
amount. The results from the sample indicate that tax-
payers as a total group reported a smaller percentage of 
income and taxes in 1979 than taxpayers did in 1969. The 
results from the sample of the returns prepared by commer-
cial preparers indicate that this group reported a smaller 
percentage of income and taxes than the total sample for 
1979. Restating the results, the differences between the 
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items as filed and the items as examined are larger for 
commercial preparers than for the total sample in 1979. 
Comparing the commercially prepared returns in regulated 
states with the nonregulated states, the results indicate 
that the error rates were smaller in Oregon than the total 
of all commerically prepared returns. The results from 
California indicate that the error rates were larger than 
the average for all commercially prepared returns. 
Model tax returns were prepared to represent commer-
cially prepared returns in a number of states other than 
Oregon and California. These are also presented in 
Appendix B. Changes in income varied from a low of 2 per-
cent for Oregon to 21 percent for New Mexico. The dif-
ferences among the income levels on commercially prepared 
returns was also of interest. The average reported income 
shown on commercially prepared returns ranged from a low of 
$10,600 for New Mexico to $20,600 on returns from Hawaii. 
This range was wide enough to confirm the necessity of 
restating the dollar changes as percentages of income in 
the statistical evaluations. 
Changes in adjustments ranged from 2 percent of the 
total for Virginia to 30 percent for North Dakota. Changes 
in deductions did not vary as widely, ranging from 2 per-
cent through 8 percent. 
In evaluating the changes in deductions, it became 
apparent that the effect of some of the errors was 
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cancelled due to errors in the opposite direction. For 
example, income would be expected to increase on examina-
tion by the IRS and the reverse should be true for deduc-
tions. In reviewing the sample for Nebraska and New 
Mexico, it was concluded that changes did not consistently 
follow this pattern. To reduce the bias caused by positive 
errors tending to cancel negative errors, all errors were 
expressed as absolute values for the statistical tests. 
Graphic Representations of the Data 
Density stripe graphs of selected states were pre-
pared to evaluate patterns in the errors made by commercial 
preparers and are presented in Appendix C. 
The pattern of the mean errors on Oregon's returns is 
compared with those from the New England states. The 
values are the mean total errors, expressed in dollars, in 
income, adjustments and deductions. This data is also 
totaled and presented in the bar graphs ranking the states. 
The largest average error comes from a $1,200 understate-
ment of total income in the sample from Rhode Island. 
Rhode Island's sample appears among those states with the 
lowest errors due to a large number of missing values in 
the sample. The information available from this sample is 
limited due to its small size. 
The sample from Massachusetts contains the smallest 
average errors. The largest average errors, other than 
Rhode Island's, are less than $1,000. The graphs indicate 
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that the samples from Oregon and the New England states are 
very similar. The differences in the magnitude of errors 
is evident when the size of the errors for California and 
comparable states are presented. 
A second density stripe graph was prepared to compare 
the total average errors from the sample of returns from 
California with the samples containing the greatest average 
errors. The size of the average errors from these states 
approaches $11,000. With the maximum on the scale set at 
$12,000, it is evident that three of the states appear to 
have large total errors because each sample contains one 
extreme value. 
The pattern of larger average errors is consistent 
for Oklahoma. The extreme values for New Mexico, Delaware 
and South Dakota cause these states to rank among ·the top 
five states on the bar charts in Appendix A. If the 
extreme values are ignored, the pattern of errors from 
these states is very similar to those in California's 
sample. 
The bar charts, shown in Appendix A, display the 
rankings of the total values of cumulative changes in 
income, adjustments and deductions. The differences are 
expressed as absolute values to allow all of the errors to 
·count, whether the error was in favor of the taxpayer or 
the IRS. All of the changes in exemptions for New Mexico, 
for example, now add to the totals. Expressing those 
changes in absolute values contributes to New Mexico's 
returns showing the highest changes in the 50 states. 
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While the bar graphs cannot be considered to repre-
sent any statistical significance, it is important to note 
that Oregon is among states with the lowest total changes 
while California ranks with the top 25 percent of the 
states in magnitude of changes upon TCMP examination. 
Cluster Analysis 
While the graphs show that there are differences 
among the states, it is difficult to conclude that those 
differences are due only to the regulation of commercial 
income tax preparers without further information. Cluster 
analysis is appropriate to detect groupings among the 
states because the number and size of the groups are not 
known in advance. 
To begin the analysis, values were developed for 
each attribute of taxpayer compliance and IRS administra-
tive activity. The goal is to identify groups of states 
with similar measures of taxpayer compliance. Reducing the 
variability among these attributes should facilitate 
testing differences in the error rates as a function of the 
state regulation of the tax preparer. 
The index of similarity used to identify distances 
~etween the states is Euclidean distance. This is used 
because it is the most common and most familiar. It may be 
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unsatisfactory for raw data because it is affected by dif-
ferences in the scales of the variables (Everitt, 1980: 
18). Because of this, the variables were standardized to 
preserve the relative distances between clusters. 
Since the optimum number of clusters was unknown, 
initially a partitioning cluster analysis in Systat called 
K-means procedure was used. The default setting for K-
means is two, which split the fifty states into two groups 
and placed Oregon and California in the same cluster. 
Successive runs, increasing the number of clusters each 
time, separated other states individually or into small 
clusters. The least number of clusters which placed Oregon 
ana California individually with their own groups of states 
was twelve. The results are shown in Appendix C. The 
Oregon cluster contains Kansas, Kentucky, Nebraska, 
Virginia and Wisconsin while California clusters with 
Arizona, Florida, Hawaii, North Dakota and New York. 
Tree or hierarchial clustering was also run on Systat 
to verify the procedure as suggested by Wilkinson (1988: 
388). Although the resulting hierarchical structure is 
useful in verifying the partitioning of the clusters, it 
also provides information about the relatedness of the 
clusters that is not available in the K-means results. The 
hierarchical structure also identifies Virginia and 
Wisconsin and Kansas and Nebraska as subsets of the larger 
cluster containing Oregon and Kentucky. Arizona and 
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California form a subset of the larger cluster containing 
North Dakota, Florida, Hawaii and New York. Both cluster-
ing procedures identify the members of these groups of sta-
tes. Oregon clusters with states with good compliance, and 
California clusters with states where historically the 
compliance has not been as good. 
The statistics for the clusters containing Oregon and 
California and the summary of the statistics for all twelve 
clusters are shown in Appendix c. The distance statistics 
for each of the variables used to group the states are also 
shown on box and whisker plots. A key identifying each of 
the twelve clusters is presented with the box and whisker 
plots. Wilkinson (1988: 434) developed the following dia-
gram (Figure 1) to illustrate the information provided in 
the box and whisker plots. Approximately one-half of the 
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box plot. 
Diagram of information provided in a 
Source: Wil~inson, 1988: 388. 
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observations lie within the box. Of that portion, one-half 
of the observations lie between the median and one side of 
the box and one-half between the median and the other side 
of the box. The quartiles are approximate because the 
Systat procedure identifies and sets apart noutsiden and 
nfar outsiden values beyond the box and whiskers. 
The two clustering procedures, described and 
interpreted above, complete the descriptive portion of the 
analysis. To better interpret the differences, nonpara-
metric methods were used to determine if the differences 
among the states are significant. 
NONPARAMETRIC RESULTS AND INTERPRETATIONS 
For each hypothesis, descriptions of the significance 
of the differences began with a general comparison of 
Oregon to all nonregulated states. Next, Oregon was com-
pared with the clustered states and with the Northwestern 
states. The presentation for California followed a similar 
format with minor differences. The results for California 
began with a general comparison to some of the nonregulated 
states, followed by a comparison with the clustered states 
and the Southwestern states. There are overlaps in the 
groupings for California. The states of Hawaii and Arizona 
which appear in both clustered and Southwestern groups are 
discussed only once. Finally, California and Oregon were 
compared for each of the hypotheses. 
Measurement Methodology 
One of the primary purposes of this research is to 
adequately describe the data. This is the first oppor-
tunity to obtain information regarding the differences 
between returns prepared by commercial tax preparers in 
various states. Therefore, so as to minimize Type II 
errors, results will be reported at higher E values than 
are usually expected. The tables will list E values as 
large as .2 to give the reader a more comprehensive 
description of the results. 
The second reason for reporting the larger E values 
is relative to the nonparametric methods used to test the 
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data. The tests are more conservative than parametric 
methods and may not show differences if the reported levels 
are arbitrarily set at .10 or .OS. 
Although results as large as .20 are reported in the 
tables, the significance level is set at .10 for discussion 
purposes in the following material. All tests are calcu-
lated as one-tail tests. The model for each test can be 
stated as: 
Null Hypothesis FR(~Y) ~ FNR(6Y + ~) 
For all NR 
Alternate Hypothesis FR (~Y ( FNR (~Y + ~) 
For some NR 
Where Y is the difference 
R is a regulated state 
NR is a non-regulated state 
- ·----· --- ---------------------------------
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The Kolmogorov Smirnov test measures differences in 
the cumulative distributions. The Sign and Wilcoxon tests 
pair observations and measure differences relative to the 
medians of the samples. 
Hypothesis I 
Items chosen to test the integrity and competency of 
the commercial preparer are exemptions, contributions, tip 
income and medical expense deductions. These itema were 
chosen by the Internal Revenue Service in their studies of 
1972 and 1973 to test the integrity and competence of com-
mercial tax preparers. Summaries of the tests' results for 
Hypothesis I are given in Tables III through VII. 
Oregon Compared With Nonregulated States. The 
results (Table III) from analyzing the sample of commer-
cially prepared returns from unregulated states indicate 
that these returns contained larger errors. Analysis of 
the samples from Illinois, New Jersey, New York, Oklahoma 
and Texas all indicate consistent E values less than .10. 
The tests were consistent in indicating significant dif-
ferences between Oregon and these states. Adjusting the 
dollar values of differences to percentages of income 
changed the significance levels of the results on the 
samples from Florida, Hawaii and Maine. On other samples, 
such as those from Georgia, Indiana and Mississippi, this 
adjustment did not affect the results. Preliminary 
evaluation of the data indicated that the errors on returns 
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TABLE III 
NONREGULATED STATES: COMPARISON 
p ~ .20 
WITH OREGON 
Hyeothesis I Integrity of Commercial PreEarers 
States Sign Test Wilcoxon Test Kolmogorov Test 
Compared Percent- Percent- Percent-
With Dollar age of Dollar age of Dollar age of 
Oregon Change Income Change Income Change Income 
Alaska .160 .170 
Alabama .076 .154 .140 .150 .025 .025 
Ar~ansas 
Ar~zona .039 .039 .096 .066 Colorado .032 .032 .120 .110 Connecticut 
Delaware 
FloriQa .154 .076 .069 .046 .190 .055 
Georg~a .095 .095 .070 .075 .160 
Hawa~i .132 .031 .068 .042 .165 
Iowa .190 
I~ibo . I ~no~s .012 .012 .055 .065 .055 .055 
Indiana .050 .050 .124 .130 .110 .110 
Kansas .100 .100 .160 .180 
Ken1;uc;:ky .132 .040 .100 .030 .067 
Lou~s~ana .200 .200 .100 
Massachusetts .190 
Maryland .014 .014 .002 .025 .018 .041 
M9in~ .072 .170 .068 .075 .050 .100 M~ch~gan .076 .155 .130 .110 
Minnesota .047 .047 .042 .091 .110 .120 
Missouri .190 .190 
Mississippi .040 .040 .011 .014 .041 .041 
Montana Nebraska 
N. Carolina .009 .009 .011 .010 .042 .018 
N. Dakota. N. Hampsh~re 
.047 .110 .005 .077 .0005 .0015 New Jersey 
New Mexico .133 .123 
Nevada .200 .155 .077 .0685 .110 .055 New York .012 .012 .062 .069 .011 .004 Ohio .110 .110 .144 .190 .190 
Oklahoma .009 .009 .027 .031 .018 .018 
Pennsylvania .110 .100 .130 .124 .011 .011 Rhode Island .130 .180 
s. Carolina .100 .. 100 .100 .034 .160 .087 
s. Dakota .150 .060 .050 .027 .081 .081 
Tennessee .110 .110 .144 .110 
TE:t.:as .032 .,032 .052 .062 .100 .100 
Utah 
Virginia .110 
VermQnt 
W?Sh~ngton 
.140 .140 w~scons~n 
w. Virginia .100 .190 .043 .040 
Wyoming 
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from Delaware, North Dakota and Vermont are smaller, rather 
than larger, than those on the returns prepared in Oregon. 
Oregon Compared to Clustered States. The results 
(Table IV) indicate errors on returns from Kentucky were 
larger than those from Oregon~ the E values for the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Wilcoxon test are .10 or less. The 
tests are less conclusive for returns from Kansas. Pairing 
the observations brought indications that the errors are 
larger but the results are not consistently significant. 
Larger error rates on the Nebraska sample are not indicated 
by the three tests. The sign test indicates errors are 
larger for Virginia and Wisconsin, but the results are not 
conclusive. 
TABLE IV 
CLUSTERED STATES: COMPARISON WITH OREGON 
Hypothesis I Integrity of Commercial Preparers 
States Sign Test Wilcoxon Test Kolmogorov Test 
Compared Percent- Percent- Percent-
With Dollar age of Dollar age of Dollar age of 
Oregon Change Income Change Income Change Income 
Kansas .100 .100 .160 .180 
Kentucky .132 .040 .100 .030 .067 
Nebraska 
Virginia .110 
Wisconsin .140 .140 
Oregon Compared to Northwestern States. The tests do 
not indicate any significantly larger error rates for the 
Northwestern states when they are compared with Oregon as 
shown on Table v. The cumulative distribution and 
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magnitude of errors are indicated to be larger for Alaska's 
returns measured as dollar values. When these values are 
adjusted to percentages of income, the tests do not indi-
cate differences. 
TABLE V 
NORTHWESTERN STATES: COMPARISON WITH OREGON 
Hypothesis I Integrity of Commercial Preparers 
States 
Compared 
With 
Oregon 
Alaska 
Idaho 
Montana 
Washington 
Wyoming 
Sign Test 
Percent-
Dollar age of 
Change Income 
Wilcoxon Test 
Percent-
Dollar age of 
Change Income 
.160 
Kolmogorov Test 
Percent-
Dollar age of 
Change Income 
.170 
California Compared With Selected Nonregulated 
States. The results in Table VI show E values of less than 
.20 for only three states. Preliminary evaluations indi-
cated that California's returns contained larger errors 
TABLE VI 
SELECTED NONREGULATED STATES: COMPARISON WITH CALIFORNIA 
p ( .20 
Hypothesis I Integrity of Commercial Preparers 
States 
Compared 
With 
California 
Hawaii 
New Jersey 
New Mexico 
Nevada 
New York 
Sign Test 
Percent-
Dollar age of 
Change Income 
Wilcoxon Tst 
Percent-
Dollar age of 
Change Income 
Kolmogorov Test 
Percent-
Dollar age of 
Change Income 
.042 
.190 
.087 
.190 
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than the majority of the nonregulated states. Over half of 
the nonregulated states had error rates or amounts substan-
tially smaller than California. The most substantial 
differences are indicated for returns from Delaware, 
Idaho, Montana, Nebraska, Wisconsin and Wyoming. 
California Compared to Clustered States. Testing for 
differences in the cumulative distributions of the samples 
indicates that the errors on the returns from Hawaii are 
larger than those from California as shown on Table VII. 
The initial evaluation of the data indicated that the 
errors on returns from all four of the other clustered 
states were actually smaller than the errors on the returns 
from California. 
TABLE VII 
CLUSTERED STATES: COMPARISON WITH CALIFORNIA 
Hypothesis I Integrity of Commercial Preparers 
States 
Compared 
With 
California 
Arizona 
Florida 
Hawaii 
N. Dakota 
New York 
Sign Test 
Percent-
Dollar age of 
Change Income 
Wilcoxon Test 
Percent-
Dollar age of 
Change Income 
Rolmogorov Test 
Percent-
Dollar age of 
Change Income 
.042 .087 
California Compared to the Southwestern States. 
Testing for differences in the cumulative distributions 
indicates (Table VIII) that errors on Hawaii's and Nevada's 
returns are larger than those from California. The 
preliminary analysis indicated that the errors on returns 
from Arizona, Colorado and Utah are smaller than those on 
returns from California. 
TABLE VIII 
SOUTHWESTERN STATES: COMPARISON WITH CALIFORNIA 
Hypothesis I Integrity of Commercial Preparers 
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States 
Compared 
With 
California 
Sign Test 
Percent-
Dollar age of 
Change Income 
Wilcoxon Test 
Percent-
Dollar age of 
Change Income 
Kolmogorov Test 
Percent-
Dollar age of 
Change Income 
Arizona 
Colorado 
Hawaii 
New Mexico 
Nevada 
Utah 
Hypothesis II 
.042 .087 
.190 
Commercial income tax preparers in Oregon were sub-
ject to continuing education requirements. Tax law changes 
in 1977 and 1978 affected the treatment of capital gains, 
individual retirement accounts, residential energy credits 
and earned income credits on the 1979 tax returns. If the 
requirement to complete tax-related continuing education 
courses was effective, commercial preparers in Oregon 
should have been more competent in the new items on the 
1979 returns. Commercial preparers in California were not 
subject to continuing education requirements, therefore, 
California will be considered with the nonregulated states 
in evaluating the tests for Hypothesis II. Summaries for 
Hypothesis II are given in Tables IX through XI. 
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Oregon Compared to Nonregulated States. The pattern 
of differences continues with the tests on the new items 
from the samples as shown in Table IX. Many of the unregu-
lated states have larger errors on the new items. Errors 
on returns from Florida, Louisiana, Maryland and New York 
are significantly larger with E values of less than .05 
indicated from all of the nonparametric tests. The tests 
indicate larger errors on the returns from Alabama, 
California, Missouri, New Jersey and Pennsylvania. The 
results are significant with £ values ranging between .OS 
and .10. Adjusting the dollar values of the changes to 
percentages of income results in very few changes in the 
significance of the differences on these tests. The states 
of Alabama and Mississippi have lower average incomes and 
the E values change when the differences are restated to 
percentages of income. Prelimin-ary evaluations of the 
data indicated that the errors on the returns from Hawaii 
and South Dakota were smaller than those from Oregon. 
Oregon Compared to Clustered States. Larger error 
rates (Table X) are not indicated by the tests of the 
sample of returns from Kansas. Reference to the prelim-
inary evaluation of the data indicates that the size of 
errors on the returns from Kansas are smaller, rather than 
larger, than the errors on Oregon's returns. 
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TABLE IX 
NONREGULATED STATES: COMPARISON WITH OREGON 
p ( 
.20 
H~Eothesis II Continuing Education 
States Sign Test Wilcoxon Test Kolmogorov Test 
Compared Percent- Percent- Percent-
With Dollar age of Dollar age of Dollar age of 
Oreqon Change Income Change Income Change Income 
Alaska 
Alabama .084 .032 .160 .130 .041 .041 
Arkansas .151 .160 
Arizon3 Colora o .050 .018 .018 
Connecticut 
Delaware 
Florida .025 .025 .031 .031 .041 .041 Georgia .084 .150 .160 .086 .086 
Hawa1.i 
Iowa Idaho Illinois .084 .084 .20 .041 .086 
Indiana .180 .032 .100 .041 .041 
Kansas Kentucky .050 .050 .043 .032 .067 .030 
Louisiana .002 .001 .025 .039 .041 .041 
Massachusetts .067 .135 
Maryland .0005 .0005 .005 .005 .041 .041 
Mc:tin~ .090 .090 .100 .110 M1.ch1.gan .032 .032 .041 .041 
Minnesota .132 .086 .086 
Missouri .040 .040 .180 .170 .007 .007 
Mississippi .067 .067 Montana 
Nebraska .050 .050 
N. Carolina .084 .084 .160 .135 .067 
N. Dakota. 
.100 N. Hampsh1.re 
New Jersey .050 .050 .092 .110 .004 .004 
New Mexico 
Nevada .060 .060 .110 .110 New York .0035 .0035 .050 .046 .0005 .0005 
Ohio .0205 .0205 .190 .190 .065 .018 Oklahoma .120 .140 .018 .018 
Pennsylvania .040 .013 .155 .137 .0005 .0005 Rhode Island 
s. Carolina .120 .120 .110 .092 
s. Dakota 
Tennessee .060 .130 .086 .086 
Texas .025 .025 .180 .190 .041 .086 
Utah Virginia .010 .010 .086 .100 .018 .018 VermQnt 
.086 .086 Wash1.ngton 
Wisconsin .041 .041 
w. Virginia .0325 .0325 .078 .091 .170 Wyoming 
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The errors on new items on the 1979 returns are 
indicated to be significantly greater for Kentucky and 
Virginia for all three tests. Testing for differences in 
the cumulative distribution indicates that the errors are 
significantly greater on the returns from Nebraska and 
Wisconsin than those on the returns from Oregon. 
TABLE X 
CLUSTERED STATES: COMPARISON WITH OREGON 
Hypothesis II Continuing Education 
States Sign Test Wilcoxon Test Kolmog:orov Test 
Compared Percent- Percent- Percent-
with Dollar age of Dollar age of Dollar age of 
Oregon Change Income Change Income Change Income 
Kansas 
Kentucky .050 .050 .043 .032 .067 .030 
Nebraska .050 .050 
Virginia .010 .010 .086 .100 .018 .018 
Wisconsin .041 .041 
Oregon Compared to the Northwestern States. The 
tests do not indicate differences (Table XI) among the 
TABLE XI 
NORTHWESTERN STATES: COMPARISON WITH OREGON 
States 
Compared 
With 
Oregon 
Alaska 
Idaho 
Montana 
Washington 
Wyoming 
Hypothesis II Continuing: Education 
Sign Test 
Percent-
Dollar age of 
Change Income 
Wilcoxon Test 
Percent-
Dollar age of 
Change Income 
Kolmogorov Test 
Percent-
Dollar age of 
Change Income 
.086 .086 
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Northwestern states other than an indication that the cumu-
lative distribution of Washington's errors is different. 
HyPothesis III 
Items which have continually caused problems for 
middle-income taxpayers were chosen from the tax returns. 
These items were included in AICPA seminars in 1979 because 
the procedure was complex or the recordkeeping was a 
problem for taxpayers~ Results for Hypothesis III are 
given in Tables XII through XVII~ 
Oregon Compared to Nonregulated States. Although the 
results (Table XII) from these tests are not as consistent, 
errors are shown to be larger on the returns from Florida, 
Georgia, New Mexico, Pennsylvania and .Tennessee. S~nce the 
Wilcoxon test is more sensitive to the magnitude of the 
errors, many significant differences are indicated by this 
test. Restating the dollar changes to percentages of 
income affects the E values for Missouri, North Carolina 
and Nevada. Preliminary evaluations showed that returns 
from Hawaii, South Carolina and Utah had smaller errors 
than those from Oregon. 
--···---· 
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TABLE XII 
NON REGULATED STATES: COMPARISON WITH OREGON 
p ( 
.20 
Hypothesis III Troublesome Items 
States Sign Test Wilcoxon Test Kolmogorov Test 
Compared Percent- Percent- Percent-
With Dollar age of Dollar age of Dollar age of 
Oregon Change Income Change Income Change Income 
Alaska .170 
Alabama .072 .068 .062 .120 
Arkansas .155 .097 .110 
Arizona .082 .090 Colorado .085 .135 .110 
Connecticut 
Delaware 
FloriQa .050 .050 .009 .018 .050 .050 Georg1.a .120 .050 .014 .032 .050 .050 
HawaJ.i 
Iowa .082 
I~fbo . I l.nOl.S .175 .200 
Indiana .170 .:70 .028 .075 
Kansas 
Ken1;uc;:ky LOUl.Sl.ana .082 .120 .160 
Massachusetts .170 .170 .068 .155 
Maryland .120 .007 .016 .020 .093 
M9in~ 
.120 .079 .110 .050 M1.ch1.gan 
Minnesota .120 .056 .140 .140 
Missouri .120 .oso .061 .079 .110 .050 
Mississippi .170 .170 Montana -
Nebraska .042 .140 
N. Carolina .140 .120 .130 .110 .005 
---N. Dakota. .062 .062 N. HampshJ.re .180 
New Jersey .110 .180 
New Mexico .030 .090 .032 .032 .055 .130 
Nevada .011 .011 .010 .028 .135 New York .140 .140 .024 .047 .050 
Ohio .120 .120 .100 
Oklahoma .170 .068 .133 
Pennsylvinia .120 .050 .056 .056 .110 .050 Rhode Is and 
s. Carolina 
s. Dakota .140 
Tennessee .025 .025 .051 .075 .120 .120 Texas .120 .110 .200 .050 .040 
Utah 
Virginia 
Vermont .154 
W~shington W1.scons1n .025 .072 .056 .123 
W. Virginia 
Wyoming 
Oregon Compared to Clustered States. The results 
(Table XIII) of the tests do not indicate that the errors 
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on the returns from Kansas, Kentucky or Virginia are larger 
than those from Oregon. Preliminary evaluations of the 
data indicated that the errors on the returns from Kansas 
were actually smaller. 
TABLE XIII 
CLUSTERED STATES: COMPARISON WITH OREGON 
Hypothesis III Troublesome Items 
States 
Compared 
With 
Oregon 
Kansas 
Kentucky 
Nebraska 
Virginia 
Wisconsin 
Sign Test 
Percent-
Dollar age of 
Change Income 
.025 .072 
Wilcoxon Test 
Percent-
Dollar age of 
Change Income 
.042 
.056 
.140 
.123 
Kolmogorov Test 
Percent-
Dollar age of 
Change Income 
The tests for differences in the cumulative distribu-
tions do not indicate differences between Oregon and 
Nebraska or Wisconsin. The sign test indicates that the 
errors are larger on the returns from Wisconsin. The 
Wilcoxon test indicates that the magnitude of the errors is 
larger on the returns from both Nebraska and Wisconsin and 
significant at the .OS level for dollar value. The results 
are not significant when the amounts are restated as per-
centages of income. 
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Oregon Compared to the Northwestern States. The 
tests (Table XIV) do not indicate differences in the error 
rates or amounts among the Northwestern states other than 
an indication that the dollar values of the errors may be 
larger on returns from Alaska. 
TABLE XIV 
NORTHWESTERN STATES: COMPARISON WITH OREGON 
States 
Compared 
With 
Oregon 
Alaska 
Idaho 
Montana 
Washington 
Wyoming 
Hypothesis III Troublesome Items 
Sign Test 
Percent-
Dollar age of 
Change Income 
Wilcoxon Test 
Percent-
Dollar age of 
Change Income 
.170 
Kolmogorov Test 
Percent-
Dollar age of 
Change Income 
California Compared to Nonregulated States. 
California is more comparable to the nonregulated states on 
the complex items, including farming and proprietorship 
income as shown on Table XV. The returns from New Mexico 
have larger errors and the results become significant when 
the dollar values are restated as percentages of income. 
The results from the other states are mixed. Preliminary 
evaluations of the data indicated that the errors on the 
returns from Connecticut, Kansas, Ohio and South Carolina 
are substantially smaller than those from California. 
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TABLE XV 
SELECTED NONREGULATED STATES: COMPARISON WITH CALIFORNIA 
p ! .20 
States 
Compared 
With 
Califronia 
Colorado 
Connecticut 
Delaware 
Florida 
Georgia 
Hawaii 
Maryland 
N. Dakota 
N. Hampshire 
New Jersey 
New Mexico 
Nevada 
New York 
Tennessee 
Hypothesis III Troublesome Items 
Sign Test 
Percent-
Dollar age of 
Change Income 
.132 
.090 
Wilcoxon Test 
Percent-
Dollar age of 
Change Income 
.020 
.124 
.073 
.140 
.032 
Kolmogorov Test 
Percent-
Dollar age of 
Change Income 
.135 
.170 
.135 
.056 
Texas .135 
California Compared to Clustered States. The tests 
(Table XVI) indicate that the errors on returns from 
Florida and North Dakota are larger than those from 
TABLE XVI 
CLUSTERED STATES: COMPARISON WITH CALIFORNIA 
p ~ .20 
States 
Compared 
With 
California 
Arizona 
Florida 
Hawaii 
N. Dakota 
New York 
Hypothesis III Troublesome Items 
Sign Test 
Percent-
Dollar age of 
Change Inccme 
Wilcoxon Test 
Percent-
Dollar age of 
Change Income 
.124 
.140 
Kolmogorov Test 
Percent-
Dollar age of 
Change Income 
.170 
---------------------------- ---~-
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California. The preliminary evaluation of the data indi-
cated that the errors on returns from Hawaii are smaller. 
California Compared to the Southwestern States. When 
the Southwestern states are compared with California (Table 
XVII) the tests indicate that the returns from New Mexico 
have larger errors. The initial evaluation of the data 
indicated that the errors on the returns from Utah are 
substantially smaller than those from California. 
TABLE XVII 
SOUTHWESTERN STATES: COMPARISON WITH CALIFORNIA 
p :i .20 
Hypothesis III Troublesome Items 
States 
Compared 
With 
California 
Arizona 
Colorado 
Hawaii 
New Mexico 
Nevada 
Utah 
Sign Test 
Percent-
Dollar age of 
Change Income 
.090 
Hypothesis IV 
Wilcoxon Test 
Percent-
Dollar age of 
Change Income 
.200 .032 
Kolmogorov Test 
Percent-
Dollar age of 
Change Income 
.056 
In the preceding tests, individual items from the tax 
returns were chosen to test integrity, effectiveness of 
continuing education and competence on the commercial 
preparer on complex items. This hypothesis is designed to 
test the differences on the return caused by the cumulative 
effect of errors on totals for income, adjustments and 
deductions. Summaries of test results are presented in 
Tables XVIII through XXII. 
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Oregon Compared With Nonregulated States. When the 
total errors on the returns from Oregon and the nonregu-
lated states are compared (Table XVIII), Alabama, 
Minnesota, Oklahoma and Texas have larger errors with £ 
values of .02 or less. The errors on returns from Florida, 
Georgia, Mississippi and New Mexico are larger and the 
results are sensitive to the restatement of the dollar 
values to percentages of income. Preliminary evaluations 
of the data indicate that the differences on the returns 
from Massachusetts, Rhode Island and New Hampshire are 
smaller. Reference to the bar graphs in Appendix A con-
firms that these states have smaller total errors. 
Oregon Compared With Clustered States. The tests do 
not indicate that the errors are larger on the returns from 
Kansas or Nehraska as shown on Table XIX. All of the tests 
indicate that the errors on tax returns for Kentucky are 
siqnificantly larger. The sign test indicates that the 
errors are larger on the returns from Virginia and 
Wisconsin. 
----------------------------------------
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TABLE XVIII 
NONREGULATED STATES: COMPARISON WITH OREGON 
p ~ .20 
Hypothesis IV Totals 
States Sign Test Wilcoxon Test Kolmogorov Test 
Comoared Percent- Percent- Percent-
with Dollar age of Dollar age of Dollar age of 
Oregon Change Income Change Income Change Income 
Alaska .110 :o93 
Alabama .020 .020 .006 .003 .002 .0005 
Arkansas .073 .073 .050 .050 .093 .093 Arizona .110 .080 Colorado .180 Connecticut 
Delaware 
Flori9a .073 .020 .010 .004 .033 .033 
Georg~a .020 .020 .017 .010 .093 .033 
Hawa~i .190 .091 
Iowa .068 .079 .093 
Idaho . a068 .050 .200 Illino~s .073 .021 .0075 .093 
Indiana 
Kansas 
Kent;:u<;:ky .200 .073 .017 .005 .033 .033 
Lou~s~ana .200 
Massachusetts 
Maryland .073 .073 .036 .050 
M~in~ .200 .140 M1ch1gan .120 .033 
Minnesota .020 .003 .012 .006 .009 .033 
Missouri .190 .100 .160 .130 .093 
Mississippi .073 .002 .042 .021 .093 .093 Montana 
Nebraska 
N. Carolina .155 
N. Dakota. .073 .073 .110 .059 N. Hampsh1re .124 
New Jersey .021 .030 .009 .033 
New Mexico .073 .073 .030 .014 .093 .033 
Nevada .020 .020 .030 .025 .093 .093 New York .073 .020 .030 .021 .002 .033 Ohio Oklahoma .020 .003 .0025 .002 .009 .002 
Pennsylvania .073 .003 .012 .0025 .009 .033 Rhode Island 
s. Carolina .020 .060 .010 .093 .093 
s. Dakota .065 .031 .093 .032 
Tennessee .073 .020 .025 .025 .093 
Texas .020 .020 .008 .006 .002 .0005 
Utah 
Virginia .200 
Vermont .193 
W~shingt:on W1scons1n .200 
w. Virginia .020 .073 .012 .036 .033 
Wyoming 
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TABLE XIX 
CLUSTERED STATES: COMPARISON WITH OREGON 
p ~ .20 
States 
Compared 
With 
Oregon 
Kansas 
Kentucky 
Nebraska 
Virginia 
Wisconsin 
Hypothesis IV Totals 
Sign Test 
Percent-
Dollar age of 
Change Income 
.200 .073 
.200 
.200 
Wilcoxon Test 
Percent-
Dollar age of 
Change Income 
.017 .005 
Kolmogorov Test 
Percent-
Dollar age of 
Change Income 
.033 .033 
Oregon Compared With Northwestern States. The tests 
indicate that the errors on totals of income, adjustments 
and deductions are larger on the returns from Idaho as 
shown on Table XX. The Wilcoxon test indicates that the 
differenc~s are significant. The tests indicate that the 
dollar values of errors on the returns from Alaska are 
larger, but not significant. When the errors are restated 
TABLE XX 
NORTHWESTERN STATES: COMPARISON WITH OREGON 
p i .20 
States 
Compared 
With 
Oregon 
Alaska 
Idaho 
Montana 
Washington 
Wyoming 
Hypothesis IV Totals 
Sign Test 
Percent-
Dollar age of 
Change Income 
Wilcoxon Test 
Percent-
Dollar age of 
Change Income 
.110 
.068 .oso 
Kolmogorov Test 
Percent-
Dollar age of 
Change Income 
.093 
.200 
to percentages of income, the differences are no longer 
evident. The tests do not indicate larger errors for 
returns from Montana, Washington and Wyoming. 
California Compared With the Nonregulated States. 
The tests {Table XXI) indicate that Alabama, Oklahoma and 
Texas have larger errors than California. These results 
are consistent with the ranking of the states using the 
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totals of all of the errors. The results of the tests are 
similar to the information obtained from the density stripe 
graph in Appendix c. Other than single extreme values from 
New Mexico, South Dakota and Delaware, only the sample from 
Oklahoma contains consistently larger values than those 
from California. 
TABLE XXI 
SELECTED NONREGULATED STATES: COMPARISON WITH CALIFORNIA 
p i .20 
Hyeothesis IV Totals 
Sign Test States 
Compared 
With 
California 
Percent-
Dollar age of 
Change Income 
Alabama 
N. Hampshire 
New Jersey 
New Mexico 
Nevada 
New York 
Ohio 
Oklahoma 
Texas 
Utah 
Wilcoxon Test 
Percent-
Dollar age of 
Change Income 
.120 
.136 
.174 .068 
Kolmogorov Test 
Percent-
Dollar age of 
Change Income 
.093 
.093 
---------------------------------------------------
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California Compared With the Clustered States. A 
separate table is not presented for these results since the 
nonparametric tests do not indicate differences in the 
errors among any of the clustered states. The initial 
evaluation of the data indicated that the errors on the 
returns from Arizona, Hawaii and North Dakota are smaller 
than California's errors. 
California Compared With Southwestern States. The 
tests, shown on Table XXII, indicate that New Mexico is the 
only state among the Southwestern states that has larger 
errors than California. Ranking the states on the bar 
graphs indicated that the errors on returns from New Mexico 
were the largest among all of the states. The initial eva-
luation of the data indicated that the errors were smaller 
on returns from Colorado and Utah. 
TABLE XXII 
SOUTHWESTERN STATES: COMPARISON WITH CALIFORNIA 
p ~ .20 
States 
Compared 
With 
California 
"-:--""""-Z"1.L .L ~\,11.1.1(;,1, 
Colorado 
Hawaii 
New Mexico 
Nevada 
Utah 
Hypothesis IV Totals 
Sign Test 
Percent-
Dollar age of 
Change Income 
Wilcoxon Test 
Percent-
Dollar age of 
Change Income 
.136 
Kolmogorov Test 
Percent-
Dollar age of 
Change Income 
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Hypothesis V 
The final hypothesis is designed to evaluate the dif-
ferences between levels of occupational regulation. 
California registers commercial tax preparers while Oregon 
has a strict licensing system. The data is evaluated for 
each of the preceding four hypotheses in Table XXIII. 
TABLE XXIII 
COMPARISON OF CALIFORNIA WITH OREGON 
p ! .20 
Hypothesis V Differences in Regulation Levels 
Sign Test Wilcoxon Test Rolmogorov Test 
Percent- Percent- Percent-
Dollar age of Dollar age of Dollar age of 
Hypothesis Change Income Change Income Change Income 
Integrity .001 .001 .004 .005 .011 .011 
Education .004 .004 .053 .050 .001 .001 
Complexity .004 .016 .003 .010 .120 
Totals .()03 .ooo .0015 .001 .002 .009 
Integrity of the Commercial Preparer. All of the 
nonparametric tests indicate that the errors on Oregon's 
returns are smaller withE values of .01 or less. 
Effects of Continuing Education. The nonparametric 
tests indicate that the errors in Oregon are smaller, pri-
marily the £ values are .05. Continuing education was 
required in Oregon during 1979 for all commercial pre-
parers. 
Complexity of Items. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test 
indicates that the cumulative distribution of the errors in 
Oregon is smaller. The sign test and the Wilcoxon tests 
indicate that the number and magnitude of errors are 
smaller for Oregon with E values of .OS. 
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Total Errors. All of the tests indicate that the 
errors for Oregon are smaller with £ values of .OS or less. 
CHAPTER VI 
INTERPRETATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
The research hypothesis is that state regulation of 
commercial income tax preparers would improve the quality 
of income tax return preparation. For purposes of the 
analysis, the level of quality is the size of errors made 
on returns filed during the 1979 tax season. The 1979 
Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP) files 
provide the data for analysis. The analysis is divided 
into two parts: the first being a descriptive analysis. 
The second part of the analysis used nonparametric statis-
tical methods to determine if there are significant dif-
ferences among ret~rns prepared by commercial preparers in 
nonregulated and regulated states. 
SUMMARY 
Descriptive Measures 
The first objective of the analysis is to describe 
the data because the 1979 TCMP files have not been pre-
viously available for academic research. The 1969 TCMP 
files were released to academics in 1981 and research has 
been completed and published by Clotfelter (1983) and Witte 
and Woodbury (1985). Both of these studies are used to 
provide background information for this analysis of the 
1979 TCMP data. 
92 
Model tax returns were prepared for each major type 
of tax preparer and for each state pertinent to the 
research question. The differences between the reported 
amounts and the corrected amounts from the returns appear 
to be highest among professionally prepared returns and 
lowest among returns prepared by individual taxpayers. 
Returns completed by commercial preparers vary in accuracy 
between the other two categories. 
When the errors are restated as percentages of 
income, the pattern remains. Errors, as percentages of 
income, are highest among professional preparers. The 
largest errors appear on returns prepared by commercial 
preparers in New Mexico, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Texas and 
Alabama. The smallest errors appear on commercially pre-
pared returns from Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New 
Hampshire and Connecticut. 
A number of charts and graphs were prepared to 
analyze the differences among the commercially prepared 
returns. The final procedure in the descriptive section 
was to cluster the states based on taxpayer compliance and 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) administrative activities. 
Based on these attributes, Oregon clusters with midwestern 
states, Kentucky and Virginia, while California clusters 
with sun-belt states and New York. 
Analysis Using Nonparametric Statistics 
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Differences are evident from the descriptive analy-
sis. The next step is to determine if the differences are 
significant. The sample size is 20,883 partitioned by four 
types of commercial preparers in 50 states. The 1979 TCMP 
data are aggregated as means by the preparer types by 
districts. Measures of dispersion such as range or 
variance are not available. Therefore, for testing, each 
mean was treated as a single observation. Because of the 
resulting small sample sizes, nonparametric methods were 
used to test the hypotheses. 
Items were chosen from the returns to test integrity 
of the preparers, continuing education requirements, com-
petency on complex items and total differences on income, 
adjustments and deductions. To summarize the results, the 
comparisons of Oregon and the nonregulated states are pre-
sented first. The hypotheses are combined and presented to 
compare California and the nonregulated states. Finally, 
differences in levels of regulation between Oregon and 
California are tested. 
Hypothesis I. Items were chosen from the returns 
which the IRS had used during 1972 to test the integrity of 
commercial taxpayers. When Oregon is compared to all of 
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the states on these items, the errors on the returns are 
substantially higher among the nonregulated states. 
Clustering the states reduces the differences. The states 
in the Northwest appear to be more similar to Oregon than 
the clustered states. The results indicate that Oregon has 
larger errors than Delaware, North Dakota and Vermont. The 
three tests produced very similar results, although the 
Wilcoxon test appears to be slightly more sensitive. 
Hypothesis II. Items which affected middle-income 
taxpayers were chosen from the 1977 and 1978 tax legisla-
tion (Aronson, Greene, Fisher and Co., 1979). These new 
items on the 1979 returns were chosen to test the effec-
tiveness of Oregon's continuing education requirements for 
commercial tax preparers. Again, most of the nonregulated 
states have larger errors than Oregon. Returns from 
Hawaii, South Dakota and Kansas have smaller errors than 
Oregon. The Wilcoxon test is the least sensitive. The 
clustered states are more similar, the errors are larger 
than Oregon, but there are not as many significant dif-
ferences. The differences between Oregon and the other 
states in the Northwest are not significant. 
Hypothesis III. Items were chosen from the returns 
which caused problems for taxpayers and accounted for a 
large percentage of changes on many tax returns. The 
Wilcoxon test appears to be the most sensitive to the dif-
ferences. Most of the states again have larger errors than 
~~~~-~- ----------------------------
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Oregon, but there are not as many significant results. 
Wisconsin has larger errors among the clustered states but 
there are no significant differences among the Northwestern 
states. Hawaii, South Carolina and Utah have smaller 
errors than Oregon. 
Hypothesis IV. The totals for income, adjustments 
and deductions were chosen from the returns to test for the 
cumulative differences in the total amounts from the 
returns. As the totals are accumulated, the differences 
between Oregon and the nonregulated states are significant. 
Massachusetts, Rhode Island and New Hampshire have smaller 
errors. Again, Kentucky has larger errors among the 
clustered states and Idaho has the larger errors among the 
Northwestern states. Using just the totals necessitated a 
smaller sample from the returns making nonparametric tests 
even more appropriate. The three tests produce similar 
results on these smaller samples. 
Hypotheses I, III and IV for California. The 
research hypotheses are similar to test the differences 
between California and the nonregulated states. 
California's preparers were not required to complete con-
tinuing education courses so Hypothesis II was omitted. 
The results from testing all of the remaining hypotheses 
are not significant so it is logical to combine the 
results. For each hypothesis, California's errors are 
substantially larger than a majority of the nonregulated 
96 
states. A few states have larger errors than California, 
but those differences are not significant. Only New 
Mexico's errors are significantly larger than California's 
on the complex items, which contributes to the largest 
total errors on returns from New Mexico when the totals 
from the returns are considered. 
Hypothesis v. The final tests were designed to com-
pare the levels of regulation. The state of California has 
the least restrictive form of regulation while Oregon main-
tains a strict licensing program for commercial tax pre-
parers. All of the tests detected significant differences 
between the error rates on returns prepared in Oregon and 
California. California's errors are significantly higher 
in all of the areas as measured by all three of the· tests. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Does state regulation of commercial income tax pre-
parers affect the quality of income tax return preparation? 
Evaluation of the model returns prepared for the various 
states indicates that the error rates for Oregon are among 
the lowest in the United States. Graphing the results also 
indicates that Oregon's returns have smaller errors. The 
nonparametric statistical tests lead to the same conclu-
sion. 
The initial description of the analysis leads to the 
conclusion that the error rates on amounts in Oregon are 
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significantly less than those measured in nonregulated 
states. If the research had concluded at this point, the 
results would have been misleading. It seemed necessary to 
consider prior research, taxpayer attributes and regional 
differences among the states, and these refinements of the 
research question lead to less conclusive results. 
In evaluating Oregon with the clustered states and 
among the states of the Northwest, the results of the 
statistical analysis are less clear. The differences are 
less evident. Often no differences are indicated by the 
tests. The descriptive measures continue to indicate that 
the errors in Oregon are smaller, but these measures do not 
offer any statistical significance. When the totals for 
all of the items are considered for Hypothesis IV, the New 
England states have smaller errors than those on returns 
from Oregon. 
In conclusion, when Oregon is compared to all of the 
states in the United States, the tests indicate that the 
null hypotheses can be rejected. When the analysis is put 
in a historical perspective and Oregon is clustered with 
the states of similar tax administrative attributes, the 
results are less clear. The descriptive statistics still 
indicate that Oregon's errors are smaller but the non-
parametric tests do not produce significant results. 
The results are much clearer for the comparisons of 
California and the nonregulated states. The tests do not 
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indicate that regulation in California lowers the amount or 
rate of errors on any of the groups of items chosen to test 
the hypotheses. When California is clustered with states 
of similar taxpayer attributes, the state clusters with 
states of lesser compliance. This may be due to the IRS 
administrative activities which are higher in all of these 
states, presumably to improve compliance. The non-
parametric and descriptive statistics lead to similar 
conclusions. Although New Mexico's errors are larger than 
California's, the remaining states either have smaller 
errors or the nonparametric tests do not detect substantial 
differences. None of the results obtained from testing the 
samples of the returns from California would indicate that 
registration or bonding of California's commercial pre-
parers is effective in lowering the error rate below com-
parable states. 
The final hypothesis was designed to evaluate the 
effectiveness of less stringent occupational regulation. 
As with the first evaluation concerning Oregon and other 
states, the statistical tests provide clear results. The 
error rates on returns from California are significantly 
higher than those on returns from Oregon. The null 
hypothesis can be rejected. A qualification seems 
necesssary here since it is apparent from the remainder of 
the research that California is not comparable to Oregon 
witnout considering other factors. California and Oregon 
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not only have different state regulation of commercial tax 
preparers, cluster analysis and historical information 
indicate that the taxpaying public is different. The 
statistical tests give clear signals, but there may be 
other factors involved in the differences on the returns 
from Oregon ~nd California. 
LIMITATIONS 
Research based on data collected for other purposes 
than the one used for the particular analysis has a number 
of limitations. The TCMP data is in an aggregate form by 
district and does not contain measures of dispersion for 
those districts. Therefore, the type of statistical 
analysis that could be used to test for the differences was 
limited. 
When the preliminary descriptions of the data were 
evaluated, it became apparent that the level of aggregation 
of the data presented a second problem. The effect of 
negative errors cancelled the effect of positive errors on 
the returns. That is, errors in favor of the taxpayer were 
cancelled by errors made in favor of the Treasury. As a 
result, the totals of the errors for the districts had to 
be understated but the amount of the understatement cannot 
be estimated from the data available. 
There are three other weaknesses in the TCMP data 
mentioned by Clotfelter (1983) that are relevant but of 
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lesser importance to this study. First, the information 
compiled from each individual tax return includes the 
reported amounts from the original return and the amounts 
the auditor deemed "correct" following the audit. Because 
these amounts only represent the IRS's opinion on taxes 
due, these "corrected" amounts may be appealed and thus are 
not necessarily "true." The second weakness is that it is 
difficult for auditors to detect many forms of unreported 
income. Third, the TCMP data fails to reflect information 
on taxpayers who did not file tax returns (Clotfelter, 
1983: 366). 
Finally, there is confusion among taxpayers as to the 
different types of tax preparers. The taxpayers were asked 
to identify the type of preparer who completed their 
return. These responses, classifying the tax preparer, 
were not verified by the TCMP examiner. Any inaccuracy in 
the responses of the taxpayers would be reflected in the 
results obtained from the analysis. 
Regardless of the limitations, the TCMP data are the 
only source of information about the actual quality of 
returns prepared by commercial income tax preparers. 
SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The TCMP data offers a treasure of information for 
analysis of a large sample of the tax returns filed in 
1979. This data will soon be available for general 
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academic research. The TCMP data from 1969 was released 
with the information aggregated at the three digit zip code 
level. If this is possible for the 1979 TCMP data, some of 
the problems encountered in this research will be miti-
gated. Specifically, measures of dispersion can be calcu-
lated for each district. In addition, the magnitude of the 
~roblem of negative and positive errors may be subject to 
estimation. Most important, the learning process involved 
in accessing the data for this project can be carried over 
and used to facilitate research on the many issues involved 
in the complete data base from the 1979 TCMP cycle. 
The 1979 TCMP data provided for this research were 
sorted by district by tax return preparer. When the 1979 
TCMP data is made generally available, other copies of the 
print tapes should facilitate research in related areas. 
For example, the data will be sorted by IRS district by 
income level. It is evident from the decriptive analysis 
in this research that there are differences in tax 
compliance among income levels. There will be an oppor-
tunity, with the added information, to investigate the 
effect of levels of income on tax compliance. A sort by 
occupation code will also be available, adding to the 
opportunities for investigation. 
Of particular interest to researchers investigating 
the incidence of tax preparer penalties will be data sorted 
by IRS district by fraud or negligence penalties. If tax 
preparer code designations are also available with this 
data, questions about penalties relative to the type of 
tax preparer can be addressed. 
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Subsequent samples taken by the IRS as a part of the 
TCMP examinations have not included questions regarding the 
type of preparer involved in return preparation. Other 
important questions can be addressed by using the data from 
the 1982 TCMP cycle but the issue or regulation of commer-
cial income tax preparers cannot be directly addressed 
unless the IRS can be convinced to add such questions to 
their questionnaires. 
Longitudinal studies should be possible which would 
assess the effectiveness of IRS administratige activities. 
Tax legislation has addressed the compliance of taxpayers 
on a number of the items tested in this study. Further 
research is necessary to determine if tax administration or 
legislation is improving compliance on those items. 
Unfortunately, only a limited number of research 
papers, using the TCMP data, has been published due to 
restricted access to the information. The TCMP data pro-
vide an exciting, unique opportunity for research. It is 
important to expand the access to the data and to encourage 
academic research from a wider variety of disciplines. 
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APPENDIX A 
BAR CHARTS 
' 
I I 
0 5000 10boo 15000 
Total Dollar Changes 
Figure 2. Taxpayer Compliance Measurement 
Program (TCMP) examination sample data total 
dollar errors by state. 
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Figure 3. Taxpayer Compliance Measurement 
Program (TCMP) examination sample data 
percentage of income. 
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APPENDIX B 
TCMP DATA AND MODEL TAX RETURNS 
TABLE XXIV 
HYPOTHESIS I EXAMPLE OF TCMP DATA PREPARED 
FOR STATISTICAL.TESTS 
PREPARER TAX ITEM CALIFORNIA OREGON 
CHAhiGE IN DOLLARS 
PUBLIC ACCT. EXENPTION $19.43 $0.00 
TIP INCOME $U.00 $960.47 
t·IEDICAL INS. $13.51 $0.00 
OTHER MEDICAL $343.59 :!=5.67 
CASH CONT. '*'39.42 $15.09 
NON-CASH CONT $27.31 $194.18 
NAT.L TAX EXEMPTION $122.54 $6.62 
TIP INCOME $-470.43 $90.03 
I'IEDICAL INS. $6. :.r3 $1.80 
OTHER NED I CAL $318.66 $=140. 43 
CASH CONT. $176.48 $121.66 
NON-CASH C.ONT $41.41 $50.67 
LOCAL TAX EXEMPTION $275.04 $16.81 
TIP INCOME $318.47 $488.84 
MEDICAL INS. $15. 12 $3.04 
OTHER MEDICAL $194.32 $8.02 
CASH CONT. $89.98. $25.90 
NON-CASH CONT :!17.27 $15.20 
OTHER PAID EXEMPTION $210. 04· $t).00 
TIP HJC011E $252.97 :1:0. t)O 
MEDICAL INS. $25.20 $9.89 
OTHEF: 1·1EDICAL $414.".1.7 $1"'2. 15 
GiSH COI'.IT. :1'101. 93 $0.57 
NOI\1-CASH CONT :i'167. 74 :¥64.89 
RANK TOTAL :!=3.661. 86 $2.361.94 
PERCENT OF INC01'1E 
PUBLIC ACCT. EXEI•IPTION 0.0767 0.0000 
TIP INCOME 0. (1000 8.9101 
NED I CAL INS. 0.0533 0.0000 
OTHER I•IEDICAL 1.3556 0.0526 
CASH CONT. 0.1555 0.1400 
NOI\1-CASH CONT t). il>/8 1. 8014 
NAT'L TAX EXEMPTION 0.8368 0.0425 
TIP HJCOME 3.:2125 0.5776 
t-IED I CAL INS. 0.0459 0.0116 
OTHER MEDICAL 2.1761 0.9009 
CASH CONT. 1.2052 0.7805 
NON-CASH CONT 0.2828 0.3251 
LOCAL TAX EXEMPTION 1.5304 0.0745 
TIP INCOME 1. 7721 2. 1673 
MEDICAL INS. 0.0841 0.0135 
OTHER MEDICAL 1. t)813 t). 0355 
CASH CONT. 0.5007 0.1148 
NON-CASH CONT O.t)961 (1. (1674 
OTHER PAID EXEI'IPTION 1.1896 0.0000 
TIF INCDI"IE 1.4327 o. 00(•(1 
I'IEDICAL INS. 0.1427 0 .. 0563 
OTHER MEDICAL 2.3463 0.8087 
CASH CONT. (1. 5773 t).0033 
r·JON-CASH CDNT t). !:?501 ~). ::.69:: 
RAI'JK TOTAL 21.2.117 17.2528 
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TABLE XXV 
HYPOTHESIS II EXAMPLE OF TCMP DATA PREPARED 
FOR STATISTICAL TESTS 
PREF'ARER TAX 1TEi1 C?;LIFOF:NIA Ot::;;EGON 
CHANGE IN DOLLARS 
PUBLIC ACCT. CAPITAL G.~ IN $224.30 $9.21 
CAPITAL GAIN :¥37.80 ~:o.oo 
CAPITAL GAIN $129.11 $477.24 
I R A $187.11 $0. <)0 
RES. ENERGY CR. $2.63 $0.0(1 
EARNED INC. CR $56.37 $0.00 
NAT'L TAX CAPITAL GAUl $1 "134. 14 $294.91 
CAPITAL GAIN $1.33 
CAPITAL GAIN $882.40 :t1 "753. 14 
I R A $46.84 $0.00 
RES. ENERGY CR. $20.80 ~0.00 
EARNED INC. CR $42.35 $3.01 
LOCAL TAX CAPITAL G•=IIN $690.86 $11.72 
CAPITAL GAIN $69.10 
CAPITAL GAIN $518.57 $1"974.37 
I R A $0.89 :::354.5tl 
RES. Ei-JERGY CR. $15.27 $12.95 
EARNED INC. CR :*'171. 95 $27.96 
OTHER P!-HD Ci~P1TAL Gc=\IN $1"964.88 $1,142.43 
CAPITAL G{ili'J $8.:':2 
CAPITf.1L Gi~IH $1~128.'·?5 ::1·(,. o~-~ 
1 i-\ r: :!'198. 3<) ::i:O.,)tJ 
RES. £i'JERGY CF.. :;1::27.17 :f4. 5(1 
EARNED INC. CR $136.28 :.$:/.66 
RANK TOTAL $7"696.09 $6,U73.64 
PERCENT OF II•ICOI·!E 
PUBLIC ACCT. CAPITAL GAIN o. 885<) (1. 0854 
C?\PI TAL GAIN (1. 1Ll91 v. 000<) 
CAPITAL GAIN 0.5094 4.4273 
I R (-.~ •). 7382 (l. 0000 
HES. E"-IERGY CR. 0.0104 (l. (l(l(l(l 
EARI·IED INC. CR o. :222'f t)., (J(H)O 
NAT'L TAX CAPITAL G.:iiN 7. 74lf'i 1. 8920 
CAPITAL GAll~ 0.0091 
CAPITAL GAIN b.0258 11.2474 
I R A 0.3198 0.0000 
RES. ENERGY CR. 0.1420 0.0000 
EARNED INC. CR 0.2892 0.0193 
LOCAL TAX CAPITAL GAIN 3.8442 0.0520 
CAPITAL GAIN 0.3845 
CAPITAL GAIN 2.8855 8.7534 
I R A 0.(l(l4<;- 1. ~·i18 
RES. ENERGY Cl":. 0. 085(• o.vo74 
EARNED INC. CR 0.':'568 0. 124U 
fJTHEF: PAID CAPITAL GAHJ 11. 1286 6.4998 
Ct4F"ITAL GPdN o. <.149•+ 
CAPITAL GAHJ 6.:59<f1 () • ~)(H)() 
I !"; A 1. '1.231 t). t)(.lt)(, 
F:ES. ENERGY CR. o. 15.39 \)., t)256 
t::ARNt:O lNC. CR <). Ti18 0. CJ4.::.6 
RC4NK rnT.~L 44.8273 34.7989 
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TABLE XXVI 
HYPOTHESIS III EXAMPLE OF TCMP DATA PREPARED 
FOR STATISTICAL TESTS 
PF:EPt~RER 
PUBLIC ACCT. 
NAT'L rAX 
OTHER PAlD 
PUBLIC ACCT. 
NAT'L ft-1X 
LOCAL TAX 
OTHER PAID 
TAX ITEM 
CASUALTY LOSS 
MOVING EXPENSE 
INCOME AVERAGE 
SCHEDULE C 
FARI1 INCOME 
CASUALTY LOSS 
I•IOVING EXPENSE 
!NCOt-lE AVERAGE 
SCHEDULE C 
FAR~l INCOI1E 
Ct~SUAL TY LOSS 
110lJINI~ EXPE::NSE 
I NCOt-IE AVERI~GE: 
SCHEDULE C 
FARI1 I NCOMC: 
CASWiL 1 Y LlJSS 
MOVIi~G EXPENSE 
I NCot1E AV!::Ri-II~E 
SCHEDULE C 
Fi~RM HJC:Ui1E:: 
F:ANK TOTAL 
CASIJI~L TY LOSS 
MOVING Ei:PE!·JSE 
INCmtE AVERAGE 
SCHEDULE C 
FARM INCOt-1E 
Ci-iSUALTY LOSS 
t•lll'.'ING EXPENSE 
1 NCOME t-;VER?-iGE 
SCHEDULE C 
FARM I NCOt-1E 
CASUALTY LOSS 
I-lOVING EXPENSE 
INCot1E AVERAGE 
SCHEDULE C 
FARM INCOME 
CASUALTY LOSS 
MOVING EXPENSE 
1 NCOI•IE AVERAGE 
SCHEDULE C 
FARI1 I NCOI"lE 
F:ANI< TOTAL 
CALIFORNIA OREGON 
CHANGE IN DOLLARS 
$367.34 
$166.63 
$713.60 
:t-2,976.89 
$2,790.11 
;1>1 '\)58. 56 
$505.86 
:1::22c. 06 
$1,720.36 
$3,663.45 
:.::-:281.57 
::>:237 • .i 1 
$643.11 
$2,0:::!.9. 80 
$1,489.84 
$9.26 
:!'7.98 
$0.00 
$2,887.56 
$909.56 
$1,441.93 
:H91. 04 
$446.85 
$241.49 
:!1,419.64 
$2,521.61 
$1-'i-6. 69 
$20-i. 09 
$302.53 
$1,354.09 
$737.14 
:f-126. 38 
-*·-36'-i'. uo $89. 56 
$3,077.51 $~~6.78 
~2.554.~) S478.8o 
$24,898.03 $14,023.79 
PERCENT OF I t-1COI'IE 
1.4493 
0.6574 
2.8155 
11.7451 
11.0082 
7.2289 
3.4545 
1. 54~~7 
11.7 1~82 
25.0175 
1.5668 
1.3194 
3.5785 
11.3502 
8.2900 
0.0524 
0.0452 
2.0899 
17.4303 
14.4653 
136.8563 
o. (iQ(i(l 
26. 78"74 
8.4378 
13.3766 
1. 2:2:56 
2.8668 
1. 5493 
9.1078 
16.1776 
0.6504 
0.9181 
l.S413 
6.0034 
3.2681 
0.7190 
2. 9'-'}7(1 
2.7244 
98. 6oC1.2 
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TABLE XXVII 
HYPOTHESIS IV EXAMPLE OF TCMP DATA PREPARED 
FOR STATISTICAL TESTS 
PREPARER TAX ITEI"'/TOTAL CAL1FORNII-1 OREGOI-l 
CHAhiGE IN DOLLARS 
PUBLIC ACCT. INCOME $'1.,112.01 $275.86 
ADJUSTMENTS $298. :'8 $49.30 
DEDUCTIONS :1;:302. 66 $1:26.78 
NAT'L TAX INCOME $475.68 $223.06 
ADJUSTMEI'ITS $:530.90 $309.22 
DEDUCTIONS :!'440.84 :t::::.25.80 
LOCAL TAX INCOI"IE $731.87 $617.83 
ADJUSTMENTS *'289. 44 :t-180. 40 
DEDUCTIONS $718.05 ;4:25.85 
OTHER PAID 11-lCOI'lE. l<t. ~ :.ou. t)9 ::;:.183. 3~ 
ADJUSTMENTS $736.09 $16.75 
DEDUCTIONS $883.17 $893.17 
RANK TOTAL $7,679.57 $3,227.40 
PERCEIH OF INCOME 
PUBLIC ACCT. INCOME 4.5887 2.6263 
ADJUSTME!'!TS 1 .. 2329 U.4694 
DEDUCTIONS l. 24·89 1.2070 
i·IIH ·;. TAX II·ICOI·iE 3 .. 3574 1.<1518 
ADJUSTMENTS 2 . .3356 2.0126 
DEDUCTIOtJS :.:: .• 111~ 2.1206 
LOCAL TAX INCONE 4.2453 2.8163 
f.)QJUSTMENTS 1. 6189 0.82::23 
OEDUCT I 01\lS 4.1651 (:.1178 
OTHER PAID JNCOI·1E 8.3461 1. 0326 
ADJ USTI'IENTS 4.5170 0.0943 
DEDUCTIONS 5 .. 4195 5.0291 
RANK TOTAL 44.24'11 19.8001 
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TABLE XXVIII 
MODEL OF TAX RETURNS PREPARED BY ALL TYPES OF TAXPAYERS 
IN FIFTY STATES 
Reported Corrected Change 
0.09 EXEMPTIONS 
INCOME 
2.42 2.33 
Wages/Salaries 
Tips 
Interest 
Farming 
Schedule C 
$13.204.95 
$12.13 
$801.88 
$28.49 
$629.69 
$36.70 
$294.05 
Ta>: Refunds 
Capital Gain-Sch D 
Not Sch D 
Form 4797 
Dividends 
Rent/Royalties 
Partnerships 
S Corporation& 
Other Income 
TOTAL INCOME* 
ADJUSTMENTS 
$4.23 
$7.66 
$359.96 
$55.62 
$140.26 
$27.87 
$60.39 
$16.168.45 
========= 
Moving E>:penses $33.36 
Employee E):penses $118.18 
IRA Payments $~5.75 
TOTAL ADJUSTMENTS* $253.57 
ADJ. GROSS INCOME $15,914.88 
ITEMIZED DEDUCTION 
Medical Insurance 
Other Medical 
State Ta::es 
Real Estate Taxes 
Cash Contribution 
Non-Cash Contrib. 
Mortgage Interest 
Other Interest 
Cas~alty Losses 
.Misc. Deduction 
TOTAL DEDUCTIONS* 
INCOME TAXES 
Tax/Table/Sch. 
Income Averaging 
Maximum Tax 
Energy Credit 
TOTAL TAXES* 
~arned Income Cr. 
PENALTY/INTEREST 
========= 
$72.44 
$395.16 
$1,082.23 
$707.63 
$706.33 
$106.74 
$1,807.53 
$986.34 
$110.88 
$414.16 
$6,876.53 
======== 
$2,039.52 
$504.65 
$261.30 
($6. 13) 
$2,827.18 
======== 
($26.15) 
$26.77 
SAMPLE SIZE = ~4,565 
$13,243.46 
$19.43 
$834.20 
$82.65 
$830.71 
1 $40.43 
$327.53 
$4.83 
$23.97 
$382.65 
$100.11 
$179.93 
$42.77 
$105.96 
$16,740.77 
========= 
$30.75 
$95.06 
. $34.09 
$223.66 
$16,517.10 
========= 
$65.69 
$331.10 
$1,074.40 
$682.60 
$644.98 
$97.61 
$1,781.13 
$943.96 
$70.76 
$340.70 
$6,500.59 
======== 
$2,192.16 
$561.06 
$289.73 
. ($4.84) 
$3,079.74 
======== 
$38.51 
$7.30 
$32.32 
$54.16 
$201.02 
$3.73 
$33.48 
$0.60 
$16.31 
$22.69 
$44.49 
$39.67 
:$14.90 
$45.57 
$572.32 
======= 
($2. 61> 
($23. 12> 
($1.66) 
($29. 91) 
$602.22 
======= 
($6. 75) 
($64. 06) 
($7.83) 
($25.03) 
($61. 35) 
($9.13) 
($26.40) 
($42.38) 
(:$40. 12) 
($73.46) 
($375.94) 
======== 
$152.64 
$56.41 
$28.43 
$1.29 
$252.56 
====== 
($17.91) $8.24 
$190.24 $163.47 
Percent 7. of Total 
Change 
3.78 
0.29 
60.18 
4.03 
190.10 
31.92 
10.16 
11.39 
14.18 
212.92 
6.30 
79.99 
28.28 
53.46 
75.46 
3.54 
-7.82 
-19.56 
-4.64 
-11.80 
3.78 
-9.32 
-16.21 
-0.72 
-3.54 
-8.69 
-8.55 
-1.46 
-4.30 
-36.18 
-17.74 
-5.47 
====== 
7.48 
11.18 
10.88 
21.04 
8.93 
====== 
··31.51 
610.65 
Change 
6.73 
1.28 
5.65 
9.46 
35.12 
0.65 
5.85 
0.10 
2.85 
3.96 
7.77 
6.93 
2.60 
7.96 
100.00 
====== 
8.73 
77.30 
5.55 
100.00 
====== 
1.80 
17.04 
2.08 
6.66 
16.32 
2.43 
7.02 
11.27 
10.67 
19.54 
100.00 
====== 
60.44 
22.34 
11.26 
0.51 
100.00 
====== 
*Columns do net add to totals due to deletion of several small items. 
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TABLE XXIX 
MODEL OF TAX RETURNS PREPARED BY NINE TYPES OF TAX 
PREPARERS I~ FIFTY STATES 
Reported Corre~ted Change 
0.09 EXEMPTIONS 
INCOME 
Wages/Salaries 
2.42 2.33 
Tips 
Interest 
Farming 
S~hedule C 
$13,310.92 
$12.20 
$810.61 
$29.00 
$640.99 
$37.36 
$300.15 
$4.28 
$8.04 
Tax Refunds 
Capital Gain-S~h D 
Not S~h D 
Form 4797 
Dividends 
RentiRoyalties 
Partnerships 
S Corporations 
Other In~ome 
TOTAL INCOME* 
ADJUSTMENTS 
$365.67 
$56.99 
$143.13 
$28.44 
$61.25 
$16,315.62 
========= 
!'loving E::penses $33.90 
Employee E::penses $119.58 
IRA Payments $36.43 
TOTAL ADJUSTMENTS* $256.33 
ADJ. GROSS INCOME $16,059.30 
ITEMIZED DEDUCTION 
Medi~al lnsuran~e 
Other Medi~al 
State Ta::es 
Real Estate Ta::es 
Cash Contribution 
Non-Cash Contrib. 
Mortgage Interest 
Other Interest 
Casualty Losses 
Mis~. Dedu~tion 
TOTAL DEDUCTIONS* 
INCOME TAXES 
TaxiTable/S~h. 
In~ome Averaging 
Ma:: i mum Tax 
Energy Credit 
TOTAL TAXES* 
Earned In~ome Cr. 
PENALTY/iNTEREST 
========= 
$72.59 
$396.10 
$1,085.04 
$708.43 
$707.48 
$107.11 
$1,807.60 
$989.04 
$110.83 
$415.23 
$6,887.40 
======== 
$2,056.93 
$512.75 
$265.97 
($6.19) 
$2,857.81 
======== 
($25.27) 
$26.78 
SAMPLE SIZE = 53,975 
$13,349.76 
$19.63 
$843.19 
$84.08 
$845.90 
$41.17 
;$334. 11 
$4.88 
$24.50 
$388.90 
$102.25 
$182.89 
~43.63 
$107.74 
$16,897.62 
========= 
$31.26 
$96.19 
$34.75 
$226.03 
$16,671.59 
$65.78 
$331.52 
$1,076.99 
$683.26 
$645.49 
$97.91 
$1,780.92 
$946.51 
$70.74 
$341.54 
$6,508.95 
======== 
$2,211.05 
$570.05 
$294.92 
($4.89) 
$3,113.41 
======== 
$38.84 
$7.43 
$32.58 
$55.08 
$204.91 
$3.81 
$33.96 
$0.60 
$16.46 
$23.23 
$45.26 
$39.76 
$15.19 
$46.49 
$582.00 
======= 
($2. 64) 
($23.39) 
($1.68) 
($30.30) 
$612.29 
======= 
($6. 81) 
($64.58) 
($8.05) 
($25.17) 
($61.99) 
($9.20) 
($26.68) 
($42.53> 
($40.09) 
($73.69) 
($378.45) 
======== 
$154.12 
$57.30 
$28.95 
$1.30 
$255.60 
====== 
($17.38) $7.89 
$190.90 $164.12 
Per~ent 7. of Total 
Change Change 
3.62 
0.29 
60.90 
4.02 
189.93 
31.97 
10.20 
11.31 
14.02 
204.73 
6.35 
79.42 
27.78 
53.41 
75.90 
3.57 
======= 
-7.79 
-19.56 
-4.61 
-11.82 
3.81 
====== 
-9.38 
-16.30 
-0.74 
-3.55 
-8.76 
-8.59 
-1.48 
-4.30 
-36.17 
-17.75 
-5.49 
====== 
7.49 
11.18 
10.88 
·21.00 
8.94 
31.22 
612.85 
6.67 
1.28 
5.60 
9.46 
35.21 
0.65 
5.84 
0.10 
2.83 
3.99 
7.78 
6.83 
2.61 
7.99 
100.00 
====== 
8.71 
77.19 
5.54 
100.00 
1.80 
17.06 
2.13 
6.65 
16.38 
2.43 
7.05 
11.24 
10.59 
19.47 
100.00 
====== 
60.30 
22.42 
11.33 
0.51 
100.00 
====== 
*Columns do not ~dd to totals due to deletion of several small items. 
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TABLE XXX 
MODEL OF TAX RETURNS PREPARED BY TAXPAYERS AND UNPAID 
PREPARERS IN.FIFTY STATES 
Reported Corrected Change 
0.08 EXEMPTIONS 
INCOME 
2.15 2.07 
Wages/Salaries 
Tips 
"Interest 
Farming 
Schedule C 
Tal: Refunds 
Capital Gain-Sch D 
$12.097.54 
$7.88 
$420.38 
$6.55 
$192.70 
$19.23 
$60.92 
$2.33 
($1. 83) 
$153.05 
($2.25) 
$77.50 
$3.19 
Not Sch D 
Form 4797 
Dividends 
Rent/Royalties 
Partnerships 
S Corporations 
Other Income 
TOTAL INCOME* 
$43.49 
$13.419.66 
========= 
ADJUSTMEIHS 
Moving Expenses $29.76 
Employee Expenses $66.92 
IRA Payments $23.42 
TOTAL ADJUSTMENTS* $155.83 
ADJ. GROSS INCOME $13.263.83 
ITEMIZED DEDUCTION 
Medical Insurance 
Other Medical 
State Ta::es 
Real Estate Ta::es 
Cash Contribution 
Non-Cash Contrib. 
Mortgage Interest 
Other Interest 
Casualty Losses 
Misc. Deduction 
TOTAL DEDUCTIONS* 
INCOME TAXES 
Ta::/Tabl e/Sch. 
Income Averaging 
Ma:: i mum Tax 
Energy Credit 
TOTAL TAXES* 
Earned Income Cr. 
PENALTY/INTEREST 
========= 
$73.52 
$309.07 
$926.11 
$717.23 
$672.45 
$79.20 
$1.894.92 
$791.27 
$112.80 
$356.46 
$6.376.86 
======== 
$L919.32 
$174.25 
$53.92 
($4. 46) 
$2.149.90 
======== 
($26.03) 
$16.22 
SAMPLE SIZE = 17.235 
$12.136.35 
$15.10 
$443.30 
$15.02 
$271.20 
$22.52 
$76.93 
$2.36 
$0.68 
$157.16 
$16.96 
$81.56 
$6.18 
$71.82 
$13.670.36 
========= 
$27.85 
$57.29 
$21.88 
$140.44 
$13.529.91 
========= 
$65.69 
$244.07 
$928.89 
$676.82 
$608.17 
$71.69 
$1.864.10 
$743.37 
$67.62 
$274.29 
$5.974.53 
======== 
$2.007.30 
$192.67 
$64.17 
($3.38) 
$2.278.05 
======== 
$38.81 
$7.22 
$22.92 
$8.47 
$78.50 
$3.29 
$16.01 
$0.03 
$2.51 
$4.11 
$19.21 
$4.06 
$2.99 
$28.33 
$250.70 
======= 
($1.91) 
($9. 63) 
($1.54) 
($15.39) 
$266.08 
======= 
($7.83) 
($65.00) 
$2.78 
($40.41> 
($64.28) 
($7.51) 
($30.82) 
($47.90) 
($45.18) 
($82.17) 
($402.33) 
======== 
$87.98 
$18.42 
$10.25 
$1.08 
$128.15 
====== 
($18. 95> $7.08 
$153.77 $137.55 
Percent ~ of Total 
Change 
3.83 
0.32 
91.62 
5.45 
129.31 
40.74 
17.11 
26.28 
1.29 
137.16 
2.69 
853.78 
5.24 
93.73 
65.14 
1.87 
======= 
-6.42 
-14.39 
-6.58 
-9.88 
2.C•1 
====== 
-10.65 
-21.03 
0.30 
-5.63 
-9.56 
-9.48 
-1.63 
-6.05 
-40.05 
-23.05 
-6.31 
4.58 
10.57 
19.01 
24.22 
5.96 
====== 
27.20 
848.03 
Change 
15.48 
2.88 
9.14 
3.38 
31.31 
1. 31 
6.39 
0.01 
1.00 
1.64 
7.66 
1.62 
1. 19 
11.30 
100.00 
====== 
12.41 
62.57 
10.01 
100.00 
====== 
1.95 
16.16 
-0.69 
10.04 
15.98 
1.87 
7.66 
11.91 
11.23 
20.42 
lOCI. 00 
68.65 
14.37 
8.00 
0.84 
100.00 
====== 
*Columns do not add to totals due to deletion of ~everal small items. 
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TABLE XXXI 
MODEL OF TAX RETURNS PREPARED BY COMMERCIAL PREPARERS 
IN FIFTY STATES 
. 
Reported Corrected 
EXEMPTIONS 
INCOME 
2.72 2.60 
Wages/Salaries 
Tips 
Interest 
Farming 
Schedule C 
Ta>: Refunds 
Caoital Bain-Sch D 
$13,650.63 
$11.88 
$812.36 
$56.04 
$719.85 
$44.56 
$209.62 
$4.83 
$13.93 
$206.23 
$63.33 
$113.57 
$8.90 
$85.43 
·Not Sc::h D 
Form 4797 
Dividends 
Rent/Royalties 
Partnerships 
S Corporations 
Other Income 
TOTAL INCOME* 
ADJUSTMENTS 
========= 
Moving E~:penses $32.94 
Employe:2 E:~penses $151.49 
IRA Payments $31.29 
TOTAL ADJUSTMENTS* $277.98 
ADJ. BROSS INCOME $16,334.68 
ITEMIZED DEDUCTION 
Medical Insurance 
Other Medical 
State Ta>:es 
Real Estate Taxes 
Cash Contribution 
Non-Cash Contrib. 
Mortgage Interest 
Other Interest 
Casualty Losses 
Misc. Deduction 
TOTAL DEDUCTIONS* 
========= 
$70.15 
$383.44 
$903.72 
$574.69 
$536.69 
$59.61 
$1,622.02 
$867.44 
$93.00 
$393.02 
$5,966.28 
======== 
$':;:,683. 66 
$21.07 
$846.77 
$136.87 
$1,010.24 
i $49.32 
$249.79 
$6.05 
$33.06 
$231.94 
$115.16 
$151.89 
$28.75 
$123.96 
$17,317.32 
========= 
$28.98 
$112.24 
.$29.55 
$229.11 
$17,088.22 
========= 
$61.98 
$317.28 
$887.77 
$552.98 
$473.46 
$50.08 
$1,590.27 
$819.45 
$61.61 
$317.86 
$5,572.82 
======== 
INCOME TAXES 
Tax/TableiSch. 
Income Averaging 
Maximum Tax 
Energy Credit 
TOTAL TAXES* 
$1,960.78 $2.148.12 
$459.97 $517.60 
$69.12 $85.46 
($7.35) ($6.00) 
$2,513.39 $2,795.75 
======== ======== 
Change 
0.11 
$33.03 
$9.19 
$34.41 
$80.83 
$290.39 
$4.76 
$40.17 
$1.22 
$19.13 
$25.71 
$51.83 
$38.32 
$19.85 
$38.53 
$704.68 
======= 
($3.96) 
($39.25) 
($1. 74> 
($48.87) 
$753.54 
======= 
($8.17) 
($66.16) 
($15.95) 
($21.71) 
($63.23) 
($9.53) 
($31.75) 
($47.99> 
($31.39) 
($75.16) 
($393.46> 
======== 
$187.34 
$57.63 
$16.34 
$1.35 
$282.36 
====== 
Earned Income Cr. ($29.20) ($18.46) $10.74 
PENALTY/INTEREST $20.12 $209.50 $189.38 
SAMPLE SIZE ~ 20,883 
Percent 'l. of Total 
Change 
4.17 
0.24 
77.36 
4.24 
144.24 
40.34 
10.68 
19.16 
25.26 
137.33 
12.47 
81.84 
33.74 
223.03 
45.10 
4.24 
======= 
-12.02 
-25.91 
-5.56 
-17.58 
4.61 
====== 
-11.65 
-17.25 
-1.76 
-3.78 
-11.78 
-15.99 
-1.96 
-5.53 
-33.75 
-19.12 
-6.59 
====== 
9.55 
12.53 
23.64 
18.37 
11.23 
====== 
36.78 
941.25 
Change 
4.69 
1.30 
4.88 
11.47 
41.21 
0.68 
5.70 
0.17 
2.71 
3.65 
7.36 
5.44 
2.82 
5.47 
100.00 
====== 
8.10 
80.32 
3.56 
100.00 
====== 
2.08 
16.81 
4.05 
5.52 
16.07 
2.42 
8.07 
12.20 
7.98 
19.10 
100.00 
====== 
66.35 
20.41 
5.79 
0.48 
100.00 
====== 
*Columns de not add to totals due to deletion of several small items. 
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TABLE XXXII 
MODEL OF TAX RETURNS PREPARED BY PROFESSIONAL PREPARERS 
IN FIFTY STATES 
Reported Corrected Change 
0.03 EXEMPTIONS 
INCOME 
2.78 2.75 
Wages/Salaries 
Tips 
Interest 
Farming 
Schedule C 
Tax Refunds 
Capital Sain-Sch 
Not Sc:h D 
Form 4797 
Dividends 
Rent/Royalties 
Partnerships 
S Corporations 
Other Income 
TOTAL INCOME* 
$18,213.11 
$34.68 
$2.739.54 
$51.71 
$2,605.01 
$103.64 
D $1,782.97 
$12.15 
$37.67 
~1,942.37 
$329.90 
$565.35 
$217.70 
$70.02 
$29,699.54 
========= 
ADJUSTMENTS 
Moving Expenses $57.51 
Employee E~:penses $276. 13 
IRA Payments $117.80 
TOTAL ADJUSTMENTS* $683.65 
ADJ. GROSS INCOME $29,015.88 
ITEMIZED DEDUCTION 
Medical Insurance 
Other Medical 
State Ta::es 
Real Estate Tal:es 
Cash Contribution 
Non-Cash Contrib. 
Mortgage Interest 
Other Interest 
Casualty Losses 
.Misc. Deduction 
TOTAL DEDUCTIONS* 
INCOME TAXES 
Ta~/Table/Sc:h. 
Income Averaging 
Ma~: i mum Tax 
Energy Credit 
TOTAL TAXES* 
Earned Income Cr. 
PENALTY/INTEREST 
$75.90 
$585.83 
$1,758.75 
$968.53 
$1,126.60 
$257.81 
$2,027.42 
$1,612.19 
$144.00 
$571.59 
$9,752.09 
======== 
$2,951.56 
$2,136.44 
$1,797.62 
($10. 12) 
$6,987.96 
($9.62) 
$93.08 
SAMPLE SIZE • 15,767 
$18.271.19 
$37.34 
$2,814.02 
$253.42 
$3,156.46 
i$106.90 
$1,885.57 
$13.54 
$114.52 
$2,052.30 
$482.74 
$786.90 
$278.07 
$232.61 
$31,521.97 
========= 
$55.61 
$236.44 
$115.55 
$640.31 
$30,881.66 
========= 
$73.84 
$525.30 
$1,746.68 
$964.83 
$1,071.48 
$246.15 
$2,019.01 
$1,591.02 
$95.51 
$516.92 
$9,449.56 
======== 
$3,286.02 
$2,359.48 
$1,946.68 
($7.94) 
$7,708.15 
======== 
$58.08 
$2.66 
$74.48 
$201.71 
$551.45 
$3.26 
$102.60 
$1.39 
$76.85 
$109.93 
$152.84 
$221.55 
$60.37 
$162.59 
$1,822.43 
======= 
($1. 90) 
($39.69) 
($2.25) 
($43.34) 
$1,865.78 
======= 
($2.06) 
($60.53) 
($12.07) 
($3.70) 
($55.12) 
($11.66) 
($8.41> 
($21.17) 
($48.49) 
($54.67) 
($302.53) 
======== 
$334.46 
$223.04 
$149.06 
$2.18 
$720.19 
====== 
($7.19) $2.43 
$291.26 $198.18 
Percent Y. of Total 
Change Change 
1.07 
0.32 
7.67 
2.72 
390.08 
21.17 
3.15 
5.75 
11.44 
204.01 
5.66 
46.33 
39.19 
27.73 
232.21 
6.14 
======= 
-3.30 
-14.37 
-1.91 
-6.34 
6.43 
------
-2.71 
-10.33 
-0.69 
-0.38 
-4.89 
-4.52 
-0.41 
-1.31 
-33.67 
-9.56 
-3.10 
====== 
11.33 
10.44 
8.29 
21.54 
10.31 
25.26 
212.91 
3.19 
0.15 
4.09 
11.07 
30.26 
0.18 
5.63 
0.08 
4.22 
6.03 
8.39 
12.16 
3.31 
8.92 
100.00 
====== 
4.38 
91.58 
5.19 
100.00 
====== 
0.68 
20.01 
3.99 
1.22 
18.22 
3.85 
2.78 
7.00 
16.03 
18.07 
100.00 
====== 
46.44 
30.97 
20.70 
0.30 
100.00 
====== 
*Columns do not add to totals due to deletion of several small items. 
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TABLE XXXIII 
MODEL OF TAX RETURNS PREPARED BY COMMERCIAL PREPARERS IN 
ARI~ONA 
. ' 
Reported Corrected Change 
0.24 EXEMPTIONS 
INCOME 
2.87 2.63 
Wages/Salaries 
Tips 
lnterest 
Farming 
Schedule C 
$11,853.39 
$15.99 
$1,098.63 
($91. 08) 
$479.36 
$24.20 
$209.58 
$0.38 
$35.04 
$145.46 
($16.31> 
$14.59 
Tax Refunds 
Capital Gain-Sch D 
Not Sch 0 
Form 4797 
Dividends 
Rent/Royalties 
Partnerships 
S Corporations 
Other Income 
TOTAL INCOME* 
ADJUSTMENTS 
($47. 14> 
$16.11 
$14,390.90 
========= 
Moving Expenses $42.08 
Employee Expenses $218.48 
IRA Payments $1-. 14 
TOTAL ADJUSTMENTS* $305.66 
ADJ. GROSS INCOME $14,085.24 
========= 
ITEMIZED DEDUCTION 
Medical Insurance $86.51 
Other Medical $662.60 
State T a}:es $515.68 
Real Estate Ta}:es $372.54 
Cash Contribution $383.48 
Non-Cash Contrib. $55.89 
Mortgage Interest $1,449.37 
Other Interest $759.99 
Casualty Losses $133.55 
-Misc. Deduction $300.20 
TOTAL DEDUCTIONS* $5.239.68 
INCOME TAXES 
Ta}:/Table/Sch. 
Income Averaging 
Max i mum T a>: 
Energy Credit 
TOTAL TAXES* 
.Earned Income Cr. 
PENALTY/INTEREST 
======= 
$1,518.64 
$320.68 
$0.00 
($17.06) 
$1,846.29 
($34.34) 
$23.18 
$11,918.20 
$15.99 
$1,122.38 
$69.75 
$836.75 
i $31.89 
$240.32 
$0.38 
$85.17 
$156.73 
$26.74 
$17.49 
($35.97) 
$72.71 
$15,229.11 
========= 
$45.13 
$179.63 
$1.11 
$257.60 
$14,917.50 
$77.76 
$864.87 
$515.51 
$352.22 
$298.55 
$43.03 
$1,360.21 
$762.02 
$74.17 
$286.67 
$5,113.91 
$1,752.93 
$341.39 
$0.00 
($18.13) 
$2,133.08 
======== 
$64.81 
$0.00 
$23.76 
$160.83 
$357.39 
$7.69 
$30.74 
$0.00 
$50.13 
$11.27 
$43.05 
$2.90 
$11. 17 
$56.60 
$838.21 
======= 
$3.05 
($38.85) 
($0.03) 
($48.06) 
$832.26 
======= 
($8.75) 
$202.27 
($0.17> 
($20.32> 
($84.93> 
($12.86) 
($89.16) 
$2.03 
($59.38) 
($13.53) 
($125. 77) 
======== 
$234.29 
$20.71 
$0.00 
($1. 07> 
$286.79 
($16.31) $18.03 
$143.13 $119.95 
Percent % of Total 
Change Chan9e 
8.26 
0.55 
0.00 
2.16 
176.58 
74.56 
31.78 
14.67 
o.oo 
143.07 
7.75 
263.95 
19.88 
23.70 
351.33 
5.82 
======= 
7.25 
-17.78 
-2.63 
-15.72 
5.91 
====== 
-10. 11 
30.53 
-0.03 
-5.45 
-22.15 
-23.01 
-6.15 
0.27 
-44.46 
-4.51 
-2.40 
------
15.43 
6.46 
6.27 
15.53 
52.50 
517.47 
7.73 
o.oo 
2.83 
19.19 
42.64 
0.92 
3.67 
o.oo 
5.98 
1.34 
5.14 
0.35 
1.33 
6.75 
100.00 
------
------
-6.35 
80.84 
0.06 
100.00 
====== 
6.96 
-160.83 
0.14 
16.16 
67.53 
10.23 
70.89 
-1.61 
47.21 
10.76 
100.00 
====== 
81.69 
7.22 
0.00 
-0.37 
100.00 
====== 
*Columns do not add to totals due to deletion of aeveral small items. 
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TABLE XXXIV 
MODEL OF TAX RETURNS PREPARED BY COMMERCIAL PREPARERS IN 
CALIFORNIA 
Percent % of Total 
Repor-ted Corrected Change Change Change 
EXEMPTIONS 2.71 2.50 0.21 7.60 
INCOME 
Wages/Salar-ies $14.136.60 $14.205.32 $68.72 0.49 8.37 
Tios $21.60 $30.43 $8.83 40.88 1.08 
Inter-est $870.65 $923.81 $53,16 6.11 6.48 
Far-ming ($11. 95) $11.00 $22.95 192.05 2.80 
Schedule c $786.56 $1.124.54 $337.98 42.97 41.18 
Tax Refunds $107.92 ;$114.97 $7.05 6.53 0.86 
Capital Sain-Sch D $252.06 $358.73 $106.67 42.32 13.00 
Not Sch D $6.00 $6.54 $0.54 9.00 0.07 
For-m 4797 $4.92 $5.37 $0.45 9.15 0.05 
Dividends $194.64 $204.13 $9.49 4.88 1.16 
Rent/Royalties ($38.16) $31.88 $70.04 183.54 8.53 
Partnerships $115.23 $154.27 $39.04 33.88 4.76 
s Cor-porations ($3.02) ($0.32) $2.70 89.40 0.33 
Other Income $50.73 $112.44 $61.71 121.64 7.52 
TOTAL INCOME* $17.209.40 $18.030.13 $820.73 4.77 100.00 
========= ========= ======= ======= ====== 
ADJUSTMENTS 
Moving E::pense ~ $34.85 $27.90 ($6.95) -19.94 9.75 
Employee EY.penses $211.66 $153.30 ($58.36) -27.57 81.90 
IRA Payments $36.94 $33.98 C$2. 96l -8.01 4.15 
TOTAL ADJUSTMENTS* $341.94 $270.68 ($71.26) -20.84 100.00 
ADJ. GROSS INCOME $16.867.47 $17.759.47 $892.00 5.29 
========= ========= ======= ====== ====== 
ITEMIZED DEDUCTION 
Medical Insurance $64.53 $55.56 ($8.97) -13.90 1.39 
Other- Medic:al $465.55 $348.38 ($117.17) -25.17 18.18 
State Ta::es $1.001.14 $957.81 ($43.33) -4.33 6.72 
Real Estate Tal:es $448.40 $416.06 ($32.34) -7.21 5.02 
Cash Contr-ibution $437.34 $349.37 ($87.97) -20.11 13.65 
Non-Cash Contrib. $88.63 $70.43 ($1'3.20) -20.53 2.82 
Mortgage Interest $2.310.84 $2.215.21 ($95.63) -4.14 14.84 
Other- Inter-est $1.202.28 $1.107.59 ($94.69) -7.88 14.69 
Casualty Losses $78.50 $61.90 ($16.60) -21.15 2.58 
·Mi sc:. Deduction $470.34 $358.68 C$111. 66) ·-23. 74 17.33 
TOTAL DEDUCT! ONS* $7.184.99 $6.540.61 ($644.38) -8.97 100.0(1 
======== ======== ======== ====== ====== 
INCOME TAXES 
Tal:/Tabl e/Sc:h. $1.738.40 $1.999.14 $260.74 15.00 68.09 
Income Aver-aging $572.44 $617.75 $45.31 7.92 11.83 
Mal:imum Tax $50.43 $100.32 $49.89 98.93 13.03 
Energy Cr-edit ($3. 29) ($2.97) $0.32 9.73 0.08 
TOTAL TAXES* $2.395.18 $2.778.09 $382.91 15.99 100.00 
======== ======== ====== ====== ====== 
Earned Inc: orne Cr. ($30.33) ($15.84) $14.49 47.77 
PENALTY/INTEREST $19.69 $159.76 $140.07 711.38 
*Columns do not add to total& due to deletion of several &mall items. 
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TABLE XXXV 
MODEL OF TAX RETURNS PREPARED BY COMMERCIAL PREPARERS IN 
FLORIDA 
I 
Percent 'l. of Total 
Reported Corrected Chanc:;~e Change Chanc:;~e 
EXEMPTIONS 2.74 2.61 0.13 4.74 
INCOME 
Wages/Salaries $9,951.19 $10,(194.07 $142.88 1.44 12.42 
Tips $24.85 $94.18 $69.33 278.99 6.03 
Interest $1 '178.93 $1,260.82 $81.89 6.95 7.12 
Farming ($68.11) ($5.84> $62.27 91.43 5.41 
Schedule c $821.93 $1,188.99 $367.06 44.66 31.91 
Tax Refunds $2.69 $3.19 $0.50 18.59 0.04 
Capital Bain-Sch D $188.47 $241.46 $52.99 28.12 4.61 
Not Sch D $8.27 $9.43 $1.16 14.03 0.10 
Form 4797 ($10. 03> $15.10 $25.13 250.55 2.18 
Dividends $296.41 $305.86 $9.45 3.19 0.82 
Rent/Royalties $186.77 $249.61 $62.84 33.65 5.46 
Partnerships $36.62 $56.74 $20.12 54.94 1. 75 
s Corporations ($83.22) $94.73 $177.95 213.83 15.47 
Other Income $145.07 $216.26 $71.19 49.07 6.19 
TOTAL INCOME* $13,848.27 $14,998.68 $1,150.41 8.31 100.00 
========= ========= ======= ======= ====== 
ADJUSTMENTS 
Moving E}:penses $48.72 $40.79 ($7.93) -16.28 14.24 
Employee E}:penses $157.69 $108.01 ($49.68> -31. 5(» 89.19 
IRA Payments $30.92 $30.78 ($0. 14) -0.45 0.25 
TOTAL ADJUSTMENTS* $313.80 $258.10 ($55.70) -17.75 100.00 
ADJ. BROSS INCOME $13,534.48 $14,740.61 $1.206. 13 8.91 
========= ========= ======= ====== ====== 
ITEMIZED DEDUCTION 
Medical Insurance $94.72 $87.14 ($7.58) -8.00 1.50 
Other Medical $707.35 $602.95 ($104.40) -14.76 20.61 
State Ta:-:es $80.73 $81.96 $1.23 1.52 -0.24 
Real Estate Ta>:es $481.35 $457.55 ($23.80) -4.94 4.70 
Cash Contribution $642.14 $586.19 ($55.95) -8.71 11.04 
Non-Cash Contrib. $56.71 $46.73 ($9.98) -17.60 1.97 
Mortgage Interest $1,965.14 $1.940.80 ($24.34) -1.24 4.80 
Other Interest $821.78 $749.50 ($72.28) -8.80 14.27 
Casualtv Losses $55.71 $35.49 ($20.22) -36.30 3.99 
Misc. Deduction $433.31 $302.51 ($130.80) -30.19 25.82 
TOTAL DEDUCTIONS* $5.655.85 $5.149.24 ($506.61) -8.96 100.00 
======== ======== ======== ====== ====== 
INCOME TAXES 
Tax/Table/Sch. $1,505.03 $1.717.31 $212.28 14.10 47.85 
Income Averaging $252.72 $409.81 $157.09 62.16 35.41 
Maximum Ta}: $94.20 $108.96 $14.76 15.67 3.33 
Energy Credit ($2. 43) ($1.29) $1.14 46.91 0.26 
TOTAL TAXES* $1,890.14 $2.333.77 $443.63 23.47 100.00 
======== ======== ====== ====== ====== 
Earned Income Cr. ($43. 40> ($29.73) $13.67 31.50 
PENALTY/INTEREST $8.24 $180.41 $172.17 2089.44 
*Columns do not add to totals due to deletion of several small items. 
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TABLE XXXVI 
MODEL OF TAX RETURNS PREPARED BY COMMERCIAL PREPARERS IN 
HAW/HI 
Percent % of Total 
Reported Corrected Change Change Change 
EXEMPTIONS 3.32 3.23 0.09 2.71 
INCOME 
Wages/Salaries $14,897.60 $14,907.40 $9.80 0.07 1.91 
Tics $8.19 $89.44 $81.25 992.06 15.86 
Interest $960.85 $978.01 $17.16 1.79 3.35 
Farming $66.81 $75.36 $8.55 12.80 1.67 
Schedule c :$1,071.10 :$1,253.43 $182.33 17.02 35.58 
Tax Refunds :$79.81 ;$108.76 $28.95 36.27 5.65 
Capital Sain-Sc:h D $163.54 :$178.14 $14.60 8.93 2.85 
Not Sc:h D $0.14 $0.19 $0.05 35.71 0.01 
Form 4797 ($0.42) $6.54 :$6.96 1657.14 1.36 
Dividends $377.76 $418.98 $41.22 10.91 8.04 
Rent/Royalties $154.74 $173.72 $18.98 12.27 3.70 
Partnerships $949.23 $1.005.16 $55.93 5.89 10.92 
s Corporations $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 o.oo 
Other Inc:ome $167.35 $212.57 $45.22 27.02 8.83 
TOTAL INCOME* $20.611.52 $21.123.92 $512.40 2.49 100.00 
========= ========= ======= ======= ====== 
ADJUSTMENTS 
Moving Expenses :$6.03 $2.99 ($3.04) -50.41 137.56 
Employee Expenses $0.15 $0.29 $0.14 93.33 -6.33 
IRA Payments $61.88 $61.88 $0.00 o.oo -0.00 
TOTAL ADJUSTMENTS* $97.46 $85.25 ($2.21) -2.53 100.00 
ADJ. GROSS INCOME $20.524.06 :$21,038.56 $514.50 2.51 
========= ========= ======= ====== ====== 
ITEMIZED DEDUCTION 
Medical Insurance $69.38 $62.29 (:t-7. 09) -10.22 1.37 
Other l'ledic:al $560.33 $395.62 ($164. 71> -29.40 31.92 
State Ta~:es $1.431.00 $1,362.75 ($68.25) -4.77 13.23 
Real Estate Ta~:es $391.57 $373.13 ($19.44> -4.71 3.57 
Cash Contribution $331. 14 $209.47 ($121.67) -36.74 23.58 
Non-Cash Contrib. $42.97 $29.45 ($13.52> -31.46 2.62 
Mortgage Interest $1.912.20 $1,906.40 ($5.80) -0.30 1.12 
Other Interest $796.91 $816.91 $20.00 2.51 -3.98 
Casualty Losses $18.49 $19.49 $0.00 o.oo -o.oo 
Mise:. Deduction $391.69 $269.62 ($123.07). -31.42 23.85 
TOTAL DEDUCTIONS* $6.372.43 $5,856.50 ($515.93> -9.10 100.00 
======== ======== ======== ====== ====== 
INCOME TAXES 
Ta:-:/Table/Sc:h. $1.997.22 $2.139.98 $142.66 7.14 70.45 
Income Averaging $753.67 $796.23 $42.56 5.65 21.02 
Maximum Ta~: $161.01 $169.64 :$9.63 5.36 4.26 
Energy Credit ($21.04) ($21. 04) $0.00 o.oo o.oo 
TOTAL TAXES* $2.995.81 $3,198.30 $202.49 6.76 100.00 
======== ======== ====== ====== ====== 
Earned Inc:ome Cr. ($12.18) ($13.67) ($1. 49) 12.23 
PENALTY/INTEREST $62.46 $125.85 $63.39 101 • .49 
*Columns do not add to totals due to deletion of several small items. 
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TABLE XXXVII 
MODEL OF TAX RETURNS PREPARED BY COMMERCIAL PREPARERS IN 
KA~SAS 
Percent :r. of Total 
Reported Corrected Change Change Change 
EXEMPTIONS 2.51 2.45 0.06 2.39 
INCOME 
Wages/Salaries $11,086.59 $11,093.27 $6.68 0.06 1.38 
Jips $4.15 $4.15 $0.00 o.oo 0.0(1 
Interest $1,070.50 $1,108.59 $38.09 3.56 7.89 
Farming $409.17 $499.62 $90.45 22.11 18.74 
Schedule c $790.14 $1,023.00 $232.86 29.47 48.26 
Ta>: Refunds $32.64 ; $32.52 ($0.12> -0.37 -0.02 
Capital Gain-Sch D $194.68 $206.29 $11.61 5.96 2.41 
Not Sch D $3.83 $16.43 $12.60 328.98 2.61 
Form 4797 $57.39 $62.08 $4.69 8.17 0.97 
Dividends $67.59 $68.15 $0.56 0.83 Q.12 
Rent/Royalties $357.58 $392.72 $35.14 9.83 7.28 
Partnerships $384.15 $359.19 ($24.96) -6.50 -5.17 
s Corporations ($2.63) ($0.48) $2.15 -81.75 0.45 
Other Income $119.33 $140.16 $20.83 17.46 4.32 
TOTAL INCOME* $15.021.84 $15.504.38 $482.54 3.21 100.00 
========= ========= ======= ======= ====== 
ADJUSTMENTS 
Hoving E~:penses $49.55 $47.34 ($2.21) -4.46 6.99 
Employee E~:penses $115.42 $90.03 ($25.39) -22.00 80.30 
IRA Payments $78.09 $76.83 ($1. 26) -1.61 3.98 
TOTAL ADJUSTMENTS* $266.36 $234.74 ($31. 62> -11.87 100.00 
ADJ. GROSS INCOME $14.755.48 $15,269.63 $514.15 3.48 
========= ========= ======= ====== ·====== 
ITEMIZED DEDUCTION 
Medical Insurance $89.47 $80.89 ($8.58) -9.59 2.34 
Other Medical $342.52 $266.62 ($75.90) -22.16 20.74 
State Taxes $587.13 $562.32 ($24.81) -4.23 6.78 
Real Estate Taxes $342.34 $345.48 $3.14 0.92 -0.86 
Cash Contribution $600.65 $564.48 ($36.17> -6.02 9.88 
Non-Cash Contrib. $16.39 $16.14 ($0.25) -1.53 0.07 
Mortgage Interest $1,407.07 $1,413.25 $6.18 0.44 -1.69 
Other Interest $878.34 $788.57 ($89.77> -10.22 24.53 
Casualty Losses $25.10 $22.41 ($2.69) -10.72 0.73 
"Hi sc. Deduction $30(1. 77 $219.30 ($81.47> -27.09 22.26 
TOTAL DEDUCTIONS* $5,085.89 $4.719.87 ($366.02) -7.20 100.00 
======== ======== ======== ====== ====== 
INCOME TAXES 
Tax/Table/Sch. $1.664.14 $1,847.30 $183.16 11.01 75.85 
Income Averaging $687.56 $723.58 $36.02 5.24 14.92 
Maximum Tax $52.99 $53.51 $0.52 0.98 0.22 
Energy Credit ($4.34) ($3.50> $0.84 19.35 0.35 
TOTAL TAXES* $2,468.03 $2,709.52 $241.49 9.78 100.(10 
======== ======== ====== ====== ====== 
Earned Income Cr. ($25.52) ($8.82) $16.70 65.44 
PENALTY/INTEREST $16.56 $443.83 $427.27 2580.13 
*Columns do not add to totals due to deletion of several small items. 
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TABLE XXXVIII 
MODEL OF TAX P~TURNS PREPARED BY COMMERCIAL PREPARERS IN 
KENTUCKY 
Reported Corrected 
EXEMPTIONS 
INCOME 
2.82 2.71 
Waqes/Salaries 
Tios 
interest 
Farming 
Schedule C 
Tax Refunds 
Capital Gain-Sch D 
Not Sch D 
$13.886.91 
$0.07 
$429.69 
$28.74 
$722.18 
$43.02 
$155.88 
$1.67 
($26.39) 
$23.99 
$100.56 
$319.56 
$0.00 
$40.69 
$16.012.20 
Form 4797 
Dividends 
Rent/Royalties 
Partnerships 
S Corporations 
Other Income 
TOTAL INCOME* 
ADJUSTMENTS 
========= 
Moving Expenses $85.17 
Employee Expenses $98.19 
IRA F'avments. $21.24 
TOTAL ADJUSTMENTS* $251.04 
ADJ. GROSS INCOME $15.761.21 
ITEMIZED DEDUCTION 
Medical Insurance 
Other Medical 
State Taxes 
Real Estate Ta>:es 
Cash Contribution 
Non-Cash Contrib. 
Mortgage Interest 
Other Interest 
Casualty Losses 
Misc. Deduction 
TOTAL DEDUCTIONS* 
========= 
$61.22 
$173.29 
$875.41 
$320.39 
$552.41 
$17.71 
$1.177.68 
$811.23 
$60.82 
$342.40 
$4.884.66 
======== 
$13.895.54 
$0.39 
$449.28 
$190.87 
$969.12 
; $45.82 
$202.06 
$2.25 
$32.53 
$24.67 
$131.41 
$342.43 
$0.00 
$44.68 
$16.659.46 
========= 
$85.17 
$91.35 
$21.14 
$263.25 
$16.396.28 
========= 
$66.97 
$131.86 
$857.93 
$295.75 
$483.36 
$4.56 
$1.227.88 
$740.10 
$55.64 
$336.69 
$4.697.00 
INCOME TAXES 
Ta>:/Tabl e/Sch. 
Income Averaging 
Maximum Tax 
Energy Credit 
TOTAL TAXES* 
$1.938.06 $2.078.18 
$287.44 $329.19 
$0.00 $0.00 
($5.07) ($3.82) 
$2.255.15 $2.457.11 
======== ======== 
Earned Income Cr. ($45.70) ($37.82) 
PENALTY/INTEREST $11.61 $73.08 
Change 
0.11 
$8.63 
$0.32 
$19.59 
$162.13 
$246.94 
$2.80 
$46.18 
$0.58 
$58.92 
$0.68 
$30.85 
$22.87 
$0.00 
$3.99 
$647.26 
======= 
$0.00 
($6.84) 
($0. 10) 
$12.21 
$635.07 
======= 
$5.75 
($41.43) 
($17.48> 
($24.64> 
($b9.05) 
($13.15) 
$50.20 
($71.13) 
($5.18) 
($5. 71) 
($187.66) 
======== 
$140.12 
$41.75 
$0.00 
$1.25 
$201.96 
====== 
$7.88 
$61.47 
Percent 7. of Total 
Change 
3.90 
0.06 
457.14 
4.56 
564.13 
34.19 
6.51 
29.63 
34.73 
223.27 
2.83 
30.68 
7.16 
9.81 
4.04 
0.00 
-6.97 
-0.47 
4.86 
4.03 
====== 
9.39 
-23.91 
-2.00 
-7.69 
-12.50 
-74.25 
4.26 
-8.77 
-8.52 
-1.67 
-3.84 
====== 
7.23 
14.52 
24.65 
8.96 
17.24 
529.46 
1.33 
0.05 
3.03 
25.05 
38.15 
0.43 
7.13 
0.09 
9.10 
0.11 
4.77 
3.53 
0.00 
0.62 
100.00 
o.oo 
-56.02 
-0.82 
100.00 
====== 
-3.06 
22.08 
9.31 
13.13 
36.80 
7.01 
-26.75 
37.9(1 
2.76 
3.04 
100.00 
69.38 
20.67 
0.00 
0.62 
100.00 
====== 
*Columns do not add to totals due to deletion OT several 5mall items. 
---·----------· 
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TABLE XXXIX 
MODEL OF TAX RETURNS PREPARED BY COMMERCIAL PREPARERS IN 
MASSACIJUSETTS 
Percent 'l. of Total 
Reported Corrected Change Change Change 
EXEMPTIONS 2.56 2.45 0.11 4.30 
INCOME 
We>.ges/Sal aries $12.736.18 $12.737.49 $1.31 0.01 0.34 
Tips $3.92 $3.92 $0.00 o.oo o.oo 
Interest $822.76 $844.21 $21.45 2.61 5.56 
Farming ($10.07) ($1.58) $8.49 84.31 2.20 
Schedule c $872.56 $1.082.07 $209.51 24.01 54.27 
Tax Refunds $37.05 : $40.29 $3.24 8.74 0.84 
Capital Gain-Sc:h D $120.14 $134.23 $14.09 11.73 3.65 
Not Sc:h D $1.76 $1.72 ($0.04) -2.27 -0.01 
Form 4797 ($12.43) ($13.58) ($1.15) 9.25 -0.30 
Dividends $471.37 $477.88 $6.51 1.38 1.69 
Rent/Rovalties ($106.32) ($25.97) $80.35 75.57 20.81 
Partnerships $56.34 $58.37 $2.«)3 3.60 0.53 
s Corporations $3.55 $21.85 $18.30 515.49 4.74 
Other Inc:ome $147.97 $163.40 $15.43 10.43 4.00 
TOTAL INCOME* $15.764.07 $16.150.10 $386.03 2.45 100.00 
========= ========= ======= ======= ====== 
ADJUSTMENTS 
Moving Expenses $3.99 $3.99 $0.00 o.oo -0.00 
Employee Expenses $77.52 $65.76 ($11. 76) -15. 17 95.92 
IRA Payments $38.16 $36.93 ($1.23) -3.22 10.03 
TOTAL ADJUSTMENTS* $153.27 $141.01 ($12.26) -8.00 100.00 
ADJ. GROSS INCOME $15.610.81 $16.009.05 $398.24 2.55 
========= ========= ======= ====== ====== 
ITEMIZED DEDUCTION 
Medical Insurance $96.65 $93.66 ($2. 99) -3.09 2.05 
Other Medical $508.32 $469.93 ($38.39) -7.55 26.32 
State Ta~:es $1.167.24 $1.167.22 ($0. 02) -0.00 0.01 
Real Estate Ta~:es $1.266.32 $1.281.41 $15.09 1.19 -10.34 
Cash Contribution $568.32 $541.11 ($27. 21> -4.79 18.65 
Non-Cash Contrib. $51.12 $45.05 ($6.07) -11.87 4.16 
Mortgage Interest $1,304.54 $1.335.47 $30.93 2.37 -21.20 
Other Interest $509.72 $451.26 ($58. 46) -11.47 40.07 
Casualtv Losses $42.77 $22.44 ($20.33) -47.53 13.94 
Mise:. Deduction $325.8(1 $305.49 ($20. 31> -6.23 13.92 
TOTAL DEDUCTIONS* $6.253.44 $6.107.56 ($145. 88) -2.33 100.00 
======== ======== ======== ====== ====== 
INCOME TAXES 
Tax/Table/Sc:h. $5.111.10 $5.209.57 $98.47 1.93 61.28 
Inc:ome Averaging $240.77 $277.30 $36.53 15.17 22.73 
Ma>:imum Ta:: $91.40 $102.53 $11. 13 12.18 6.93 
Energy Credit ($10.03) ($8.69) $1.34 13.36 0.83 
TOTAL TAXES* $5.485.68 $5.646.36 $160.68 2.93 100.00 
======== ======== ====== ====== ====== 
Earned Inc:ome Cr. ($22.79> ($13. 60) $9.19 40.32 
PENALTY/INTEREST $21.54 $165.89 $'-44.35 670.15 
*Columns do not ~dd to totals due to deletion of several small items. 
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TABLE XL 
MODEL OF TAX RETURNS PREPARED BY COMMERCIAL PREPARERS IN 
NEB~SKA 
Percent '- of Total 
Reported Corrected Change Change Chant;~e 
EXEMPTIONS 2.56 2.53 0.03 1.17 
INCOME 
Wages/Salaries $12.086.06 $12.092.48 $6.42 o.o:s 0.90 
:rips $0.54 $1.83 $1.29 238.89 0.18 
Interest $930.13 $941.17 $11.04 1.19 1. 56 
Farming $895.63 $1.235.64 $340.01 37.96 47.92 
Schedule c $482.47 $811.00 $328.53 68.09 46.30 
Refunds $8.79 ; $14.19 $5.40 61.43 0.76 Tax 
Capital Gain-Sc:h D $511.48 $548.38 $36.90 7.21 5.20 
Not Sc:h 0 $0.86 $5.60 $4.74 551.16 0.67 
Form 4797 $101.26 $123.97 $22.71 22.43 3.20 
Dividends $42.65 $85.73 $43.08 101.01 6.07 
Rent/Rovalties $417.35 $454.93 $37.58 9.00 5.30 
Partnerships $311.42 $158.17 ($153.25) -49.21 -21.60 
s Corporations $0.00 $0.05 $0.05 0.01 
Other Inc:ome $129.57 $154.57 $25.00 19.29 3.52 
TOTAL INCOME* $16.322.71 $17.032.29 $709.58 4.35 100.00 
========= ========= ======= ======= ====== 
ADJUSTMENTS 
Moving Expenses $79.18 $59.08 ($20.10) -25.39 76.08 
Employee E>:penses $75.56 $72.35 ($3.21) -4.25 12.15 
IRA Payments $12.89 $8.70 ($4.19) -32.51 15.86 
TOTAL ADJUSTMENTS* $233.24 $206.82 ($26.42> -11.33 100.00 
ADJ. GROSS INCOME $16.089.46 $16.825.47 $736.01 4.57 
========= ========= ======= ====== ====== 
ITEMIZED DEDUCTION 
Medical Insurance $88.27 $93.63 $5.36 6.07 1.98 
Other Medic:al $103.09 $109.48 $6.39 6.20 2.36 
State Ta:·:es $720.78 $727.87 $7.09 0.98 2.62 
Real Estate Ta>:es $483.06 $597.60 $114.54 23.71 42.30 
Cash Contribution $449.13 $489.01 $39.88 8.88 14.73 
Non-Cash Contrib. $28.90 $27.43 ($1.47> -5.09 -0.54 
Mortgage Interest $1.472.25 $1.494.b7 $22.42 1.52 8.28 
Other Interest $938.67 $1.007.97 $69.30 7.38 25.59 
Casualty Losses $14.21 $43.08 $28.87 203.17 10.66 
Mise:. Deduction $231.17 $202.31 ($28.86) -12.48 -10.66 
TOTAL DEDUCTIONS* $5.108.85 :t5.379.b1 $270.76 5.30 100.00 
======== ======== -------- ====== ====== --------
INCOME TAXES 
Ta:{iTable/Sc:h. $1.639.22 $1.694.21 $54.99 3.35 37.93 
Income Averagint;~ $662.64 $764.78 $102.14 15.41 70.45 
Maximum Tax $57.91 $57.49 ($0.42) -0.73 -0.29 
Energy Credit ($11.17) ($11.23> ($0.06) -0.54 -0.04 
TOTAL TAXES* $2.374.81 $2.519.80 $144.99 6.11 100.00 
======== ======== ====== ====== ====== 
Earned Income Cr. ($13.89) ($11. 74> $2.15 15.48 
PENALTY/INTEREST $13.24 $85.21 $71.97 543.58 
*Columna do not add to totals due to deletion of several &mall items. 
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TABLE XLI 
MODEL OF TAX RETURNS PREPARED BY COMl~RCIAL PREPARERS IN 
NEW ~XICO 
Percent % of lotal 
Reported Corrected Change Change Chanc;~e 
EXEMPTIONS 2.32 2.23 0.09 3.88 
INCOME 
Wages/Salaries $9,861.00 $9,858.79 ($2.21) -0.02 -0.10 
Tics $3.31 $25.35 $22.04 665.86 0.99 
·Interest $465.07 $499.34 $34.27 7.37 1.54 
Farming ($56.56) $62.79 $119.35 211.01 5.35 
Schedule c $437.20 . $752.19 $314.99 72.05 14.13 
Tax Refunds $30.40 $30.40 $0.00 o.oo o.oo 
Capital Gain-S::h D $161.48 $336.18 $174.70 108.19 7.83 
Not Sch D $0.22 $0.22 $0.00 0.00 o.cio 
Form 4797 $24.34 $160.50 $136.16 559.41 6.11 
Dividends $123.01 $122.99 ($0.02) 0.02 0.00 
Rent/Royalties ($112.48) ($20. 72) $91.76 81.58 4.12 
Partnerships ($13.11> ($7 .64) $5.47 ·41. 72 0.25 
s Corporations ($940.87) ($90.25> $850.62 90.41 38.15 
Other Income $59.06 $507.40 $448.34 759.13 20.11 
TOTAL INCOME* $10.607.23 $12,836.98 $2,229.75 21.02 100.00 
========= ========= ======= ======= ------
ADJUSTMENTS 
Moving E:{penses $5.05 $17.41 $12.36 244.75 -42.65 
Employee Expenses $202.00 $160.66 ($41.34) -20.47 142.65 
IRA Payments $4.74 $4.74 $0.00 o.oo 0.00 
TOTAL ADJUSTMENTS* $212.0(t $183.02 ($28.98) -13.67 100.00 
ADJ. GROSS INCOME $10.395.22 $12.653.97 $2.258.75 21.73 
========= ========= ======= ------ ====== 
ITEMIZED DEDUCTION 
Medical Insurance $95.60 $97.25 $1.65 1. 73 0.73 
Other Medical $401.41 $300.05 ($101.36i -25.25 -44.82 
State Tal:es $511.00 $522.96 $11.96 2.34 5.29 
Real Estate Ta):es $332.89 $347.21 $14.32 4.30 6.33 
Cash Contribution $336.01 $472.34 $136.33 40.57 60.29 
Non-Cash Contrib. $14.39 $11.50 ($2.89) -20.08 -1.28 
Mortgage Interest $2,549.01 $2,574.72 $25.71 1.01 11.37 
Other Interest $1,474.22 $1,603.69 $129.47 8.78 57.25 
Casualty Losses $81.21 $15.89 ($65.32> -80.43 -28.89 
Mise:. Deduction $663.99 $702.82 $38.83 5.85 17.17 
TOTAL DEDUCTIONS* $6.810.58 $7,036.71 $226.13 3.32 100.00 
======== ======== ======== ====== ====== 
INCOME TAXES 
Tax/Table/Sc:h. $1.464.49 $1.825.49 $361.00 24.65 75.05 
Income Averaging $91.41 $184.05 $92.64 101.35 19.26 
Maximum Tax $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 0.00 
Energv Credit <$"3. 02) ($3.01> $0.01 0.33 o.oo 
TOTAL TAXES* $1.615.89 $2,096.92 $481.03 29.77 100.00 
======== ======== ====== ====== ------------
Earned Income Cr. ($63.24) ($11. 60) $51.64 81.66 
PENALTY/INTEREST $2.91 $649.16 $646.25 22207.90 
*Columns do not add to total~ due to deletion of several small items. 
-----------------------
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TABLE XLII 
MODEL OF TAX RET'GR.~S PREPARED BY COMMERCIAL PREPARERS IN 
NEW YORK 
Percent '1. of Total 
Reported Corrected Chanc;.e Change Change 
EXEMPTIONS 2.63 2.54 0.09 3.42 
INCOME 
Waqes/Salaries $14.542.01 $14.532.17 ($9.84) -0.07 -1.93 
Tios $14.78 $16.64 $1.86 12.58 0.36 
interest $1.610.15 $1.665.63 $55.48 3.45 10.88 
Farming $16.28 $42.72 $26.44 162.41 5.18 
Schedule c $626.25 $826.42 $200.17 31.96 39.25 
Ta>: Refunds $105.91 i$116.59 $10.68 10.08 2.09 
Capital Gain-Sch D $125.66 $149.57 $23.91 19.03 4.69 
Not Sch D $2.05 $2.09 $0.04 1.95 0.01 
Form 4797 ($20. 71> $13.01 $33.72 162.82 6.61 
Dividends $337.82 $360.46 $22.64 6.70 4.44 
Rent/Royalties $5.30 $51.51 $46.21 871.89 9.06 
Partnerships $168.73 $183.83 $15.10 8.95 2.96 
s Corporations $14.11 $21.44 $7.33 51.95 1.44 
Other Income $92.21 $143.78 $51.57 55.93 10.11 
TOTAL INCOME* $18.639.89 $19.149.86 $509.97 2.74 100.00 
========= ========= ======= ======= ====== 
ADJUSTMENTS 
Movinq Expenses $24.23 $15.25 ($8.98> -37.06 22.18 
~m~loyee Expenses $118. 14 $103.43 ($14.71) -12.45 36.33 
IRF. Pavments $43.67 $35.08 ($8.59) -19.67 21.22 
TOTAL ADJUSTMENTS* $357.30 $316.81 ($40.49) -11.33 100.00 
ADJ. GROSS INCOME $18.282.55 $18.833.04 $550.49 3.01 
========= ========= ======= ====== ====== 
ITEMIZED DEDUCTIOhl 
Medical !nsuranc:e $70.86 $51.27 ($19.59) -27.65 4.11 
Other Medical $303.79 $211.24 ($92.55) -30.47 19.41 
State la:·:es $1.520.80 $1.505.33 ($15.47) -1.02 3.24 
Real Estate Ta::es $938.26 $883.98 ($54.28) -5.79 11.38 
Cash Contribution $448.54 $399.06 ($49.48) -11.03 10.38 
Non-Cash Contrib. $50.86 $36.90 ($13.96) -27.45 2.93 
Mortqage Interest $829.33 $809.24 ($20.09) -2.42 4.21 
Other Interest $595.93 $547.84 ($48.09) -8.07 10.08 
Casualty Losses $129.00 $90.42 ($38.58) -29.91 8.09 
Mise:. Deduction $574.07 $482.94 ($91.13) -15.87 19.11 
lOTAL DEDUCTIONS* $5.998.48 $5.521.61 ($476.87) -7.95 100.00 
======== ======== ======== ====== ====== 
INCOME TAXES 
Ta:.:/Tabl e/Sch. $2.080.52 $2.278.52 i198.00 9.52 83.12 
Income Averaging $393.43 $411.88 $18.45 4.69 7.74 
Maximum Tax $110.78 $112.42 $1.64 1.48 0.69 
Energy Credit ($13.02) ($10.16) $2.86 21.97 1.20 
TOTAL TAXES* $2.598.19 $2.836.41 $238.22 9.17 100.00 
=:.=-====== ======== ====== ====== ==:=== 
Earned Income Cr. ($22.'59) ($18.86) $3.73 16.51 
PENALTY/INTEREST $8.86 $100.66 $91.80 1036.12 
*Columns do not add to totals due to deletion of several small items. 
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TABLE XLIII 
MODEL OF TAX RETURNS PREPARED BY COMMERCIAL PREPARERS IN 
NORTH DAKOTA 
Percent % of Total 
Reported Corrected Change Change Chanr;~e 
EXEMPTIONS 2.51 2.50 0.01 0.40 
INCOME 
WaQes/Salaries $9.755.58 $9.756.94 $1.36 0.01 0.21 
Tips $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 o.oo 
Interest $522.96 $563.30 $40.34 7.71 6.21 
Farming $287.08 $568.09 $281.01 97.89 43.28 
Schedule c $337.07 $640.05 $302.98 89.89 46.67 
Tax Refunds $44.64 $36.59 ($8.05) -18.03 -1.24 
Caoital Gain-Sch D $381.34 $328.17 ($53.17) -13.94 -8.19 
Not Sch D $0.21 $0.25 $0.04 19.05 0.01 
Form 4797 $45.58 $51.66 $6.08 13.34 0.94 
Dividends $30.97 $32.57 $1.60 5.17 0.25 
Rent/Rovalties $666.82 $723.95 $57.13 8.57 8.80 
Partnerships. ($90.49) ($78. 76) $11.73 12.96 1.81 
s Corporations $16.26 $12.25 ($4.01> -24.66 -0.62 
Other Income $19.06 $32.67 $13.61 71.41 2.10 
TOTAL INCOME* $12.074.90 $12.724.13 $649.23 5.38 100.00 
========= ========= ======= ======= ====== 
ADJUSTMENTS 
Moving Expenses $29.03 $29.03 $0.00 0.00 -o.oo 
Employee E>:penses $190.80 $106.98 ($83. 82> -43.93 102.76 
IRA Payments $3.19 $3.19 $0.00 0.00 -(1.(1(1 
TOTAL ADJUSTMENTS* $271.06 $189.49 ($81. 57) -30.09 100.00 
ADJ. GROSS INCOME $11.803.85 $12.534.65 $730.80 6.19 
========= ========= ======= ====== :-:===== 
ITEMIZED DEDUCTION 
Medical Insurance $86.43 $79.11 ($7. 32) -8.47 3.34 
Other Medical $275.71 $247.90 ($27.81> -10.09 12.68 
State Tm:es $368.84 $329.21 \$39.63) -10.74 18.07 
Real Estate Ta>:es $601.00 $555.41 ($45.59) -7.59 20.79 
Cash Contribution $427.94 $417.85 ($10.09) -2.36 4.60 
Non-Cash Contrib. $14.36 $14.18 ($0.18) -1.25 0.08 
Mortgage Interest $970.59 $934.76 ($35.83) -3.69 16.34 
Other Interest $1.106.12 $1.079.27 ($26.85) -2.43 12.24 
Casualty Losses $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 0.00 
Misc. Deduction $207.99 $166.27 ($41.72) -20.06 19.02 
TOTAL DEDUCTIONS* $4.240.10 $4.020.80 ($219.30) -5.17 100.00 
======== ======== ======== ====== ====== 
INCOME TAXES 
TaxtTable/Sch. . $1.723.09 $1.798.86 $75.77 4.40 54.02 
Income Averaginc;~ $367.67 $428.52 $60.85 16.5~i 43.38 
Ma::imum Tax $4.85 $4.88 $0.03 0.62 0.02 
Energy Credit ($5.64) ($5.95) ($0.31> 5.50 -0.22 
TOTAL TAXES* $2.103.32 $2.243.58 $140.26 6.67 100.00 
======= ======== ====== ====== ====== 
Earned Income Cr. ($64. 81> ($58. 71> $6.10 9.41 
PENALTY/INTEREST $31.58 $60.62 $29.04 91.96 
*Columns do not add to totals due to deletion of several small items. 
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TABLE XLIV 
MODEL OF TAX RETURNS PREPARED BY COMMERCIAL PREPARERS IN 
OREGON 
Percent 
"· 
o-t lotal 
Re!)orted Corrected Change Change Ch;;mc;~e 
EXEMPTIONS 2.90 2.89 0.01 0.32 
INCOME. 
Wages/Salaries $14.800.83 $14.845.48 $44.65 0.30 12.76 
Ti!)S $1.99 $14.44 $12.45 625.63 3.56 
·Interest $604.01 $617.80 $13.79 2.28 3.94 
Farming ($135.28) ($90.99) $44.29 32.74 12.66 
Schedule c $1.095.73 $1.269.45 $173.72 15.85 49.66 
Tax Refunds $91.00 $98.58 $7.58 8.33 2.17 
Ca!)ital Gain-Sch D $300.63 $355.56 $54.93 18.27 15.70 
Not Sc:h D $0.66 $0.66 $0.00 0.00 o.oo 
Form 4797 $58.52 $75.60 $17.08 29.19 4.88 
Dividends $158.84 $173.15 $14.31 9.01 4.09 
Rent/Rovalties $17.5(\ $33.57 $16.07 91.83 4.59 
Partnershi!)s $209.25 $217.07 $7.82 3.74 2.24 
s Corporations ($179. 73) ($244.39> ($64.66) 35.98 -18.48 
Other Income $274.51 $275.83 $1.32 0.48 0.38 
TOTAL INCOME* $17.688.16 $18.038.01 $349.85 1.98 100.00 
========= ========= ======= ======= ====== 
ADJUSTMENTS 
Movi nq E:q::~enses $57.69 $41.97 ($15.72> -27.25 49.51 
Ern!)loyee Ex!)enses $125.50 $111.18 ($14.32) -11.41 45.10 
IRA Payments $35.16 $32.53 ($2.63) -7.48 8.28 
TOTAL ADJUSTMENTS* $319.70 $287.95 ($31. 75> -9.93 100.00 
ADJ. GROSS INCOME $17.368.46 $17.750.05 $381.59 2.20 
========= ========= ======= ====== ------------
ITEMIZED DEDUCTION 
Medical Insurance $b8.14 $67.17 (:$0.97) -1.42 0.48 
Other Medical $187.87 $162.88 ($24.99) -13.30 12.30 
State Taxes $1.481.76 $1.477.19 ($4.57) -0.31 ,..) r"\C:: ..... ~:...J 
Real Estate Taxes $619.29 :$580.19 ($39.10> -6.31 19.24 
Cash Contribution $826.77 $808.50 ($18.27) -2.21 8.99 
Non-Cash Contrib. :$52.21 $49.73 ($2.48) -4.75 1.22 
Mortqage Interest :$1.916.12 :$1.963.37 $47.25 2.47 -23.26 
Other Interest $870.91 $861.70 ($9.21) -1.06 4.53 
Casual tv Losses :$54.76 $41.91 ($12.85) -23.47 6.32 
Mise:. Deduction :$406.31 $271.38 ($134.93) -33.21 66.41 
TOTAL DEDUCTIONS* $b.529.38 $6.326.21 ($203.17) -3.11 100.00 
======== ======== ======== ====== ====== 
INCOME TAXES 
Ta:·: tTable/Sch. $1.790.44 $1.879.41 $88.97 4.97 72.25 
Income Averaging $985.26 $1.012.11 $26.85 2.73 21.80 
Ma~:imum Ta:: $51.38 $51.38 $0.00 o.oo 0.00 
Energv Credit ($6.31> ($5.59) $0.72 11.41 0.58 
TOTAL TAXES* $2.881.52 $3.004.67 $123.15 4.27 100.00 
======== ======== ====== ====== ====== 
Earned Income Cr. ($31.11> ($31.06) $0.05 0.16 
PENALTY/INTEREST $91.56 $134.62 $43.06 47.03 
*Columns do not add to totals due to del~tion of several 5mall items. 
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TABLE XLV 
MODEL OF TAX RETURNS PREPARED BY COMMERCIAL PREPARERS IN 
VIRGINIA 
Reported Corrected 
2-72 .2.65 EXEMPTIONS 
INCOME 
Waqes/Salaries 
Tips 
$15.621.08 
$10.42 
$15.598. "'5 
$16.77 
$354.98 
$109.39 
$820.04 
; $59.93 
$152.07 
interest 
Farming 
Schedule C 
Tax Refunds 
Capital Gain-Sch D 
Not Sch D 
Form 4797 
$335.43 
$64.76 
$535.45 
$54.94 
$129.33 
$29.94 
$22.15 
$73.49 
($17.37) 
$98.42 
($8.26) 
$34.51 
$30.01 
$37.60 
$93.54 
($0. 74) 
$98.78 
Dividends 
Rent/R~valties 
Partnerships 
S Corporations 
Other Income 
TOTAL INCOME* $17.566.39 
$4.57 
$49.93 
$18.031.26 
========= ========= 
ADJUSTMENTS 
Movinq Expenses $40.55 $45.08 
Emp 1 oyee E~: penses $79. 26 $71. 4 7 
IRA Pavments $42.62 $43.93 
TOTAL ADJUSTMENTS* $230.87 $226.03 
ADJ. GROSS INCOME $17.335.52 $17.805.22 
ITEMIZED DEDUCTION 
Medical Insurance 
Other Medical 
State Ta::es 
Real Estate Ta>:es 
Cash Contribution 
Non-Cash Contrib. 
Mortoage Interest 
Other Interest 
Casualtv Losses 
Mise:. Deduction· 
TOTAL DEDUCTIONS* 
INCOME TAXES 
Tax/Table/Sch. 
Income Averaging 
Mav. i mum T a>: 
Energv Credit 
TOTAL TAXES* 
Earned Income Cr. 
PENALTY/INTEREST 
========= ========= 
$86.89 
$292.20 
$967.80 
$449.22 
$553.30 
$33.08 
$1.899.45 
$980.33 
$75.46 
$2:!.9.00 
$5.996.(16 
======== 
$86.73 
$273.52 
$945.21 
$451.82 
$489.05 
$24.18 
$1.847.96 
$950.43 
$68.67 
$198.56 
$5.768.96 
======== 
~2.055.98 $2.149.71 
$301.73 $337.16 
$19.32 $25.31 
($5. 19) ($2. 46) 
$2.380.36 $2.522.96 
======== ======== 
($17.91> ($14.17) 
$35.93 $129.25 
Change 
0.07 
($22.83) 
$6.35 
$19.55 
$44.63 
$284.59 
$4.99 
$22.74 
$0.07 
$15.45 
$20.05 
$16.63 
$0.36 
$12.83 
$15.42 
$464.87 
======= 
$4.53 
($7.79) 
"$1. 31 
($4.84) 
$469.70 
======= 
($0.16) 
($18.68) 
($22.59) 
$2.60 
($64.25) 
($8.90) 
($51.49) 
($29.90) 
($6.79) 
($20.44) 
($227.10) 
======== 
$93.73 
$35.43 
$5.99 
$2.73 
$142.60 
====== 
$3.74 
$93.32 
Percent 7. of Total 
Change 
2.57 
-0.15 
60.94 
5.83 
68.92 
53.15 
9.08 
17.58 
0.23 
69.75 
27.28 
95.74 
0.37 
155.33 
44.68 
2.65 
======= 
11.17 
-9. 83" 
3.07 
-2.10 
2.71 
====== 
-:-0.18 
-6.::S9 
-2.33 
0.58 
-11.61 
-26.90 
-2.71 
-3.05 
-9.(10 
-9.33 
-3.79 
====== 
4.56 
11.74 
31.00 
·52.60 
5.99 
====== 
-20.88 
259.73 
Change 
-4.91 
L37 
4.21 
9.60 
61.22 
1.07 
4.89 
0.02 
3.32 
4.31 
3.58 
0.09 
2.76 
3.32 
100.00 
====== 
-93.60 
160.95 
-27.07 
100.00 
====== 
0.07 
8.23 
9.95 
-1.14 
28.29 
3.92 
22.67 
13.17 
2.99 
9.00 
100.00 
====== 
65.73 
24.85 
4.20 
1.91 
100.00 
====== 
*Columns do not add to totals due to deletion of &everal small items. 
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TABLE XLVI 
MODEL OF TAX RETURNS PREPARED BY COMMERCIAL PREPARERS IN 
WASHINGTON 
Percent % o-f Total 
Reported Corrected Chant;~e Change Chant;~e 
EXEMPTIONS 2.84 2.81 0.04 1.24 
INCOME 
Wages/Salaries $16.744.24 $16.647.77 ($96.47) -0.58 -18.47 
Tips $3.82 $3.82 $0.00 o.oo o.oo 
"Interest $920.55 $987.81 $67.26 7.31 12.88 
Farming ($185.98) ($95.08) $90.90 48.88 17.40 
Schedule c $487.08 $866.41 $379.33 77.88 72.61 
Tax Refunds $6.30 $6.76 $0.46 7.30 0.09 
Capital Gain-Sch D $515.50 $525.18 $9.68 1.88 1.85 
Not Sch D ($2. 44) ($2.26) $0.18 7.38 0.03 
Form 4797 $15.59 $20.73 $5.14 32.97 0.98 
Dividends $288.11 $288.45 $0.34 0.12 0.07 
Remt/Roval ties ($133.94) ($74.07) $59.87 44.70 11.46 
Partnerships $45.01 $54.05 $9.04 20.08 1.73 
s Corporations $76.77 $76.77 $0.00 0.00 0.00 
Other Income $13.31 $12.59 ($0.72) -5.41 -0.14 
TOTAL INCOME* $19.974.40 $20.496.80 $522.40 2.62 100.00 
========= ========= ======= ======= ------
ADJUSTMENTS 
Moving Expenses $21.82 $11.32 ($10.50) -48.12 27.94 
Employee E):penses $105.41 $79.53 ($25.88) -24.55 68.87 
IRA Pavments $25.12 $27.62 $2.50 9.95 -6.65 
TOTAL ADJUSTMENTS* $231.63 $194.05 ($37.58) -16.22 100.00 
ADJ. GROSS INCOME $19.742.77 $20.302.76 $559.99 2.84 
========= ========= ======= ====== ====== 
ITEMIZED DEDUCTION 
Medical Insurance $60.95 $60.11 ($0.84) -1.38 -2.42 
Other Medical $199.89 $186.01 ($13.88) -6.94 -40.02 
State Ta}:es $122.37 $125.31 $2.94 2.40 8.48 
Real Estate Ta):es $543.49 $559.75 $16.26 2.99 46.89 
Cash Contribution $685.20 $662.17 ($23.03) -3.36 -66.41 
Non-Cash Contrib. $29.16 $25.08 ($4.08) -13.99 -11.76 
Mortgage Interest $2.056.95 $2.141.37 $84.42 4.10 243.43 
Other Interest $858.88 $886.52 $27.64 3.22 79.70 
Casual tv Losses $85.69 $71.07 ($14.62) -17.06 -42.16 
-Misc. Deduction $478.48 $385.84 ($92.64) -19.36 -267.13 
TOTAL DEDUCTIONS* $5.679.61 $5.714.29 $34.68 (1.61 100.(10 
======== ======== ======== ====== ====== 
INCOME TAXES 
Tax/Table/Sch. $2.428.93 $2.564.64 $135.71 5.59 58.40 
Income Averaging $555.26 $599.18 $43.92 7.91 18.9(1 
Maximum Ta:{ $55.47 $90.30 $34.83 62.79 14.99 
Energv Credit ($2.90) ($3.50) ($(1.60) 20.69 -0.26 
TOTAL TAXES* $3.040.81 $3.273.18 $232.37 7.64 100.00 
======== ======== ------ ====== ------------
. Earned Income Cr • ($18.81) ($17.04) $1.77 9.41 
PENALTY/INTEREST $18.18 $358.33 $340.15 1871.01 
*Columns do net add to totals due to deletion c-f several small items. 
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TABLE XLVII 
MODEL OF TAX RETURNS PREPARED BY COMMERCIAL PREPARERS IN 
WISCONSIN 
EXEMPTIONS 
INCOME 
Reported Corrected 
2.77 2.74 
Waoes/Salaries $12.877.97 $12.885.95 
$3.55 
$908.28 
$542.81 
$1.167.52 
i $74.70 
$339.73 
Tips 
interest 
Farming 
Schedule C 
Tax Refunds 
Capital Gain-Sc:h D 
Not Sc:h D 
Form 4797 
$2.33 
$889.96 
$394.40 
$851.55 
$70.28 
$324.89 
$1.54 
$116.67 
$213.80 
$37.88 
$97.68 
($5.12> 
$92.18 
$1.55 
$130.75 
$220.74 
$113.85 
Dividends 
Rent/Rovalties 
Partnerships 
S Corpor.ations 
Other Income 
TOTAL INCOME* $16.391.51 
$82.67 
$0.67 
$85.93 
$16.984.68 
========= ========= 
ADJUSTMENTS 
Moving Expenses $29.53 $18.89 
Employee Expenses $95.07 $77.49 
IRA Pavments $20.98 $20.98 
TOTAL ADJUSTMENTS* $206.16 $160.92 
ADJ. GROSS INCOME $16.185.34 $16.823.75 
ITEMIZED DEDUCTION 
Medical Insurance 
Other Medical 
State Ta::es 
Real Estate Taxes 
Cash Contribution 
Non-Cash Contrib. 
Mortgage Interest 
Other Interest 
Casualtv Losses 
Mise:. Deduction 
TOTAL DEDUCTIONS* 
INCOME TAXES 
Tax/Table/Sc:h. 
Income Averaging 
Maximum Tax 
Energv Credit 
TOTAL TAXES* 
========= ========= 
$52.02 
$328.54 
$1.386.26 
$777.66 
$508.48 
$33.50 
$1.356.16 
$641.33 
$16.19 
$244.97 
$5.711.65 
======== 
$1.795.46 
$530.96 
$136.54 
($8.67) 
$2.521.96 
======== 
$49.59 
$333.07 
$1.385.70 
$793.89 
$466.65 
$30.66 
$1.376.22 
$621.96 
$9.83 
$209.39 
$5.620.19 
======== 
$1.919.10 
$618.50 
$137.98 
($9.69) 
$2.741.25 
======== 
Change 
0.03 
$7.98 
$1.22 
$18.32 
$148.41 
$315.97 
$4.42 
$14.84 
$0.01 
$14.08 
$6.94 
$75.97 
($15. 01) 
$5.79 
($6.25) 
$593.17 
======= 
($10.64) 
($17.58) 
$0.00 
($45.24) 
$638.41 
======= 
($2.43) 
$4.53 
($0.56) 
$16.23 
($41. 83> 
($2.84) 
$20.06 
($19.37) 
($6. 36) 
($35.58> 
($91. 46) 
======== 
$123.64 
$87.54 
$1.44 
($1. 02> 
$219.29 
====== 
Earned Income Cr. ($27.73) ($24.72) $3.01 
PENALTY/INTEREST $36.80 $922.64 $885.84 
Percent % of Total 
Change Change 
1.08 
0.06 
52.36 
2.06 
37.63 
37.11 
6.29 
4.57 
0.65 
12.07 
3.25 
200.55 
-15.37 
113.09 
-6.78 
3.62 
======= 
-36.03 
-18.49 
0.00 
-21.94 
3.94 
====== 
-4.67 
1.38 
-0.04 
2.09 
-8.23 
-8.48 
1.48 
-3.02 
-39.28 
-14.52 
-1.60 
====== 
6.89 
16.49 
1.05 
11.76 
8.70 
====== 
10.85 
2407.17 
1.35 
0.21 
3.09 
25.02 
53.27 
0.75 
2.50 
o.oo 
2.37 
1.17 
12.81 
-2.53 
0.98 
-1.05 
100.00 
====== 
23.52 
38.86 
-o.oo 
100.00 
2.66 
-4.95 
0.61 
-17.75 
45.74 
3.11 
-21.93 
21.18 
6.95 
38.90 
100.00 
56.38 
39.92 
0.66 
-0.47 
100.00 
====== 
*Columns do not add to totals due to deLetion of several small items. 
APPENDIX C 
DENSITY STRIPE GRAPHS AND CLUSTER ANALYSIS 
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Filure 4. Comparison of sample from Oregon and 
se ected northeastern states. 
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Figure 5. Comparison of sample data from 
California and states with highest average 
errors. 
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Figure 6 •. Hierarchical s.tructure illustrating the 
nartition1ng of the clusters. 
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SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR 12 CLUSTERS 
VARIABLE BETWEE~J ss DF WITHIN ss DF F-RATIO PROB 
PINC1 44.882 11 4.118 38 37.656 0.000 
PINC2 40.380 11 8.620 38 16.182 o.ooo 
PINC3 36.232 11 12.768 38 9.803 o.ooo 
PINC4 43.343 11 5.657 38 26.470 o.ooo 
RETE X 39.858 11 9.142 38 15.061 0.000 
ADDTAX · 35.065 11 13.935 38 8.693 0.000 
ADMCOST 38.103 11 10:897 38 12.080 0.000 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------· 
CLUSTER NUMBER: 5 
MEI'IBERS STATISTICS 
CASE DISTANCE VARIABLE MIIHI1UM I'IEAN 
az 0.52 PINCl -0.23 0.68 
ca 0.35 PUIC2 -0.31 0.52 
fl 0.56 f'HJC3 0.14 0.60 
hi 0.47 f'HIC4 0.09 0.63 
nd 0.66 RETE X -0.40 0.50 
ny 0.67 ADDTAX 0.09 0.88 
ADI'ICOST -0.39 0.27 
CLUSTER NUMBER: 11 
MEMBERS STATISTICS 
CASE DISTANCE VARIABLE MINIMUM MEAN 
ks 0.27 PINCl -0.84 -0.47 
kv 0.31 PINC2 0.85 1.60 
nb 0.33 PINC3 -0.92 -0.44 
or 0.42 PINC4 -0.64 -0.19 
va (1.39 RETE X -0.79 -0.35 
wi 0.43 ADDTAX -1.15 -0.54 
ADMCOST -1.06 -0.55 
Figure 7. Summary statistics for K-means 
cluster analysis. 
MAXII1UM ST.DEV. 
1.52 0.58 
1.50 0.54 
1. 64 0.53 
0.94 0.30 
1. 48 0.66 
1.60 0.47 
1.63 0.68 
MAXIMUM ST.DEV. 
-o.oo 0.29 
2.16 0.47 
0.44 0.44 
0.26 0.27 
0.17 0.30 
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TCMP HANDBOOK 
147 
148 
-· 
"-tOIIII(Solloc{ule~.Pt.. III.IIM't#'" '.··.·- ··.SCI. -----------~------------~----~--------+-------~-------*--------~ i'..,;, ,.cwt. CSchod•lii"I!,"PP;lJI, UM tSJ.' ···'-. · ·- ... 
•....ifti12as ~a. Pt:au: ...... ,7,. ·.• ·· . a: 
----~,----~------~-~------~------+------4------~-------'.·.' -~-----·-·-P~~-~----~----··--~~-···~-·~.;~;_._.~~---·--·--·-·-·------~-----·-·-··-·~·:_·CL--+------------4------------t-----------~------------:~ ':"~---~~~--~. ···-··. ~ .. ···:·:··· ...:· t-: 
--~~~--~------------~-4--------+-------4------~--------~ ....... i .. .:: . --:--- ... -.~~.. ~ 
149 
·:¥.~~-~~a~~~u;J~l~: $;~~~ ~~Z ::#.f~~I~~~ 
~Ad.....,.._ ............. ~~~-~~~~,;·:--!-.0.~-~~~~i.:~;;;::: re.c:omouaa ..... -· :.· 
A 
-~------~----~~--~~~--------~----------~ 
' ~----------------------~--------~---------· 
. . ... -·· Cooll __ ,,_21••21•1 108. 
_:;---~·-~221=--=-~--~~-~=-=~-:-:-·-=:~i-~·~·.,iaa.._·  .. .,.:.t-----+------4.! ::r'::...-:'~- .... _•=:. 
·.'--·-----·-·_c._·;_,_,_:,_·._u':"IM_··-=-·-· _._:-_·_jiJ7_.·~~ 1-----+------f ~ PICA--·-,_ 1~ i 
_11; ___ ..... 2111 ·. :··,;aa, .Q ~-::.;•.;:-:;;:.::'"'"::.:;"':.;;-;;:;-:.:.;;;... ___ ~1-----+-------
---------------+-----+------f u-·--"'CA 1a .. ~~---(U...32J .::tCIII.· 1-•.;...II.II_T_A ______ .,.;.. .. ______ +-----f-----··: 
·:c; .. o~u-:nl~~~:,-111... 
1:17 • 
........ ~.-
IIIIOIMiTuWI ......... 1311. 
:··· 
_:1--·--~·=--...J-....li~----~-
1 
-1 
... 11178 ea. Tax ..a 
. 1ACI. 
":r· 
--·!1711 ~~ 
-·-
:'~~--:.:: : ,.,_ , .. 
-!-.: 
-I'ICA.IIIITA 1C. .r·.~ 
..-: oa.r....,._.a 
.···· 1Cio ;•' UGO«l-aa. t10. sn 
. 
~---- --~~~~~-~1-----+---------j 
"' ~~~~~~-----+-----r-------~ J 
·j -~ 
~-~----------_;..----------,-d--.+---------+-------~-.] 
s-o... ,... ·1 
~-----------------------~--------~----------j 
- ,.,_ 1 ~~~~----------------L-----J~------\ 
·,· 
150 
~--:~~t;~{~l.qf.~~~·:_ ;t:t¥r~~~:~ }~~~~}:~ :f!;:~~~~~~ 
-·c·= .. :> .. ,:.·. ··-~ .,,.._ .. [J.-..-:::.:•c-:-.·7·:·· NO...;.,tic_i....,ila.~:--.;;·~;• ;:. 
3 ... ·--· .:~.~:;:;;,~~: ... :·~ ~':-! ua: --=::::::~e~~:;.~:{~;;;~~g~·ii..9~;!¥~~i 
:;r ~ ..... aec:z:.w -.~-:~·~:zi'.:: ~;.: 
t---------1----+-----1'::.,: 
.. : .... ·=~· .. :: .. , :.~-~217; ~ ~-----.;...----if----+----i~.:... ~ 
---- 21a. ·-1----...;..-.;......;.._+----+-----t:··:•·!----------+-----+---""""'\J '~ .. ~CIIM&) ·•.218. .& 
~--------~--------~_,~--------+-----------{'-~"'------·-· --~-----:-:-·;.i_'·-~-·+--------+-----------rfi ca. . >·.~. ·:. ·-:·.,' :<"" ·=o.. ~ 
·.":..:.:-. T- ,: ;·: ·-; ·: 1&2. :~· .. ·-=T'-:::-::-::~::':::•::II-%20:;::::::::-'-·---i: .... ~-=-'-·-t· ------t-------:~ 
;·:•_: T,.... •• ,.~wcaot 18:1.· . :-~:· ·.~":~CL.tMU ~ :z:z:;: ~ 
. ·.r:.·: • 
. ;;.~ ~:_-·-~~~-7-------~---~-.. _ _-_. ___ ;_~_-·_-:-:_, _________ +---------f~;;.-===~:~,s~~,~.~~~€- i~l~~~~~*f~~~-.i 
~~------------~-----+------~~----~~~~~~~~~~~· 
... :· ~-:--..... .-:--.-_--,-~-~-.. -,-:.~-: ... -117_.+------+------i·=-~~ ·;: :~;·--:.::;:< ~~ ~~~~~~~~~!1~~~~1 
0 ---· :: :···.:._=':"·; 
~-·:·...,.u.u•nt . • ~- 2211. 
··=a. ::~.:~.,.....U;.Iltle-11 .. ·· :.::. 
~~--~----------r-----+-----~ 
. :;.~:...,.,u.n .. :a ~-22t. 
__ ,.__ _____ ~--+----+------! 
~232. 
:z:A.• .[l--- -·; ... 
;-- 1-":~~--~"-:~~·=-=-·~~~ft"~·~ ... ~---~--+-----;----··_·"_; .. _.,~.-·,_·~' 
. R--61 Rov .. ~ 235. · :~<.!::.·. ::~i-;, ..... ,:;:.;.";:.·.:;""";;;.;•:.:•::••~-----+------l-------1 
............... 
hft Ill. liN tOf•l 
238. 
"..,.,.,. .... ~- • P'IIR Ill. Une 1G(dl 
~~.; llwaMrutn. 
2:17. 
· l Pwt Ill, IIMI t2 ·:!~-~-~ -·j-;IE~a;.:-=:.;._::;;;:TIU:...;,:a.._------+------+------1 
" ·--~-:•;;:-~'::"-=··~· .. ~·~"~~·-• ....... ___ :mo_.+-------:-------1 
.. ~. . Est.ta or Truta,. :zao.. ·----~·~--·=:.:'=-'·.:;";;; .. :..';.;"~;.;:•~·~----+----_,~------1 
..... -~ · · :=:.t·~:=;-ef:r"- U1. I i 
SmaaJ e•-. eoro... 
, . P~ Ill. IIMI 11(dJ 
·.~. Sail. C - Eft_,. f"'utlwi Vel..td 
. :left. F - Ennr I'Otltnre v ....... u 
·. c:... Medtocl· ,.,. n. unoe u 
2G. 1-
·2&7. o---.. : 
--Con of IOOdiiOIG ~ ~~~~~M~OO.~·~~~~~M~---·-~-~-·+------+------1 
'·J "~:----------+-----+------! a.-- 2St. 
·--·'--'· .. . 
'· 
,, 
~ 
151 
.-. 
· ... 
;· 
~i::·.:~7,·:'". -.-:-:....-:-•• -.,':' .• -.-.-, --:·:--.-c-, _:.. ___ -. _-._-:;-;;-;~:.-_,-;.~.~~·~· .~. :-. -.• ~:....._-. - •. -_-._-_-.":"~ ..-":".-: '"·;-.~:-·..1-.·--_,..,_,.. .•-.. '"-~.:;__-:--· .. ..:--~---.:.··~-.. -•. - ... -~-.. -.;· .. ---.---.-_-_-.:_~~-~ .. -=. :_:-:,;:_:=:-;~~ .. ::a;-1 
------------------------------------
